

COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

E R R A T A S H E E T

REPORT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Correct the Chart on page 43 as follows:

The box headed by "The Secretary" should read:

The Secretary

Under Secretary

Deputy
<u>Under Secretary</u>
(substantive)

Deputy
<u>Under Secretary</u>
for Administration

Page 47 - delete the word "research" in the
last line of the first paragraph.

Foreign Affairs

*A report to the Congress by the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, February 1949*

The Commission on Organization of The
Executive Branch of the Government

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Letter of Transmittal


WASHINGTON, D. C.,

18 February 1949

DEAR SIRs: In accordance with Public Law 162, Eightieth Congress, approved July 7, 1947, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government submits herewith its report on Foreign Affairs, and separately, as appendix H, the task force report on Foreign Affairs.

The Commission wishes to express its appreciation for the work of its task force and for the cooperation of officials of departments and agencies concerned in this report.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Herbert Hoover", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.


Chairman.

The Honorable

The President of the Senate

The Honorable

The Speaker of the House of Representatives



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Foreign Affairs

I. The Approach to the Problem

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has received from its task force on foreign affairs a report which is outstanding for its analysis of the present-day problems confronting the Government in the conduct of foreign affairs. The report brings out clearly the complex character of modern United States international relations. By giving attention not only to the State Department but also to the Congress, the President and his executive office, and the foreign affairs aspects of the work of departments and agencies other than the State Department, the report affords a sound perspective through which to ascertain the organizational requirements in this field of governmental activity.

In seeking solutions for organizational problems, the task force report properly places major emphasis on definition of principles and procedures upon which organizational reforms can be predicated. In addition, the report makes various suggestions for specific application of these principles and procedures. In so doing, however, it recognizes that these detailed applications generally can be made most effectively by the President, the heads of the various departments and agencies, and other individuals in the executive branch who have the actual responsibility for organization and adminis-

tration. This general approach has the approval of the Commission, and it is desirable to underline the necessity for permitting the heads of the various units of the executive branch the maximum freedom to organize and administer their respective units to meet the various needs which exist.

The concepts on which the task force report is based and the recommendations of organizational principles and procedures derived therefrom are believed by the Commission to be sound. The Commission likewise is in agreement in the main with the recommendations of the report which involve application of these principles and procedures. The instances in which the conclusions of the Commission modify or differ from those set forth in the task force report will appear hereinafter.

II. The Complexities of the Present Situation

The time is particularly appropriate to appraise the machinery of the Government for the conduct of foreign affairs. The United States emerged from the recent World War with a radically new role in world affairs. As a result, today's organizational requirements are drastically different from those of the prewar era. The executive branch today finds itself forced to develop positive foreign policies and programs, involving not merely the State Department but many other departments and agencies as well, and to deal cooperatively with other nations on a multilateral as well as a bilateral basis. The Congress, in addition, finds that the exercise of its traditional powers in the domestic as well as in the international field has made it a participant in the conduct of foreign affairs on an unprecedented scale.

The problems of Government organization for the conduct of foreign affairs are, therefore, not confined to the State Department alone but involve the organization of the Presidency, the State Department and the Foreign Service, the departments and agencies other than the State Department, the interdepartmental relationships, and the relationships between the executive and legislative branches. The special problems in each of these cases will be discussed separately at a subsequent point. Accompanying the involvement of

all these elements and contributing to the complexities of the situation is the increased size of the Government as a whole and of the State Department in particular.

Tangible manifestations of the foregoing are found on all sides. In the Presidency new factors affecting the conduct of foreign affairs include the Chief of Staff to the President and statutory interdepartmental bodies such as the National Security Council. The State Department itself, in terms of appropriations is 12 times larger and in terms of personnel almost 5 times larger in 1948 than it was in 1938. In the interdepartmental field there are more than 30 committees concerned with economic, social, military, and other aspects of foreign affairs. Of 59 major departments and agencies in the executive branch,¹ at least 46 are drawn into foreign affairs to a greater or lesser extent. Certain units are deeply involved, such as the National Military Establishment in connection with the administration of occupied areas abroad, the Economic Cooperation Administration in connection with financial assistance overseas, the Treasury Department in international financial matters, and the Commerce Department in connection with export control. Finally, Congressional participation in the conduct of foreign affairs has become particularly evident in the enhancement of the role of the House of Representatives in connection with appropriations for foreign programs.

¹These 59 departments and agencies are exclusive of nonstatutory interdepartmental committees and certain temporary bodies which, if included, would raise the total to 74.

A. The Executive-Legislative Relationship Under the Constitution in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

The organization of the executive branch for the conduct of foreign affairs must necessarily be shaped to accord with the over-all governmental framework provided by the Constitution. The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches results in a duality of authority over foreign affairs which complicates the machinery of Government in that area, especially in contrast with the machinery of countries operating under the parliamentary system of government.

The difficulty caused by this duality of authority has been sharpened by the new position of the United States in world affairs. Prior to the recent World War, the Congress at times had considerable influence, of course, on foreign relations, but not on any continuous basis. The President, on the other hand, possessing relatively greater powers than in domestic affairs, largely controlled foreign affairs with only occasional reference to the Congress. Recent events have changed the situation and made the Congress a much more significant and regular participant in foreign affairs. As a consequence, the solutions of today's problems require joint legislative-executive cooperation on a scale heretofore unknown in American history.

The Constitution is not at all precise in its allocation of foreign affairs powers between the two branches. The President has the power to negotiate treaties, but only subject

to confirmation by two-thirds vote of the Senate. The Constitution gives the President the power to appoint ambassadors and ministers, again subject to Senate confirmation. In addition, he is specifically empowered to receive ambassadors and ministers of other nations. Except for such powers, however, the executive authority must be derived from general constitutional provisions.

On the other hand, the Constitution gives the Congress certain explicit authority in the international field, including the powers to regulate foreign commerce, to fix import duties, and to declare war. Most important of all is its control over appropriation of funds. As the United States has assumed its new role in world affairs, and as domestic and foreign problems have involved more and more the same or closely related issues, all these congressional powers have assumed greater significance than in the prewar era.

It is one thing to suggest the need for the executive and legislative branches to cooperate in the conduct of foreign affairs and another to achieve such cooperation. One particular obstacle which should be frankly faced is the traditionally suspicious attitude of the Congress toward foreign affairs and toward the segment of the executive branch concerned with it.

This attitude appears to stem from three principal sources:

1. The fact that the State Department is the channel of communications between the United States and foreign nations. In that sense, the State Department represents foreigners. Furthermore, foreign affairs problems are usually

troublesome and irritating, and they involve dollars or other commitments to other than the American electorate. In seeking to solve these problems the State Department is handicapped by the lack of any domestic constituency which will give the Congress credit for action taken or which will rise to the State Department's defense against congressional criticism.

2. The fact that the conduct of foreign affairs of necessity must frequently be on a secret and confidential basis. This is particularly true in the preliminary stages of a given matter where announcement of the intentions of the United States prior to consultation with other nations would result in embarrassments which would make it impossible to deal with those nations. This secrecy is resented by the Congress, which feels that secrecy is too often used to avoid congressional interference and control. The result is to afford a breeding ground for constant conflict.

3. The fact that up to about 1924 social prestige and protocol considerations were paramount in the minds and actions of the bulk of Americans concerned with foreign affairs. From this grew the conception of State Department and Foreign Service personnel as being primarily concerned with tea parties and striped pants. Today, as a result of the Rogers Act of 1924 and the Foreign Service Act of 1946, and as a result of foreign affairs being injected as never before into the main stream of American life, this fact is no longer true, but the memory lingers on and will persist for at least another generation.

Given the present constitutional framework and the attitude of the legislative branch toward foreign affairs, the situation calls for mutual cooperation and restraint. The executive branch must appreciate the role of the Congress and the propriety of its participation in foreign affairs where *legislative* decisions are required. Similarly, the Congress should appreciate that leadership in the conduct of foreign affairs can come only from the executive side of the Government and that the Congress should not attempt to participate in *executive* decisions in the international field. .

One serious procedural impediment to achieving satisfactory legislative-executive cooperation is the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote for the confirmation of treaties. No thoughtful student of the conduct of foreign affairs can ignore the consequences of this provision. It is a serious trouble breeder between the executive branch and the Senate in that such an inherently rigid rule encourages circumvention by the executive by resort to the procedures of executive agreements and joint resolutions. Attempts to use these procedures, in turn, involve friction between the Senate and the House of Representatives. An especially bad result is that the emphasis is directed to the question of whether the proper procedure is being employed, instead of to the substance of the issues before the Congress. The question of a change in the present requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote is deemed, however, to be outside the province of this Commission.

B. The Organization Within the Executive Branch for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

The problem of organization within the executive branch for the conduct of foreign affairs is, in the final analysis, the same problem as in the Government as a whole. First, despite the relatively greater authority assigned by the Constitution to the President in the foreign affairs field, authority or the power of command over the foreign affairs activities of the entire executive branch is not satisfactorily vested in the President. Similarly, at the departmental level, including the State Department, full authority is not placed in the departmental or agency heads. Second, the line of command and supervision over foreign affairs activities from the President to the department and agency heads, and through them to their subordinate units, is far from clear. Third, the staff services for foreign affairs activities of the President, the Secretary of State, and the other department and agency heads are utterly inadequate.

The present difficulties will be outlined in relation to:

1. The Presidency.
2. The interdepartmental relationships of the State Department and the other departments and agencies.
3. The internal organization of the State Department and the Foreign Service.

1. THE PRESIDENCY

The President, as the single member of the executive branch answerable to the electorate, is ultimately responsible to the American people for the formulation, execution, and coordination of foreign policies. The emphasis is on "ultimately," because the President, either personally or institutionally, can attempt to control only the very top and crucial problems of foreign policy formulation, execution, and coordination.

Today the authority of the President over the foreign affairs activities of the executive branch is seriously hampered by both legal and practical impediments. The legislative creation of new agencies and specific coordinative bodies with foreign affairs powers, the existence of independent regulatory agencies with executive functions, and the grant of foreign affairs authority and funds to bureaus and offices below the level of the department or agency head, all serve to lessen the efficiency of the executive branch as a whole. Likewise these factors detract from the President's ability to correct administrative weaknesses. They lessen the capabilities of the departments and agencies to provide "self-coordination" and correspondingly throw a greater burden on the executive office of the President. They also prevent the establishment of a direct and effective chain of command from the Chief Executive down through the numerous segments of the executive branch.

The Presidency, furthermore, is only casually organized to furnish staff assistance to the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. Better machinery is badly needed to bring

competent and better rounded foreign affairs advice to the President and to force prompt resolution of interdepartmental disputes which, if left unsettled at lower levels, may impair the foreign relations of the United States. The Cabinet, moreover, it must be recognized, is not and cannot become an effective deliberative council of advisers to the President.

2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Active participation of the departments and agencies other than the State Department in all phases of present-day foreign affairs imposes severe strains on the organizational structure of the Government. These other departments and agencies display an increasing tendency to establish policies or to make policy interpretations which are not coordinated with the foreign policies and interpretations of the State Department. The State Department, in turn, does not always coordinate its policies with over-all United States national policies. With the conduct of foreign affairs no longer the exclusive province of the State Department, coordinated action by the State Department and some 45 other units with foreign affairs activities is a *sine qua non* for efficient and effective dispatch of business. Until such action is achieved, the line of command and supervision from the President down through the department heads to subordinate levels will remain unclear, indecisive, and ineffective.

This new situation in the foreign affairs field does not mean, however, that the State Department has become just

another executive department. Its statutory authority, basically unchanged since 1789, definitely fixes its role as a staff specialist and arm of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs and leaves its duties flexible and elastic. The other departments and agencies, in contrast, derive their foreign affairs authority through direct grants from the Congress which spell out the substantive tasks to be accomplished, usually in considerable detail. In essence, the State Department functions can be described as relating to the means or procedures of conducting foreign relations, whereas the organic statutes of the other departments and agencies pertain more to substantive matters, e. g. powers over fissionable materials, loans, communications, aviation, exports, imports, and the like. Coordination of all these varied activities obviously cannot be directed from the Presidential level. A large part must be delegated by the President to the State Department as his staff agency.

On certain crucial issues, however, coordination of foreign policy formulation and execution must come from the President or his executive office. To date the principal response to this need for high-level integration has been the development of specialized interdepartmental bodies at the cabinet level to advise the President on certain aspects of foreign affairs, such as national security and international finance. The absence of similar mechanisms in other important areas, particularly where foreign affairs touch upon domestic affairs, tends to give the President a partial and limited perspective in reaching decisions and to leave a substantial amount of

policy execution to be coordinated on a "hit or miss" basis.

A final complicating factor in present-day governmental organization for the conduct of foreign affairs is the looseness and variation in organization of foreign affairs activities in the other departments and agencies. Some important departments have more than one bureau or office involved in foreign affairs but have no mechanism whereby the department head is able to coordinate the international activities of his own department. This results not only in confusion within a particular department but also places an added administrative burden upon the State Department which must seek not only to coordinate interdepartmental activity but activity within another department as well. Thus once again an important requirement of clear power of command and a clear chain of command is reemphasized.

3. THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The organizational difficulties of the State Department and the Foreign Service stem more from practical than legal sources. By and large the Secretary of State in legal theory is in command of the Department itself. In the case of the Foreign Service the Secretary's theoretical power in substantive matters is also clear. On the administrative side, however, ambiguous language in the Foreign Service Act of 1946 has tended to strengthen the traditional status of the career service as a semi-independent organization.

The practical difficulties in the main relate to impediments

in the Secretary's chain of command and to his need for more adequate staff assistance and procedures. As a result, the Secretary and the Under Secretary have an intolerable burden and little time for thoughtful and considered reflection on foreign affairs problems. The frequent and continued absences of the Secretary from the Department since the end of World War II, moreover, sets apart the job of head of the State Department from that of the usual department chief.

Numerous factors contribute to the existence of the present impediments in the Secretary's chain of command. One major factor is the existence of two personnel systems, one for the Foreign Service and the other for the Department, each separately administered. Serious unrest and bad feeling exist between the members of these two services and make effective administration an impossible job.

A second major impediment is the system whereby coordinate authority at the substantive policy action level is vested in two different types of units, geographic and economic, each of which reports to different heads who, in turn, report only to the Secretary and Under Secretary. This coordinate authority arrangement necessitates an elaborate and time-consuming system of lateral clearance (in part through excessive use of the committee device), prevents the fixing of responsibility, and tends to foster undesirable duplication of work.

Other significant and disturbing factors, less comprehensive in character, which tend to fragmentize the Department and thereby weaken the internal chain of command, include the following:

a. The Lack of Adequate Utilization of Staff Aids and Procedures

The heavy demands on the time of the Secretary and Under Secretary make it particularly essential that smooth working procedures exist for assembling and correlating staff advice on important policy matters and, conversely, for keeping the heads of action and other units informed of top level decisions and the reasons therefor. The postwar establishment of the Executive Secretariat and the Policy Planning Staff represents steps in the right direction, and both should be strengthened and more effective use made of their resources.

b. The Need at the Top Command Level for Better Public Relations and Utilization of Public Opinion

Today, American and foreign public opinion are both vital factors in the conduct of foreign affairs. At present the Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, is burdened with operational duties of the foreign information and educational exchange programs and is not a participant in high-level policy formulation. Furthermore, the State Department's relationships with the press and other media of public information are extremely weak.

c. The Need for an Effective Intelligence Organization in the State Department

The weakest and least effective unit in the State Department today is the one known as Research and Intelligence. This situation arises largely because of nonacceptance of the intelligence personnel by certain influential segments of the

Department, particularly the geographic offices, and from a basic misconception on all sides, including the intelligence unit itself, of the intelligence needs of the State Department. At present there appears to be an overemphasis on pure research, the bulk of which is not utilized within the Department. The relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency, moreover, which at present partake of rivalry rather than cooperation, require correction.

d. The Imposition on the State Department of Program Operational Responsibility

In the years since the recent World War the State Department has tended more and more to assume responsibility for program operations, either as the direct operator or as an active coordinator. In some instances these responsibilities have been given the State Department because of the absence of any other agency in the Government to do the job. This situation throws needless burdens on the Secretary and Under Secretary. The regular units of the State Department, however, are not presently equipped or oriented to handle such programs. Finally, the creation of new and separate units inside the State Department to operate these programs increases the difficulties of internal and interdepartmental coordination.

All these factors, taken together, contribute to the low esteem in which the State Department is held in the eyes of the Congress, the press, the general public, and, indeed, of many of its own personnel. Organizational reforms, while not a panacea for the State Department's ills, can as a minimum, chart for it a truer course in these difficult times.

III. Organizational Concepts

The conduct of foreign affairs today involves almost the entire executive branch—the President, the President's executive offices, the State Department, numerous other departments and agencies, and intricate interdepartmental machinery. In addition, it involves constant cooperation between the executive branch and the Congress. As a consequence the problems of organization are equally government-wide in scope, and organization reforms must be based on definite concepts of the part to be played by each segment of the Government.

The concepts for organization within the executive branch are, in summary, the following:

1. The decisions within the executive branch on the objectives of the United States in world affairs are ultimately decisions for the President only to make. He may, of course, delegate this power, but, as the sole elected member of the executive branch, he cannot divest himself of his final responsibility. When the President does delegate the power to make decisions, it must be recognized that it is impractical to make a blanket delegation to the State Department alone or to any other single department or agency.
2. The executive responsibility for the formulation and carrying out of foreign policies to achieve objectives is today that of the President with staff assistance from his executive

office and the State Department. Under the President this responsibility is shared in various degrees by numerous departments and agencies throughout the executive establishment.

3. The responsibility for coordinating all the foreign affairs activities of the State Department and the other departments and agencies, whether in the decision-making process or in the processes of policy formulation and execution, ultimately is also that of the President. In delegating this responsibility the President may turn to the State Department, which is the specialist in foreign affairs, as, for example, to provide chairmen for interdepartmental committees, or he may turn elsewhere, depending on the balance of foreign and domestic implications in a particular problem.

4. The conduct of foreign affairs today involves the use of many means and instruments. Financial assistance, force or potential force, and propaganda are a few of the major ones. The utilization of these instruments similarly involves the performance of numerous supporting functions. A few examples are collection of information, evaluation of information through analysis and research, dissemination of information, employment of personnel, disbursement of funds, making of contracts, issuance of rules and regulations, and drafting of legislation.

5. The responsibility today for a decision as to which of several instruments to employ in the conduct of foreign affairs, together with the accompanying decisions as to when to employ them and as to the purposes to be accomplished

thereby, carries with it two additional responsibilities. The first is for coordination throughout the executive branch in the choice of the instrument, the time of its use, and the purposes to be accomplished thereby. The second is for loyal teamwork between the State Department and the other departments and agencies instead of the evasion and backbiting that characterized these relationships during the recent war.

It is essential to recognize that in the discharge of this multifold responsibility, two different segments of the executive branch may perform functions which appear similar, but there should not and need not be duplication in the performance of identical functions in two parts of the Government. For example, if it is deemed to be of advantage to the United States that a democratic rather than a communistic government be in power in a foreign country, it may be found desirable to employ many instruments, including those of public information or propaganda, financial assistance, or other aids against outside interference. The medium of information may be in the State Department, the financial assistance instrument in the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Export-Import Bank and elsewhere, and other instruments may be in other branches of the Government.

All of these instruments, for example, involve the function of research and analysis of information. The State Department's research and analysis would relate to the state of public opinion of the country in question and the factors influential in forming public opinion; the Economic Cooperation Administration's research and analysis would be directed

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to the economic condition of the foreign country and the balance of international trade; and the military establishment's research and analysis would pertain to the status of communist military power on the borders of the country in question and the strategic disposition of United States forces in occupied areas nearby to strengthen the democratic elements in power in the country in question. Yet the performance of these functions involves no inevitable duplication of effort. For example, no duplication would occur in the case of financial assistance so long as the State Department economic and research units do not go over the same economic ground as those of Economic Cooperation Administration.

6. The effective discharge of the executive responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs (including the formulation of policies, employment of instruments to carry out policies, and coordination in both the formulation and execution stages) requires that authority be vested in the President and descend from him through a clear line of command to responsible department and agency heads with subordinate authority over cohesive executive agencies.

7. Decisions as to the conduct of foreign affairs today inevitably are decisions affecting our whole political, economic, and social life. The problem of organization for the conduct of foreign affairs is, therefore, but a segment of the larger problem of organization for the conduct of national affairs. Hence, governmental organization for the conduct of foreign affairs cannot be treated as a separate mechanism but must be regarded as an integral part of a larger mechanism.

These general concepts provide the foundation for the recommendations which follow. In some measure these recommendations are geared to the immediate future. Times change, however, and organizational forms must be adjusted accordingly. Organization cannot be immutable and the recommendations herein cannot be regarded as having indefinite validity.

IV. Recommendations

The recommendations which follow are essentially recommendations of principles. Neither this report, nor that of the supporting task force, purports to be a complete "blue-print" covering the many possible applications of these principles. Certain specific suggestions for organizational changes in the State Department will, of course, be set forth, but the details of these reforms will generally have to be worked out by the men in charge of the various organizational segments.

A. Recommendations Concerning the Congress

Recommendation No. 1

Legislation which grants new foreign affairs powers of an executive nature otherwise than to the President or to an established executive department or agency will normally cause serious difficulty in efficient administration. Such legislation should not be adopted unless there are overwhelming advantages in creating a new agency.

Each time the Congress creates a new agency with the power to employ a specified instrument of foreign policy, it weakens the executive establishment as a whole. Jurisdictional conflicts are immediately set in motion which increase the possibility of duplication and the burden of coor-

dination. The latter is already so heavy on the President that many problems of coordination must be left untouched.

By giving the new powers to the President, the Congress would strengthen his executive power to integrate this new authority with already existing authority. By giving it to an existing department or agency, the burden of coordination would be transferred in large measure from the President to the head of the department or agency. Particular care, moreover, should be taken not to confer executive powers on independent commissions which are not responsible to the President. While the creation of independent bodies to discharge quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions will always be necessary, the grant to them of executive powers is contrary to the principles of sound organization and impedes the efficient conduct of foreign affairs.

Recommendation No. 2

Effective administration is not achieved by establishing by legislation the precise functions and membership of coordinating and advisory bodies within the executive branch.

The recent legislative practice of establishing interdepartmental bodies with defined responsibilities over foreign affairs—e. g. National Security Council or National Advisory Council—tends to obscure the responsibility for making executive decisions, to make each of the bodies acquire the aspects of a new agency, and to encourage other interdepartmental groups to seek formal congressional sanction. All

of these tendencies add up to weakening the power of the Chief Executive, a circumstance which in turn reduces his responsibility and complicates the administration of the executive branch. Such legislation does not assure better coordination in the executive branch, nor can it require the President to use the advice received. The Congress can, however, facilitate executive creation of coordinating and advisory bodies by enactment of general enabling legislation which will provide a flexible framework within which the President can act.

Recommendation No. 3

Legislation making specific grants of foreign affairs powers and of supporting funds below the level of the appropriate department or agency head should be avoided.

In the past the Congress on occasion has granted specific power and appropriated specific funds below the department or agency head level, as in the cases of the foreign affairs activities of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This practice tends to free the grantee from executive control and encourages him to establish independent channels of communication with the Congress. It aggravates the problem of coordinating foreign relations activities both within individual departments and agencies and between different units of the executive branch.

The practice of appropriating funds directly to a constituent unit of a department or agency further limits the ability of

the department or agency head to adjust the foreign affairs programs of his several bureaus or offices to meet changing international conditions and to reduce internal overlapping or duplication of effort.

B. Recommendations Concerning the President

Recommendation No. 4

Cabinet level committees, with their memberships and assignments fixed by the President, are necessary in crucial areas in the conduct of foreign affairs where the issues transcend the responsibility of any single department and where Presidential consideration or decision is necessary.

The foreign affairs requirements are but a part of the national requirements of the United States. In the formulation, execution, and coordination of the policies to meet these requirements, the ultimate responsibility lies with the President. In the main, this process takes place at the department and agency level, but on certain crucial problems Presidential consideration and often Presidential decision will be necessary.

In our first report, Part Two, the Executive Office of the President, attention is called to the desirability of the establishment of cabinet level national policy committees to advise the President in the instances where his consideration or decision is necessary. These committees, on a regular or ad hoc basis as required, will serve as a systematic means of providing the President with balanced advice on the critical

international problems of the day which transcend the responsibilities of the State Department or any other single department.

Likewise, as recommended in our first report, the President should be free to select the membership of the Cabinet-level committees dealing with foreign affairs, and to determine their assignments and the scope of their authority. Since the President cannot be compelled to follow, or even listen to the advice of any particular body, no attempt should be made to legislate specifically on this subject. Instead, general enabling legislation should provide a flexible framework within which the President may act.

The need for Cabinet-level committees on the conduct of foreign affairs, as emphasized above, exists only where Presidential consideration or decision is required on matters transcending the responsibilities of a single department. In a great number of foreign affairs matters this requirement will not be present. The Cabinet-level committees should not, therefore, supplant the State Department as a staff arm of the President, and the State Department in this role should be the major coordinating force within the executive branch on foreign affairs matters. Likewise, the Cabinet-level committee device must be carefully controlled so that the committees confine themselves to producing integrated advice to the President and do not become additional foreign affairs agencies in the executive branch which themselves have to be coordinated.

Recommendation No. 5

The successful functioning of Cabinet-level and other interdepartmental committees in the foreign affairs area should be facilitated by the assistance of specific institutional aids in the Executive Office and the State Department.

The Cabinet-level and interdepartmental committees cannot function successfully without specific institutional aids. The staff secretary to the President, whose appointment is recommended in our report, General Management of the Executive Branch, should keep the President advised of policy issues being considered by the principal Cabinet-level committees, and of any overlapping of assignments or conflicts which may exist. Each permanent or semi-permanent Cabinet-level committee, moreover, such as the present National Security Council and National Advisory Council, will ordinarily require a full-time executive secretary, and a small nucleus of staff supplemented by additional staff drawn from the regular policy units of the departments and agencies participating in the work of the various committees. By this means the essential secretariat service and staff work will be furnished. Through these institutional aids coordination of high-level foreign affairs matters should be greatly facilitated and, indeed, the issues for Presidential consideration should be so narrowed as to relieve the President in practice of what would otherwise be a heavy burden.

Similarly, staff and secretariat assistance should be provided for interdepartmental committees below the Cabinet

level. In most instances this assistance should be provided by the State Department, which at present is doing considerable work of this kind. In special cases, however, other departments or agencies may furnish these aids. The activities of these interdepartmental committees should also be subject to scrutiny by the President's staff secretary.

C. Recommendations Relating to the State Department and the Foreign Service

These recommendations, based on the organizational concepts previously set forth, fall into two general categories. First, general recommendations defining the role of the State Department in the conduct of foreign affairs and, second, specific recommendations of internal organizational reforms.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Recommendation No. 6

The State Department should concentrate on obtaining definition of proposed objectives for the United States in foreign affairs, on formulating proposed policies in conjunction with other departments and agencies to achieve those objectives, and on recommending the choice and timing of the use of various instruments to carry out foreign policies so formulated.

The ultimate responsibility within the executive branch in the determination of United States objectives and in for-

mulating, executing, and coordinating foreign policies lies with the President. Under him, the State Department is cast in the role of the staff specialist in foreign affairs, and, pursuant to Presidential delegation, its role will involve leadership in defining and developing United States foreign policies, in determining the means and timing of their accomplishment through employment of the available instruments, in the recording of such policies, and in seeing to it that such policies are explained at home and abroad. These responsibilities necessarily will mean that, except for coordination in crucial areas where Cabinet-level committees are involved, the State Department will be the focal point for coordination of foreign affairs activities throughout the Government.

The State Department is not, however, the sole unit of the executive branch for determination of the objectives of the United States in world affairs or for formulating and executing foreign policies to achieve those objectives. Many other governmental departments and agencies, by reason of the present-day blending of the domestic and foreign aspects of national problems and by reason of operations abroad, are sources of policy considerations in the conduct of foreign affairs. The State Department should consult with and advise these other departments and agencies for the purpose of bringing their experience to bear in the formulation of foreign policies and of assisting them in administering particular instruments of foreign policy so as to achieve desired objectives in a consistent manner. The agency charged with re-

sponsibility for action should not, however, be required to obtain the concurrence of other agencies prior to taking action.

It is sound to adopt the principle that the department or agency with the power to exercise an instrument of foreign policy should be looked to, and relied upon, by the State Department to gather the necessary facts within the special competence of the particular department or agency on a world-wide basis; to evaluate those facts; to propose policies or programs within its power to execute; and to execute the programs agreed upon in accordance with established policy. These other departments and agencies must be organized internally so as to be able to meet the State Department's requests promptly and, if they are still unable to render these services adequately, the President should take measures to ensure the correction of their shortcomings. The State Department then would be free to concentrate on coordination within the executive branch, particularly on seeing that conflicts are resolved, making sure for the President that other departments and agencies do not, as in the past, slide out of their responsibilities, and exercising general guidance so that all the Government's foreign affairs activities are conducted in consonance.

In this manner, the State Department will be able to discontinue the bulk of the specialized functions it has recently been, or now is, performing in the fields of foodstuffs, petroleum and other fuels, aviation, shipping, labor, welfare, and the like. It will, however, have to retain a small group of

specialists in these fields as expert advisers and as the focal point for consultation and coordination with other agencies. Furthermore, insofar as certain other departments and agencies are oriented to act only in terms of domestic interests and pressures, the State Department on occasion may still have to assume more positive leadership, but it should do so only after the particular failure has been brought to the Chief Executive's attention.

Recommendation No. 7

The State Department as a general rule should not be given responsibility for the operation of specific programs, whether overseas or at home.

This proposition as a general rule is desirable. Difficulties in application, however, exist, especially in that the sudden thrusting on the executive branch of responsibility for new world-wide programs found it with little or nothing in the way of machinery to carry out such programs. As a consequence the State Department has had to assume responsibility for activities such as liquidation of surplus property abroad, the foreign information program, and the educational exchange program.

The recent creation of the Economic Cooperation Administration to handle the economic assistance program in Europe and in the Far East prevented the placing of this additional program burden on the State Department. In this instance the advantages in creating a new agency appear to have been

overwhelming and the solution is in accord with the principle of this recommendation.

The Government's responsibilities for occupied areas in Germany, Austria, and the Far East are divided,² with the State Department being assigned responsibility for formulation of policy and the Army Department for execution and administration of policy. From the outset, serious frictions have existed in this arrangement. The basic difficulty has been the uncertainty and delay in the preparation and enunciation of policy and the consequent tendency of the administrative agency, through its daily decisions, to make its own policy. Other factors have been the attempt to handle occupied-areas problems below the secretarial level, without clear definition of responsibility and without clear channels for the transmission of policy guidance from the State Department to the theater commanders.

The transfer of responsibility for the civil or non-military aspects of administration of occupied areas from the Army Department to the State Department, leaving the garrison or other military functions to the Army Department, has been under frequent consideration during recent years. In the instant recommendation, it is proposed that the State Department not undertake operational programs unless

² Commissioners Acheson and Forrestal, by reason of the positions they occupy in the executive branch and their consequent direct relationship to certain immediate occupied areas questions, have abstained from participation in the views expressed in this and the two following paragraphs dealing with occupied areas. This nonparticipation relates only to the occupied areas discussion and not to the balance of the recommendations or to the other portions of the report.

unusual circumstances exist. The present circumstances do not appear to be sufficiently unusual to call for an assumption of occupied areas responsibility by the State Department.

The machinery for administration of occupied areas, as well as that of logistical support, is presently supplied by the military establishment. It is wholly consistent with the concepts underlying this report that this administrative machinery be located outside the State Department, as, for example, in the military establishment or in a new administration of overseas affairs, but that it receive its instructions from, and report to, the Secretary of State. Thus a direct channel of communication would exist between the theater commanders, as high commissioners or otherwise, and the Secretary of State, who in turn is directly under the President, who is the Commander in Chief. Likewise, the State Department would not have to build up, by transfer from the Army Department or otherwise, a self-sufficient group within its own organization responsible for the non-military administrative phases of occupied areas.

In certain other areas, governmental agencies are now in existence to which the State Department's present operational responsibilities for engineering, rehabilitation, and like programs could be transferred. Likewise, the functions of visa control and munitions export control should be transferred from the State Department to the Justice and Commerce Departments, respectively.

In two instances it appears that operational responsibility, for the present at least, must remain in the State Department in default of any other satisfactory location in the executive branch. The one is the educational exchange program which the task force report recommended be transferred to the Federal Security Agency. The Federal Security Agency does not have the orientation, experience, or skills to carry on work in this broad cultural field, and therefore the State Department should continue to administer this program.

The second instance is the foreign information program with its heavy load of operational and technical duties in connection with the radio broadcasting activities of the "Voice of America." Here, the task force recommended transfer to a Government corporation which would make it possible to keep the operation responsive to State Department policy guidance. A strong motivation behind this suggestion is the urgent need for freeing the Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, from devoting his personal attention to details of an operational nature and for making him available as a high-level staff adviser and chief of press and other public relations for the Secretary of State. This end can be equally well attained, however, by reorganization within the public affairs area. One possibility is the creation of a new post under the Assistant Secretary of a "general manager" to whom would be assigned full operational authority and responsibility for the "Voice of America" and such other portions of the foreign information program as are primarily operational in character.

Recommendation No. 8

The State Department should continue to discharge its traditional responsibilities of representation, reporting, and negotiation.

The State Department's principal duties under presidential direction should be:

- a.* To establish, man, maintain, and conduct the machinery of diplomatic relations, correspondence, conversations, negotiation, and agreement with other governments except where, in technical or special cases, parts of these activities are assigned to other departments or agencies, and even then the State Department should observe and counsel their conduct.
- b.* To recruit and maintain personnel adequate for its tasks at home and abroad, protected as a career service by tradition as well as law from invasion by political or other demoralizing influence.
- c.* To give guidance and direction to our diplomatic missions and delegations abroad, to review and distribute to other interested agencies the intelligence gathered by the State Department, to see to it that the recommendations of the missions are acknowledged and considered but leaving to them, wherever possible, ways and means of accomplishment.
- d.* To aid the President in the selection of qualified persons other than career servants whenever he or the Congress determines they should be drawn from the public at large for particular purposes or particular missions.

e. To assume primary responsibility for foreign relations aspects of general policies followed by all peacetime missions overseas, including occupation forces and special missions and programs, and to this end to see that the activities of all American officers abroad are reported to, and are observed and counseled by, the chief of the American diplomatic mission if such officers are temporary, and if permanent and not involving operational programs, that such officers are made part of the diplomatic mission itself.

f. To recommend to the President any participation and the extent of our participation in international bodies and conferences and to supervise our delegations when established except as the President or Congress otherwise determines in special cases. This involves consultation and coordination with other departments and agencies.

g. To preserve with the Senate and House a continuous working system of liaison and intercommunication on all matters affecting foreign affairs, in order to reach mutual comprehension, confidence, and agreement.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

Recommendation No. 9

The State Department should be organized so that the Secretary of State, legally and practically, is in command of the Department and the Foreign Service, so that the line of command from the Secretary of State through

the Under and Assistant Secretaries to the lowest level is clear and unencumbered, and so that the Secretary of State is provided with adequate staff services at the top level. The Department should also have authority and funds to equip itself with persons of the highest capacity to represent this country at international organizations and conferences.

This recommendation is fundamental. Its objectives, in terms of the internal organization of the State Department, are to simplify the structure, clarify the Secretary's authority, make his lines of command clear and free from interference, separate staff responsibility from action or line responsibility, and relieve the Secretary and Under Secretary from the burdensome details which now come to them, and thereby afford them an opportunity for thoughtful study of major policy problems.

Representation of the United States at international organizations and conferences by individuals with special abilities for the peculiar type of task involved will relieve the Secretary and other top Departmental officials from the additional heavy burdens which have been imposed on them since the end of the recent war. While the United Nations Participation Act—with the amendments currently proposed—equips the Government with permanent representatives and staff at the United Nations headquarters, problems still remain in regard to departmental assistance at meetings of the General Assembly. Similar problems arise in connection with the greatly increased need for representation at such meetings

as the Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, and the like. Furthermore, a need exists for providing State Department representation at conferences dealing with telecommunications, aviation, shipping, agriculture, labor, and many other matters.

The only present means of providing representatives is to tear the Department apart to meet each individual situation. At one time in the past year, for example, the Secretary of State and all but one of the Assistant Secretaries were absent from the Department on missions to international meetings. The burden on those left behind was excessive and the functioning of the Department was seriously impaired.

The Secretary of State and his principal assistants are needed in Washington. The Government should be able to send high level officials, with adequate staffs, to represent the United States at international organizations and conferences. When not so engaged, these men should, in part at least, be able to spend their time in the Department advising and aiding the Secretary in the formation of the policies which they may have to handle. In this way they can be fully informed of all facets of United States policies.

This over-all recommendation will be amplified in various respects by the recommendations which follow. In reaching these conclusions the Commission and its task force have kept in close touch with the organizational plans for the State Department developed under Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett. The Commission is happy to say that its thinking and that of the State Department are in complete accord

on principles, and, except for certain particulars in which the Commission's recommendations are more far-reaching than those of the State Department, the conclusions of both on specific changes are in agreement.

By way of preface to these recommendations it is first desirable to outline the general pattern of internal organization which will facilitate achievement of the objectives of the over-all recommendation. This pattern, shown graphically on pages 42 and 43 together with the present top level organization, is as follows:

1. The strengthening of the Secretary and Under Secretary level by the addition of two Deputy Under Secretaries, the one to act in matters of substance, and the other, as "general manager," to administer the Department and the overseas service.
2. The fixing of responsibility for action in five line units under five Assistant Secretaries. Four of these Assistant Secretaries would head up regional units, with the responsibility for the four traditional geographic segments of the world. A fifth would be in charge of relationships with international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations.

Both the regional and international organization Assistant Secretaries would *at the action level* be responsible for and be equipped, in terms of personnel, to deal with not solely "political" aspects of foreign affairs, as is the basic conception of the duties of the existing geographic office directors, but for

all aspects, whether they be political, economic, public opinion, intelligence, or administration.


The Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, would also have top, but not immediate, responsibility for action in connection with the operations of the foreign information programs and of the educational exchange programs. Action in these public affairs fields, however, is not of the same character as that required of the regional and international organization Assistant Secretaries and, moreover, the Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, should organize his unit, by the "general manager" device referred to earlier or otherwise, so that he can devote the bulk of his own time to his staff duties at the top level of the State Department.

3. The provision of adequate *staff* services to the Secretary and Under Secretary and to the line units consisting of:

a. An Assistant Secretary, Economic and Social Affairs, with the dual function of supervising a staff group who would afford a source of expert advice from a global instead of a regional point of view on economic, social, and other specialized aspects of foreign affairs and who would be the channel of communication and the point of coordination on interdepartmental relations within the executive branch in the foreign affairs field.


b. An Assistant Secretary for congressional relations on a full-time basis.

c. An Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, referred to previously, who would serve as the high-level adviser on domestic



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and foreign public opinion and as the chief of press and other media of public relations.

d. The Legal Adviser as at present.

e. An active high-level Operations Committee, under the direct supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary for substantive matters, assisted by the Executive Secretariat to insure coordination between the staff and action levels. This Committee is not to be an additional layer in the line of command but a device to facilitate communication of information, coordination of related activities, and generally to promote teamwork between the action and staff units.

f. A Planning Adviser supported by a broad-gauge staff to function as an anticipator of the problems which will arise tomorrow because of today's policies.

g. A Special Assistant, Intelligence, who, as chief of intelligence, would supervise the centralized intelligence activities of the Department, serve as a source of guidance to the decentralized intelligence arms of the regional units, and provide the focal point for coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency.

This pattern of organization means that the State Department would have a Secretary, Under Secretary, two Deputy Under Secretaries, eight Assistant Secretaries, and three senior officials of rank equivalent to that of Assistant Secretary. It contemplates abolition of the posts of Counselor, Assistant

Secretary, Occupied Areas, and Assistant Secretary, Transportation and Communications. The net increase in senior officials over the present scheme of organization is three, namely the two Deputy Under Secretaries and one additional Assistant Secretary. It will further have the effect of eliminating the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Special Assistant, Press Relations.

The office level as an additional "layer" in the Department's structure will also disappear except possibly on the administrative side, thus removing a blockage point in the Secretary's line of command. Deputies to the various Assistant Secretaries on the substantive side, equivalent in experience and stature to the present office directors, will, of course, still be required.

Finally, the pattern of organization set forth above can succeed only on the fundamental premise, set forth in Recommendation No. 20 hereinafter, that the two personnel services—the Foreign Service and the Department Service—be amalgamated into a single service responsive to the Secretary.

a. Recommendations Pertaining to Action Responsibilities

Recommendation No. 10

The fundamental world objectives and foreign policies of the United States should be continuously defined so as to permit delegation of authority to the line units to take action within the objectives and policies so defined.

The State Department, since the war, has at all levels been too much concerned with "details" and not enough with "policy." The Secretary-Under Secretary top command is overburdened by being drawn down into participation in too many daily decisions with the consequence that the entire Department lives day-to-day, and policies tend to be determined in terms of short-range decisions.

The State Department began in recent years to endeavor to reduce the United States objectives and foreign policies to writing. Continued emphasis on this admittedly difficult task, and on making such written statements available to all concerned, will provide the means by which the regional Assistant Secretaries and the international organization Assistant Secretary may assume responsibility for all but the most crucial decisions and afford the top command time for reflection and long-range thinking. Furthermore, this process will make possible the relation of objectives within and between countries and regions and between regions and international organizations, thereby leading to greater consistency of policy. Likewise, it will furnish a means for more intelligent guidance to chiefs of missions abroad and relieve them of the necessity of referring all details to Washington.

Recommendation No. 11

Within the action units responsibility for decisions should be clearly fixed with adequate machinery by which the decision-maker can consult but never be required to obtain the concurrence of staff advisory units or other action units.

The responsibility for the formulation of foreign policy proposals and for action in line with approved policies should be placed on the four regional Assistant Secretaries and the international organization Assistant Secretary. Instances of unclear jurisdiction should be resolved at the top level through the Deputy Under Secretary on the substantive side, particularly through the Operations Committee, of which he would be deputy chairman. Each Assistant Secretary will have, as an integral part of his line operation, the functional advisers on economic and social problems, who are now under the Assistant Secretary, Economic Affairs. Likewise, each Assistant Secretary should have a very small group of intelligence research personnel and information specialists.

Within the regional and the international organization systems the responsibility for recommending action in a given case should be assigned to a single officer below the Assistant Secretary level. The present intolerable system of coordinate authority whereby concurrences in different chains of command within the Department are required should be eliminated. The action officer should, however, consult staff advisory groups or other action units and report the results of such recommendations with his recommended action. Adequate machinery to enforce this consultation process should be developed through the Executive Secretariat. Every consultant should be allowed to attach to any document his comment or protest if he dissents, after his views have been considered. The action on such recommendations

should be restricted to the five Assistant Secretaries concerned, the Deputy Under Secretaries, the Under Secretary, and the Secretary. By this means the present evils of the geographic-functional conflict can be materially reduced.

The role of the Assistant Secretary, International Organizations, is different from that of the four regional Assistant Secretaries in one important respect. While participating in the formulation of foreign policy he should not be an additional agent in this field, but should, so far as possible, obtain his policy guidance from the various regional units, the Planning Adviser, and from other staff advisers, probably largely through the Operations Committee. This difference lends emphasis to the conclusion that a properly conceived and executed regional scheme of organization can operate adequately to arrive at policies for multilateral dealings.

Recommendation No. 12

The five Assistant Secretaries with action responsibilities should serve as the focal points of contact between the Department and the overseas and international organization missions in both substantive and administrative matters.

The delegation of substantive authority to the four regional Assistant Secretaries and to one international organization Assistant Secretary should result in their being able to handle the bulk of substantive matters coming into the Department from missions at overseas points and at international organizations without reference to the top command of the Depart-

ment. Concurrently, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration should delegate to them adequate tools of administration with which to meet the needs of these missions. While the Deputy Under Secretary on the administrative side must at all times retain firm control over the determination and carrying out of administrative policies, particularly with respect to inspections, much of the day-to-day work in connection with personnel administration, organizational planning, budgetary and other matters with respect to overseas and other missions can be more efficiently performed on a decentralized basis in the action units. Within the State Department, however, the administrative aspects of the action units should be decentralized only to the extent the Secretary, acting through the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, deems it advisable.

The delegation of authority to act and the decentralization of tools of administration to the line Assistant Secretaries can, moreover, be advantageously carried one step further by giving greater authority (but not autonomy) to the missions abroad and at international organizations, both in regard to substantive action and administration. This further delegation and decentralization must, of course, be a matter of secretarial policy and must depend upon the capacity of the various chiefs of missions. Progress in this direction is essential, however, because at the present time the officers in the Department in Washington tend to ride the field missions with much too tight a rein and endeavor to give them much too meticulous guidance.

Recommendation No. 13

The chief of each United States foreign mission should be the responsible American spokesman for the area or country to which he is assigned. He should observe and counsel all United States activities therein, and he should be responsible for administration of his mission.

In its new role in the conduct of foreign affairs, the United States frequently engages in two general types of activity in foreign countries. The one is the traditional representation and reporting activities of the diplomatic missions; the other, the special operational activities of various economic, social, and other programs.

As to the traditional representation and reporting activities, it is desirable not only to have all personnel responsible to the chief of the mission but also part of the mission. There has been less serious question of this proposition since the 1939 consolidation of the Commerce and Agriculture overseas services with the Foreign Service. In subsequent recommendations herein, however, it is proposed that a small number of specialist attachés who, as part of their work, fill the information needs of the other departments and agencies, be designated by those other departments and agencies. These specialists while on overseas service should, as temporary or reserve officers, be a part of the Foreign Affairs Service and should be responsible to the chief of the mission for their work, department, and for purposes of administration. They should, moreover, be an integral part of the mission to which they are assigned and their services would be utilized by the

chief of mission and the State Department as well as by the department by which they are appointed. This line relationship to the chief of the mission is essential and his authority should include:

- a.* The power to return to the United States any specialist on duty for reasons related to improper deportment or for 'unsatisfactory work performance, subject always to final decision by the Secretary of State.
- b.* The right to object to assigning a given individual to the mission, subject always to the Secretary of State having the final word.
- c.* The right to express disagreement with (but not to prevent transmission of) reports of specialists designated by the other agencies.
- d.* The ultimate authority overseas with respect to foreign affairs aspects of program operations, such as those currently being performed by Economic Cooperation Administration.

In the case of operational activities abroad, where they are directly under the State Department, the personnel involved should also be part of the mission. Where such tasks are assigned to other departments or agencies, whether they be economic, social, technical, or otherwise, they may be separately headed and administered at home. It is unworkable and dangerous, however, to have American spokesmen and operators abroad dealing with foreign nations who are independent of the ambassadors or ministers and who are not responsible to them for supervision and coordination.

b. Recommendations Pertaining to Staff Responsibilities

Recommendation No. 14

The Assistant Secretary, Economic and Social Affairs, should concentrate on providing a source of economic, social, and other advice from a global standpoint and upon serving as a channel of communication and focal point of coordination with the other departments and agencies in the executive branch.

The staff advisers under the Assistant Secretary, Economic and Social Affairs, must be *consulted* by the action units, but their *concurrence* in proposed action should *not* be required. A very small group of functional advisers should suffice for these purposes and they should not seek to duplicate as at present the staffs of other departments and agencies or the functional specialists assigned to the State Department's regional action units. The other departments and agencies should, in the main, be relied upon for information within their special competences, both domestic and foreign.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the division between the action and staff units heretofore drawn has in certain respects a delusive simplicity. There are limited occasions when the action requirements of the Department will transcend the four regional and the one international organization units and where action with respect to individual countries must be taken on a global basis. An example is the handling of trade agreements. To this limited extent

this staff unit is a hybrid organization with some action responsibilities. The top command of the State Department must take particular care that this limited action responsibility does not afford an "empire-building" device whereby the unit headed by the Assistant Secretary, Economic and Social Affairs again seeks to have coordinate authority with the action units, and that the geographic versus functional conflict does not again cripple the Department. The overseeing of this particular problem is one which the Deputy Under Secretary on the substantive side must keep under his direct and continuous surveillance.

Recommendation No. 15

The Assistant Secretary, Congressional Affairs, should be responsible on a full-time basis for establishing a coordinated program of two-way liaison with the Congress.

The recent experience of endeavoring to take care of congressional relations on a part-time basis has demonstrated the need for full-time, high-level direction in this field. The Assistant Secretary, Congressional Relations, should participate actively in top-level policy formulation in the State Department. He should be able to marshal personnel from anywhere within the Department to present to the Congress special phases of foreign affairs problems. Conversely, he should be able to arrange to bring to the Department the views of congressional leaders on international matters.

It is not intended that this Assistant Secretary should serve as the exclusive channel of communication between the State Department and the Congress. On frequent occasions the Secretary and the Under Secretary will be called upon to consult with congressional leaders. In addition, the Assistant Secretary will have to be able to call upon various specialists within the Department to provide information on technical phases of foreign affairs activities. He will also have to work with the budget officers of the State Department in connection with appropriation matters. Where congressional contacts are made directly by other departmental officials, the Assistant Secretary should be kept informed. Finally, as a minor but significant part of his work, the Assistant Secretary should be the medium whereby the State Department provides helpful services to the members of Congress. In all these duties the Assistant Secretary must have adequate staff to aid in the preparation of material, in following important issues, and in performing various services.

Recommendation No. 16

The Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, should concentrate on serving as a high-level staff adviser on domestic and foreign public opinion, and as chief of press relations and other media of public relations for the State Department.

Today American public opinion is a vital factor in the conduct of foreign affairs, and the State Department must not

only estimate and evaluate the views of the American public in foreign affairs matters but also must win its acceptance and support on the paramount issues. Furthermore, the opinions of the peoples of foreign countries, as contrasted with their governments, also bear upon the conduct of American foreign relations.

The weakest link with the American public is the absence in the State Department of a single high official responsible for the vital contacts with the press and other media of public information. The Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs, should fill this void. Furthermore, he should be the staff officer advising the Secretary and Under Secretary, and also the action units, on the public opinion aspects of any problem. Finally, he should observe and give policy guidance to foreign information and educational exchange programs, the operational responsibility for which should be in a "general manager" reporting to the Assistant Secretary. A precedent for the relationship envisaged between the Assistant Secretary and the "general manager" is that which recently existed between the Under Secretary and the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey where the latter, with effective backing from the Under Secretary, ran the operational program without interference from other segments of the Department.

Recommendation No. 17

The Secretary of State should continue the present high-level planning activity under a Planning Adviser, with special emphasis on freeing him and his staff of current

problems, upon providing him with broad-gauge staff, and upon utilization by him of competent advice from inside and outside the Government.

The present Policy Planning Staff has been a valuable aid to the top command of the State Department, especially as an "anticipator" of problems. At present, however, its effectiveness appears to have been lessened by a tendency of the top command to utilize it on day-to-day problems, by its almost exclusive reliance for its staff on individuals with Foreign Service backgrounds, and by its reluctance to draw sufficiently upon the resources of other departments and agencies except possibly those of the National Military Establishment. These weaknesses should be corrected.

In addition, the Secretary of State should endeavor to bring together a small group of highly competent and reliable individuals from outside the Government to counsel the Planning Adviser. This group should not, either on request or on its own initiative, give affirmative advice as to what the world objectives and foreign policies of the United States should be, but it should concentrate on problems submitted to it by the Planning Adviser and on advising him on the probable consequences of various proposed courses of action. This group might include former ambassadors, other former Government officials, leaders from business, commerce and labor, and educators.

Recommendation No. 18

The centralized intelligence unit in the State Department should be reorganized and reoriented, and intelli-

gence advisers should be assigned to the regional action units.

The present misconception of the intelligence needs of the State Department must be eradicated. The creation of revitalized regional units on the action side should tend to correct the current deplorable attitude of the existing geographic offices toward intelligence. The reorientation of the centralized intelligence activities by de-emphasis of academic research and increased attention on current estimates and evaluations and to serving and making use of the Central Intelligence Agency is required. At present, except for the Special Projects Staff, the Biographic Information Division, and the routine library, reference and collection functions, the existing intelligence unit appears to expend too much of its energies on projects which do not contribute sufficiently to the main work of the State Department.

The task force report contemplates the decentralization of the present area research personnel as intact units to the four new regional action units. This move would involve almost 5 percent of the personnel of the entire Department.

The Commission is not in favor of this step.

It is recognized, however, that the new regional units, as self-contained line organizations, will need intelligence advisers just as they also need economic and social advisers. These regional intelligence advisers should perform staff functions within the action units and should not themselves engage in research work. Their responsibilities should be

to understand the foreign policy problems of the action units, to recommend particular intelligence research projects to the central intelligence unit, and to follow up on the performance of such research by the central unit. In addition, they should assist the central unit in the preparation of "political" estimates for the Central Intelligence Agency and for other departments. It is recommended that these regional intelligence advisers be assigned to the regional units from the present research divisions.

The really significant intelligence needs of the Department must be met on a centralized basis. This central unit, under a Special Assistant to the Secretary as at present, should occupy a dual position. In relation to the intelligence advisers in the regional units, the central unit should be both a source of general intelligence guidance and a channel of communication with the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of other departments. As an intelligence unit itself it should be a device by which the Secretary and Under Secretary can obtain expert evaluations and check on information coming from the action units.

The Planning Adviser in particular should make full use of the Special Assistant and of his central staff in connection with his planning activities. For this task the Special Assistant should build up a group of mature individuals with high talent in analysis and evaluation, who should have full access to all information coming into the Department. This group must be supported by a body of skilled researchers.

The central unit should not, however, seek to monitor all

information coming into the State Department from abroad, but should concentrate on tasks assigned to it by the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Planning Adviser, and on issues raised through its relations with the Central Intelligence Agency. It should continue to include, of course, the library, reference and collection functions, but should be organized internally so that the Special Assistant does not have to devote the bulk of his time to administrative and supervisory duties.

A prime responsibility of the chief of the intelligence unit is in relation to the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence units of other departments. He should be responsible for setting up effective machinery by which the Central Intelligence Agency and the other departments can obtain "political" estimates from the State Department. Conversely, he must see to it that the State Department gets evaluations and other data from the Central Intelligence Agency and the other departments which are useful to the State Department in formulating its policies and programs. In part he should be able to do this through membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. In these various ways he will be better able to make evaluations for the top command of the State Department and, in particular, to check on the recommendations of the regional units.

Recommendation No. 19

The Operations Committee, with the Under Secretary or Deputy Under Secretary for substantive matters as

chairman, and staffed by the Executive Secretariat, should be made the coordinating link between the action and staff segments and between the various units within each segment.

Serious present weaknesses are the lack of any systematic means of bringing problems to the top command level and, conversely, of ensuring that the various Assistant Secretaries are advised of what takes place at the top level. High-level committees have been suggested on past occasions, but the efforts to place them in operation have proved abortive largely because of inadequate top-level support; the absence of any secretariat and staff assistance; and the inclusion of too many individuals as participants in the meetings. Failure to overcome the individualistic tradition of the Department whereby senior career officers insist upon direct access to the Secretary and Under Secretary has also been a factor.

The Operations Committee should meet frequently, perhaps daily. The Under Secretary, when present, should preside, although as a general rule the Deputy Under Secretary on the substantive side, as a kind of combined deputy chairman and executive secretary, would probably carry the bulk of the responsibility. The present Executive Secretariat should provide "secretarial" and "staff assistance." This assistance would include maintenance of a file on pending problems, preparation of agenda and organization of documentation for meetings, preparation of post-meeting reports and transmission of decisions to the heads of action units, and following up to make sure that action is actually taken.

The provision of a top-level head for the Operations Committee, particularly by making it the primary responsibility of the Deputy Under Secretary, plus the selection of a man for that post with the will to make the Committee work, and the provision of staff assistance by the Executive Secretariat, should meet two of the past difficulties which defeated less ambitious attempts. Confining the participants to Assistant Secretaries and other senior officials of equivalent rank, moreover, would reduce the membership of the Committee to workable size (approximately 12), thereby removing another objectionable feature. Finally, other recommendations, particularly the delineation of line and staff responsibilities and the amalgamation of the Foreign Service and Department personnel systems, should in time help break down the individualistic tradition and the atmosphere of distrust which have prevented similar committees from functioning successfully in the past.

c. Recommendations Relating to Personnel

Recommendation No. 20

The personnel in the permanent State Department establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a single foreign affairs service obligated to serve at home or overseas and con-

stituting a safeguarded career group administered separately from the general Civil Service.*

The State Department and the American embassies, legations, and consulates abroad, which together make up the diplomatic and consular machinery of the Nation, are now served by two separate groups of men and women, one "The Foreign Service of the United States" and the other enrolled under the ordinary Civil Service system. The two groups, in terms of American citizens, are approximately equal in size. This division of forces between a Foreign Service centering on a separate corps of officers, mostly stationed abroad but partly in key positions in Washington, and a group of employees who work chiefly at home is a source of serious friction and increasing inefficiency. Such a division of personnel in foreign affairs has been abandoned in all but a handful of countries. Among those in which it still exists, the United States is the only great power.

The division leads to jealousies and to inequality of compensation among people doing much the same work. The Foreign Service, through long periods of service abroad, undoubtedly loses contact with American domestic conditions. The Civil Service employees, who seldom or never serve abroad for any long period, fail often to understand other nations and appreciate foreign conditions.

* **RESERVATION:** While concurring generally in this recommendation because of the administrative advantages of consolidating the two services, I think that it is of crucial importance that this process not be permitted to operate so as to destroy the morale or spirit of either group.

JAMES FORRESTAL

The present conditions also lead to the existence of two administrative offices, one for each body of public servants, but both in the same household and dealing frequently with the same personnel questions. The Foreign Service is in law and practice largely self-administered, and is to some degree even independent of the Secretary of State.

In recommending the consolidation of the Foreign Service and the State Department Service into a single new Foreign Affairs Service, it is believed that for the present the consolidated service should be separate from the general Civil Service. The Commission's recommendations on the general Civil Service, in our report on Personnel Management, contemplate sweeping changes in the entire Civil Service personnel system. These changes will necessarily involve adjustments and experimentation extending over a period of years. Similarly, the consolidation of the Foreign Service and the State Department Service will also require the gradual solution of numerous problems in terms of practical circumstances. Consequently it is believed that the two reorganizations should for the present proceed on separate bases but that the top officials in both systems should keep in close touch with each other so that the guiding principles in both readjustments are not at variance.

Certain general principles for carrying out this consolidation are set forth in the task force report, Recommendation 15. The Commission is generally in accord with those principles. The list below reiterates some of those principles which warrant special emphasis, and restates others with certain modifications:

- a.* The members of the single new foreign affairs service should all be pledged to serve at home or abroad.
- b.* The consolidation should be *mandatory* but should be carried out *gradually* over a short period of years.
- c.* The consolidated service should include all personnel except (i) at the top level the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretaries, the Assistant Secretaries, and others of comparable rank, and ambassadors, and ministers, (ii) certain technical personnel in programs such as foreign information, for whom the existence of comparable overseas assignments seems improbable, (iii) at the lower levels, mechanical or subsidiary employees such as janitors, engineers, guards, and messengers, and all alien employees of whatever rank.
- d.* The consolidation should receive the continuous attention and support of the Secretary and the Under Secretary, with the direct execution being entrusted to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Over-all policies and standards governing entrance, transfer, classification, examination, promotion, and retirement should be established by the Secretary, perhaps after consultation with a temporary advisory board with a membership such as that suggested by the task force report. Particular attention should be given to equalizing the time spent in the field with that at home.
- e.* The assignment of personnel within the consolidated

system requires a flexible system of personnel administration so that the Secretary is free to draw upon not only the various talents within the service as he needs them, but also on qualified personnel from elsewhere in the executive branch and from outside the Government. This flexible system should also make it possible for members of the foreign affairs service to transfer to positions elsewhere in the executive branch for which they have the necessary qualifications. Under this principle the general, special, and staff personnel categories suggested in the task force report should be utilized as tools in personnel administration and not as rigid compartments to which considerations of caste and perquisites become attached.

f. The present Civil Service personnel of the State Department should enter the consolidated service on application and oral examination. This process must take into account the needs of the single service for personnel with special as well as general aptitudes, including certain aptitudes of primary importance in the Department at home as contrasted with the missions overseas. Departmental personnel who are unwilling to enter the new service but who are qualified for their present duties might be continued in their present posts on some special "limited service" basis or be given opportunities elsewhere in the government.

g. All members of the consolidated service of the same grade should have equal status in every respect, including compensation and retirement rights.

b. Recruitment and promotion policies should be varied and flexible so as to obtain and keep individuals with the different required qualifications, including especially resourcefulness and executive ability. Administration should be geared so as to place more responsibility on young men in the first 15 years of service. In the case of members with special aptitudes, they should be enlisted and promoted without reference to the versatility and elasticity expected of others with more general talents. This will necessarily involve recruitment of personnel at all levels and not merely at the bottom or present Class 6 level.

i. A temporary or reserve officer classification should be continued and should be open to (i) representatives of other departments and agencies nominated by them and acceptable to the State Department on personal and similar grounds who will serve abroad as technical reporters and attachés in the small number of cases where this service cannot be adequately performed by the new corps; (ii) personnel to implement special programs such as the European Recovery Program or in other temporary capacities; and (iii) applicants for admission to the general or special officer classifications who have passed the necessary examinations but who are awaiting appointment. These temporary or reserve officers should have status identical with the general and special officers of corresponding grade and should be paid and supported like other members of the corps, the funds, in the case of representatives of other departments and agencies, to come

from grants to the single service from appropriations of the other departments and agencies.

j. The consolidated service should not be self-administered but subject to direction and inspection of the Secretary. For purposes of recruitment, examination, promotion, retirement, and inspection, the Secretary should have authority to set up special boards to assist him in an advisory capacity.

The departments and agencies other than the State Department will continue to have heavy requirements for information from overseas points. In the main these needs should be filled by the single foreign affairs service which should take active measures to recruit specialists from the other segments of the executive branch and from business, labor, and other sources. The Secretary of State should obtain advice from the other departments and agencies through interdepartmental consultation, but the existing Board of the Foreign Service, which represents the undesirable practice of administration by a committee, should be abolished.

In the limited number of cases where specialized technical reporting, or an unusual quantity of reporting or other special requirements exist, the other departments and agencies should designate and obtain appropriations for personnel for their overseas work. These individuals would be sent abroad as temporary or reserve officers in the single service (see subparagraph (*i*) above). While on such assignments they should constitute an integral part of the missions to which they are assigned and should serve the chiefs of mis-

sion and the State Department as well as the department or agency by which they are appointed and in which their career lies.

D. Recommendations for the Other Departments and Agencies

Recommendation No. 21

The other departments and agencies should consider the possible foreign impact of all proposed major policies and programs, and consult with the State Department in regard thereto.

The present attitude of the other agencies is that they do not want the State Department to formulate foreign policies or programs without consulting with them. Although the State Department has made sincere efforts to do this, the other agencies feel it is their sole prerogative to initiate a domestic policy or program and that the State Department need not be consulted. It seems needless to labor the point that in a world as economically and socially interdependent as ours, an agricultural price-support program, for instance, is not without consequence to foreign states.

Each agency should, moreover, constantly bear in mind that the instruments of foreign policy should always be used to achieve objectives of foreign policy and not as methods of determining foreign policy.

Recommendation No. 22

The other departments and agencies which have important duties in foreign affairs should each establish an officer or office directly responsible to the department or agency head for coordinating its foreign affairs activities.

Few departments and agencies have recast their organizations to meet effectively their increased responsibilities in foreign affairs. Some of the bureaus or offices within the major executive establishments have had to operate largely without benefit of top-side direction. This situation has placed an added administrative burden upon the State Department as it often has had to try to coordinate constituent parts of a department, or to sit silently in interdepartmental committees, while contending bureaus of one agency resolve their internal differences. Likewise, the other departments and agencies must be geared to provide prompt and reliable information to the State Department so that in urgent matters the State Department is not forced to set up its own specialist units in order to get the job done. This also would be the responsibility of the single officer or official acting under the department head.

Important tasks for such a department or agency coordinating officer to perform would include supervision and improvement in its committee participation; assurance of the development of a department or agency viewpoint before its representative speaks in an interdepartmental conference; follow-up on departmental or agency committee and inter-

national conference commitments; functioning as the department's or agency's focal point for liaison on foreign affairs matters; fostering of required cooperation and working relationships; review of departmental or agency legislative proposals to determine impact on foreign affairs; overcoming of insular or domestic perspective of departmental or agency personnel performing substantive work involving foreign and domestic considerations; avoidance of departmental or agency attempts to separate domestic and foreign aspects of work; and coordination of all departmental and agency report requests to overseas missions.

V. Economy and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

The task force report does not attempt to calculate the amount of immediate savings if all of its recommendations are accepted. The reason lies in the fact that the present-day requirements for the effective conduct of foreign affairs by the United States are on a scale unprecedented in American history. The accompanying expenditures are necessarily large but they do not in the main represent costs of administration. The total estimated appropriations for international affairs and finance for fiscal year 1949 are approximately \$7 billion, including \$4.4 billion for recovery programs such as the European Recovery Program and \$1.25 billion for occupation responsibilities in Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. Of this \$7 billion, the State Department and Foreign Service appropriations are only \$120 million or less than 2 percent of the total.


The estimated 1949 military appropriations other than those for occupied areas are, in large measure as a result of the international situation, in the neighborhood of over \$12 billion. Coupling this amount with the above amounts for economic assistance and occupation activities makes it evident that the only real prospect of economy lies in making progress toward world peace and stability. Wars and threats of wars and their drain on men and resources occur because

diplomacy and other peaceful instruments fail or threaten to fail. The organizational segments of the Government in the foreign affairs field must be equipped to play their vital part in seeking to attain this ultimate goal. By recruitment of high quality personnel to man these units and by increased efficiency in their performance, both contemplated by the recommendations heretofore, stated savings in manpower and dollars will inevitably result.

For the present the functions being performed by the State Department and the other departments and agencies in the foreign affairs field are crucial and necessary governmental functions and, except for minor readjustments, cannot be curtailed. In the particular case of the State Department it should be noted that readjustments have been going on ever since 1945 when it was first saddled with wartime programs and personnel for the want of better locations elsewhere. This readjustment process, accomplished in part by transfer of personnel, has reduced the total personnel in the State Department from a peak of 7,623 in 1946 to 5,652 on September 1, 1948, or a reduction of 26 percent.

An admonition should also be expressed as to organizational arrangements for participation by the United States in international organizations and conferences. For fiscal year 1949, the appropriations for this purpose are \$160 million or \$40 million more than the combined appropriations for the State Department and Foreign Service. With responsibilities for this participation spread throughout the Government and with the unfamiliar nature of the task, the Bureau of the

Budget and the State Department must take aggressive leadership in promoting efficient arrangements and procedures for participation in international organizations so that the United States gets value received for its expenditures.



Related Task Force Report

The Commission has had printed the complete report of its task force on foreign affairs as appendix H.

Other material, supplementary to the task force report, is submitted separately to the Congress in typescript, and consists of the following:

APPENDIX—IV.¹ The Role of the President in Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX—V. Interdepartmental Aspects of Foreign Affairs:

- A. Comments on Specific Affairs Interdepartmental Committees.
- B. Data on the Foreign Affairs Aspects of the Activities of Departments, Commissions, and Agencies Other than the State Department.
- C. Interdepartmental Committee Structure for Foreign Affairs.
- D. The Role of Committees in the Formulation and Implementation of Foreign Policy.
- E. Evaluation of Foreign Affairs Interdepartmental Committees.
- F. Relationships of the Federal Departments with the United Nations and other International Organizations and Conferences.

APPENDIX—VI. The Organization of the State Department:

- A. Staff Outline of Reorganization of the Department of State.
- B. The Domestic Information Activities of the Department of State.
- C. The Intelligence Program of the Department of State.
- D. The State Department as a Program Operator.

¹ This and the other material listed below are appendices to the task force report. The numbering of each appendix indicates its relationship to the corresponding chapters in the task force report.

APPENDIX VII. The Organization of the Foreign Service:

A. The Foreign Service.

B. The Foreign Offices and Foreign Services of Other Governments.

C. The Legislative History of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

APPENDIX VIII. Legislative-Executive Relationships in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs.

Acknowledgment

The Commission wishes to express its appreciation to the following members of its task force on foreign affairs:

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
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The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs


A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS

P R E P A R E D F O R

THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

by

Harvey H. Bundy, Partner, Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, Mass., and Former Assistant
the Secretary of War and James Grafton Rogers, President, Foreign Bondholders
Council and Former Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Services



Letter of Transmittal

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

13 January 1949.


DEAR SIRs: In accordance with Public Law 162, approved July 7, 1947, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has undertaken an examination into the operation and organization of the executive functions and activities. In this examination it has had the assistance of various task forces which have made studies of particular segments of the Governments. Herewith, it submits to the Congress a study prepared for the Commission's consideration of the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs.

The study of each task force naturally is made from its own particular angle. The Commission, in working out a pattern for the Executive Branch as a whole, has not accepted all of the recommendations of the task forces. Furthermore, the Commission, in its own series of reports, has not discussed all the recommendations of an administrative nature although they may be of importance to the officials concerned.

The Commission's own report on Foreign Affairs is submitted to the Congress separately, titled "Foreign Affairs."

The Commission wishes to express its appreciation to Harvey H. Bundy, former Assistant Secretary of State and former Assistant to the Secretary of War, James Grafton Rogers, former Assistant Secretary of State and president, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council and Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War and State as advisor, and their staff for preparation of this task force study.

Faithfully,



Chairman.

The Honorable

The President of The Senate

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Letter of Submission

The Hon. HERBERT HOOVER,

Chairman, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We transmit herewith the report of the Foreign Affairs Task Force on "The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs." The report consists of a nine-page Summary Statement in which certain salient facts and principal conclusions are emphasized. This is followed by two parts: Part One consisting of an analysis of organizational concepts and major organizational recommendations, and Part Two of a general survey and analysis of the present machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs.

We were appointed as your Task Force on Foreign Affairs in January 1948, with the Honorable Henry L. Stimson as adviser. The conclusions in the Summary Statement have been discussed with Mr. Stimson and we are authorized to say that he is in general accord.

Both of the members of the Foreign Affairs Task Force were Assistant Secretaries of State under Mr. Stimson in the years 1931-33, and had rather intensive and detailed familiarity with the problems of foreign affairs in the operations of the State Department as they then existed. Since that time we have had frequent opportunities to observe subsequent problems and operations.

In view of the wide scope and the nature of the project assigned to the Task Force, an effort has been made to concentrate on the major problems which exist today and to suggest remedies for them. As we indicated to the Commission at the outset, we deemed it neither desirable nor practicable to undertake a management engineering survey of the State Department nor of the many other Government departments and agencies operating in the field of foreign affairs. Accordingly, the bulk of the report is devoted to definition of organizational policy and principles. While numerous minor problems are discussed, and certain recommendations made with respect thereto, the report is not to be deemed all inclusive as to the detailed organizational changes which might be desirable.

The Task Force report is based on a plan of attack from four main approaches, all closely related but nonetheless sufficiently distinct to warrant separate treatment. These four approaches are:

1. The role of the President in foreign affairs and his relationship to the Department of State and United States diplomatic representatives abroad.

2. The role of the Congress in foreign affairs in relationship to the President and the Department of State.

3. The relationship of the Department of State to the other governmental departments and agencies which are concerned in the conduct of foreign affairs.

4. The internal organization of the Department of State and its missions abroad and of the Foreign Service.

In the areas covered by these four subjects, a number of subsidiary studies were prepared by the Task Force staff between January and September 1948. The analyses and conclusions of these subreports were appraised by the staff through a series of conferences within the staff group, and then further scrutinized and analyzed by another series of conferences between the Task Force members and the staff. Following these steps, a general survey and analysis was prepared, with the staff to a substantial degree carrying the laboring oar. From this general survey this final report was prepared, and the contents thereof represent our own views and conclusions.

Not only have we had the assistance of a very competent, energetic, small staff of assistants but we have devoted a considerable part of our own time to these studies, and have especially given our attention to interviews and conferences with many prominent individuals who are or have been officially concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs in recent years. We have also conferred with representatives of the press who have been active in this field, and with leaders in industry and university circles who are familiar with Government operations of this type. We have interviewed in the aggregate well over 100 such persons, and the staff has, in addition, interviewed more than 1,000 individuals. We have consulted a number of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The subreports of the staff give a multitude of examples and details in this confused and complicated picture. Quite naturally different interpretations of facts and varying shades of opinion will be found in these subreports. Certain of this material has been reproduced and is available to the Commission in the form of appendices. Other staff reports were prepared in the nature of working tools and, as a result, did not lend themselves to reproduction, but are available in the files of the Task Force. This was the case, in particular, with the valuable special project report on "Interdepartmental Aspects of Foreign Affairs." A list of the appendices is attached at the end of this letter.

The work was organized by the formation of a small staff, of which John F. Meck, Jr. was staff director and executive secretary, with Everard K. Meade, Jr. as his principal over-all assistant. Because of the complexities involved in analysis of the relationships between the State Department and the foreign affairs aspects of the work of

the other departments and agencies, a special staff was formed to study this particular area, consisting of George A. Latimer as project director, with J. Clayton Miller as his principal assistant. The secretarial work in connection with the preparation of reports was under the supervision of Miss Ruth Wendland. The other members of the immediate staff were:

Donald W. Brown.	Louis W. Koenig.
Daniel S. Cheever.	Eileen Renzi.
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, Jr.	Wm. E. Vogelsang.
Henry Field Haviland, Jr.	Frances Williamson.

In addition, the Task Force had as consultants at various times the following:

Harold Guetzkow.	Harold Stein.
Donald H. McLean, Jr.	Clarence Thurber.
John W. Masland.	Van Lear Woodward.
Wallace J. Parks.	

Considerable help was also given by individuals presently serving in various departments and agencies of the Government. This group included:

Chester L. Callander (Treasury Department).
George M. Ewing (Department of Labor).
Arthur E. Goldschmidt (Department of Interior).
Edward H. Harding (Department of State).
Charles E. Johnson (Department of State).
Curtiss Murrell (Department of State).
James Q. Reber (Department of State).
Earl D. Sohm (Department of State).
Duncan Wall (Department of Agriculture).

Respectfully submitted.

HARVEY H. BUNDY.
JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS.

Advisor's Letter

HIGHHOLD,
HUNTINGTON, LONG ISLAND,
November 22, 1948.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: The major recommendations of Messrs. Bundy and Rogers have my general and hearty approval. I have not been able to examine the detailed evidence on which these and other recommendations are based, but my own experience and observations lead me to believe that these proposals are soundly designed to improve the work of our Government in foreign affairs.

For my part, I should like to add a few words of a more general nature, in support of my conviction that increased effectiveness in our foreign relations is an imperative present requirement.

The world today is faced with two great challenges. Can it keep the peace, and can it build a secure foundation for ordered freedom? We have reached a stage in history when it is absolutely vital that we meet both of these challenges successfully. The scourge of war has now acquired an expanding destructive power enormously greater than ever before. We must have peace. At the same time mankind cannot and will not abandon its long upward struggle toward freedom and the good life. Challenges to freedom continue, and the tension between free societies and their opponents must be recognized as a grave threat to peace. In such circumstances, the conduct of American foreign policy takes on a new order of importance.

The great scientific and industrial revolution of the nineteenth century profoundly affected both the nature and effect of war and the hope for human progress toward freedom from want. At first it was the latter change which occupied our attention. For the first time in history it seemed possible to escape from the grim boundaries of starvation, to abolish slavery and human misery, and to construct, not for a few, but for all, a society of opportunity and prosperity. During the nineteenth century our Nation, and many other nations too, were absorbed in the pursuit of this great new opportunity. We Americans were occupied in the opening of a continent, and in the rapid development of a new civilization founded to a unique degree upon the novel riches of the industrial age. During this century the people of the United States treated their foreign affairs as a minor problem. We believed that our foreign relations in the main could take care of themselves. We sought a vision of peaceful progress and we thought it could be found within our borders.

For we had grasped only one-half of the meaning of the industrial revolution. The progress of science and invention brought with it

a vastly increased interdependence among the nations of the world. The civilization it created was brittle, for the same science and invention which had produced new riches had produced at the same time a wholly new power of destruction. War became a threat, not merely to soldiers and able-bodied men, but to the whole fabric of society. And in the smaller, interconnected world of the twentieth century, war became a spreading terror from which no people could hope to stand apart.

Two great world wars have now brought home to mankind this tragic lesson. Indeed, in the closing days of the second world war there was unleashed an unprecedented weapon of such power that in any future war it might well shatter our present civilization.

Now in 1948, it seems clear that the people of this Nation have fully accepted two great truths. We have learned that aggressive war anywhere is a direct threat to us and to our freedom. We have learned that the peace, and the freedom, of all men, are indivisible. We have therefore accepted the heavy responsibilities which go with our great strength, and we have undertaken a position of leadership in the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world.

This great undertaking will continue as long as we can foresee. The crises and dangers of today may pass, but the progress of the world will never be automatic. We must recognize, therefore, that as a participating member of the world community, in time of peace as in time of peril, the United States must continue to play a major part.


In meeting the emergencies of recent years, we have frequently been forced to take special measures to reinforce the inadequate structure of our governmental machinery in foreign affairs. We have not had time—or we have thought we did not have time—to do a thorough job of reorganization to meet our new and broader duties. Now we know that this haste has brought grave problems. We know that we must settle down for a long pull.

The report here presented offers a sound basis for workmanlike reorganization. I commend it to the Commission. But above and beyond the merits of any specific proposal, I urge upon the Commission the absolutely critical importance of leaving nothing undone that may make us better able to ward off the danger of catastrophe, and to bring nearer, in so far as in us lies, the lasting peace which all mankind demands. Our people deserve the best in organization and skill from their Government. Our President and Secretary of State deserve every possible advantage of sound organization and qualified personnel. These are the instruments of our struggle for an end to fear and a beginning of new hope and confidence, among ourselves and all the people of the world.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON.

The Honorable HERBERT HOOVER.



FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Summary Statement

Your Foreign Affairs Task Force, after completion of comprehensive studies by ourselves and our staff, has been impressed by the drastic changes in the conduct of foreign affairs over the last 15 years, not only in the character and magnitude of the problems but also in the accelerated tempo of the operations and the complicated nature of governmental activities and procedures.

In approaching the question of solutions for the problems presented, the task force has considered it no part of its duties to appraise the capacity or performance of any individual, but rather to deal only with the type of personnel and the machinery best adapted in the long run to make it easier for whatever persons may be in office to carry out their duties effectively.

It is of course true that the effectiveness of any operation, whether in government or in private business, depends primarily on the quality of the men and women who occupy positions of responsibility, and in this matter of the conduct of foreign affairs there is a strong temptation to say that all that is necessary is to obtain the services of a sufficient number of the ablest men and women in the United States and let them determine the machinery best suited to their own operations.

A report to this effect would hardly be helpful. Furthermore, it is believed that the form of the machinery used is of great importance in aiding or hampering any public servant in the performance of his duties. There are certain principles and certain procedures which in the light of experience can be utilized to improve materially the present unsatisfactory situation. These principles and procedures, it is hoped, will commend themselves to the Congress, to the President, and to the executive departments and agencies as valuable in making the United States activities in foreign affairs more consistent, more efficient, and in fact more wise.

A number of facts have struck us with great force:

First

a. The traditional line of demarcation between domestic and foreign problems has completely disappeared, and the governmental organization must be shaped to formulate and execute national policies which have both domestic and foreign aspects.

b. The activities of departments and agencies other than the State Department affect to an extraordinary degree the conduct of foreign affairs, and these other departments and agencies show an increasing tendency to establish policies or make policy interpretations in the foreign affairs area which are not coordinated with the foreign policies or interpretations of the State Department. The policies or interpretations of the State Department, in turn, are not always coordinated with over-all United States national policies.

c. As a result the conduct of foreign affairs within the executive branch more than ever requires action, supervision, and coordination from the office of the President and cannot be solely the special province of the State Department.

d. In partial response to this situation, specialized inter-departmental bodies have appeared at the cabinet level to advise the President on the conduct of foreign affairs in certain areas, such as national security and international finance. There is a complete absence of such mechanisms to advise the President in other important or potentially important areas.

RECOMMENDATION

To meet these problems we recommend that the President should establish cabinet-level committees to advise him on both the domestic and foreign aspects of matters affecting foreign affairs and involving more than one department or agency of the executive branch. They should be on a regular or *ad hoc* basis as the occasion demands. Specific committees should not be established by statute, but general enabling legislation should afford a flexible framework within which the President can act and should provide for specific institutional aids, including an executive secretary with purely procedural and no substantive powers. The executive secretary should not build up a large secretariat but should meet the bulk of his personnel needs by calling upon the various departments and agencies.

Second

a. The State Department has expanded enormously due, in part at least, to the absorption of certain war agencies of the government, such as the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Office of War Information (OWI).

b. There have been built up in the State Department organizational units which to some extent, at least, duplicate or parallel activities which are or should be appropriate functions of other departments and agencies of the government.

c. The activities of the State Department have extended into fields of program operation, such as propaganda, surplus property

disposition, and foreign economic assistance, which had never before been part of the functions of the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION

To meet this situation we recommend that the State Department's general responsibilities in foreign affairs should consist of obtaining definition of proposed objectives of the United States, of formulating proposed policies to achieve United States objectives (in conjunction with other departments and agencies where their interests are involved or where they have experience to contribute), and of recommending the choice and timing of the various means and instruments of carrying out United States foreign policies, as well as its traditional responsibilities in connection with representation abroad, collection and distribution of information, and negotiation. As a corollary, the State Department should not have responsibility for operation of programs such as those relating to foreign economic assistance and propaganda except in very unusual instances. The other departments and agencies, when called upon by the President or the Congress, should administer specific means or instruments of carrying out United States foreign policies (under the observation and with the advice of the State Department) in a manner consistent with other United States foreign policies and with over-all United States objectives.

Third

a. An appalling burden has fallen on the Secretary and Under Secretary of State and no human being has the time or energy to carry on the duties they have been attempting to perform. At the present time and under present conditions, this situation is intolerable.

b. There are many delays and much confusion in the coordination of the activities of the various major organizational units within the State Department, largely resulting from a lack of operational responsibility below the level of the office of the Secretary or Under Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the internal organization of the State Department should be recast as follows:

a. The structure for policy and action should be regional to the fullest possible extent with four regional Assistant Secretaries responsible for the four traditional geographic areas of the world, but supplemented by an Assistant Secretary for multilateral affairs who should be responsible for matters transcending the spheres of the regional Assistant Secretaries, and who should be responsible for our policy with respect to international organizations, for interdepartmental

coordination and for supervision of certain small groups of functional specialists.

b. The Secretary should delegate to the four regional Assistant Secretaries responsibility to take action in their respective areas within broad policies previously defined by him, and he should decentralize to them the day-to-day tools of administration.

c. The Secretary, in exercising supervision, should be aided by an Under Secretary who, as at present, can act for him as his alter ego, and by a Deputy Under Secretary who will be responsible for the planning and coordinating process and, in particular, for overseeing a high-level operational policy committee and an executive secretariat which are to insure thorough consideration of all aspects of policy matters and to enforce orderly procedure.

d. The administration and management of the State Department and its missions overseas should be made the responsibility of a Deputy Under Secretary for Administration who in personnel, budget, and other managerial problems, can invoke and rely upon the active attention and direction of the Secretary and Under Secretary.

e. The responsibility for recommending action should be assigned in each case to a single officer below the rank of Assistant Secretary who is in either the regional or multilateral system (depending on where the decision is to be effectuated) who must consult (but never be required to secure concurrence of) the other regional desks and multilateral or advisory groups affected, and then report their consultation and comment with his recommendation. Final action on such recommendations should be restricted to the five Assistant Secretaries, the Deputy Under Secretaries, the Under Secretary, or the Secretary.

f. The present economic and other functional staffs should be reduced to (i) a small group of specialists (mentioned above) who do not duplicate the informational and advising functions of other departments or agencies but act as liaison with them and serve as staff consultants within the State Department and (ii) functional specialists attached to the regional offices. The Department should rely primarily upon the other departments and agencies for information and experience within their fields, insisting upon their being organized to supply these needs.

Fourth

a. There is serious unrest in the relations between the Foreign Service and the State Department personnel of the civil service.

b. The personnel of both the State Department and the Foreign Service, in general, have been of high quality and have demonstrated a devotion to duty during a most confused and difficult period. Both services have been kept out of politics.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the personnel in the permanent State Department establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a single foreign affairs service, divided into grades and divisions, obligated to serve at home or overseas and constituting a safeguarded career group administered separately from the general civil service as it now exists.

Fifth

There has been growing distrust of the State Department and its operations by members of the Congress, and to some extent also by the public. This produces serious, and in some cases disastrous, effects upon the maintenance of the continuous operation of sound foreign policies, with the ever present danger of withdrawal of vital congressional approval and financial support.

RECOMMENDATION

The recommendations made above will, we believe, materially improve this situation. We further recommend that the State Department should place congressional relations in the hands of an Assistant Secretary on a full-time basis who should be responsible for supervising and give direction to all State Department relationships with the Congress.

We recognize the confusion that has resulted from constant changes in the principal officers of the State Department and also of other departments and agencies, and the added confusion in the State Department which has come from repeated threats of major reorganizations and from constant minor organizational changes and reassignments of duties. We, therefore, emphasize the importance of continuity in office, and we recommend that any reorganization which may be determined upon be carried through as rapidly as possible. And we also recognize that some of our recommendations may already have been adopted or are already under consideration.



PART ONE

Chapter I

ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

The conduct of foreign affairs today involves almost the entire executive branch—the President, the President's executive office, the State Department, numerous other departments and agencies, and intricate interdepartmental machinery. In addition, it involves constant cooperation between the executive branch and the Congress. As a consequence the problems of organization are equally government-wide in scope, and organizational reforms must be based on definite concepts of the part to be played by each segment of the Government.

The concepts for organization within the Executive Branch are, in summary, the following:

1. The decisions within the executive branch as to the objectives of the United States in world affairs are ultimately decisions for the President only to make. He may, of course, delegate this power, but, as the sole elected member of the executive branch, he cannot divest himself of his final responsibility. When the President does delegate the power to make decisions, it must be recognized that it is impractical to make a blanket delegation to the State Department alone or to any other single department or agency.

2. The executive responsibility for the formulation and carrying out of foreign policies to achieve objectives is today that of the President. Under the President this responsibility is shared in various degrees by numerous departments and agencies throughout the executive establishment.

3. The responsibility for coordinating all the foreign affairs activities of the State Department and the other departments and agencies, whether in the decision-making process or in the processes of policy formulation and execution, ultimately is also that of the President. In delegating this responsibility the President may turn to the State Department, which is the specialist in foreign affairs, for example, to provide chairmen for interdepartmental committees, or he may turn elsewhere, depending on the balance of foreign and domestic implications in a particular problem.

4. The conduct of foreign affairs today involves the use of many means and instruments. Financial assistance, force or potential force, and propaganda are a few of the major ones. The utilization of these instruments similarly involves the performance of numerous supporting functions. A few examples are collection of information, evaluation of information through analysis and research, dissemination of information, employment of personnel, disbursement of funds, making of contracts, issuance of rules and regulations, and drafting of legislation.

5. The responsibility today for a decision as to which of several instruments to employ in the conduct of foreign affairs, together with the accompanying decisions as to when to employ them and as to the purposes to be accomplished thereby, carries with it an additional responsibility. This additional responsibility is for coordination throughout the executive branch in the choice of the instrument, the time of its use, and the purposes to be accomplished thereby. It is essential to recognize that in the discharge of this multifold responsibility two different segments of the executive branch may perform functions which appear similar, but there should not and need not be duplication by the performance of identical functions in two parts of the Government. For example, if it is deemed to be of advantage to the United States that a democratic rather than a communistic government be in power in a foreign country, it may be found desirable to employ many instruments, including those of public information or propaganda, financial assistance, or other aids against outside interference. The medium of information may be in the State Department, the financial assistance instrument in Economic Cooperative Administration, the Export-Import Bank and elsewhere, and other instruments may be in other branches of the Government. All of these instruments, for example, involve the function of research and analysis of information. The State Department's research and analysis would relate to the state of public opinion of the country in question and the factors influential in forming public opinion; ECA's research and analysis would be directed to the economic condition of the foreign country and the balance of international trade; and the military establishment's research and analysis to the status of communist military power on the borders of the country in question and the best disposition of United States forces in occupied areas nearby to strengthen the democratic elements in power in the country in question. Yet the performance of these functions involves no inevitable duplication of effort. For example, no duplication would occur in the case of financial assistance so long as the State Department economic and research units do not go over the same economic ground as those of ECA.

6. Decisions as to the conduct of foreign affairs today inevitably are decisions affecting our whole political, economic, and social life. The problem of organization for the conduct of foreign affairs is,

therefore, but a segment of the larger problem of organization for the conduct of national affairs. Hence, governmental organization for the conduct of foreign affairs cannot be created as a separate mechanism but must be regarded as an integral part of a larger mechanism.

These general concepts provide the foundation for a plan of organization for the participation of the entire Government in the conduct of foreign affairs. As organizational problems transcend the foreign affairs area, so will this plan of organization. Certain recommendations will, therefore, bear directly on over-all government organization for the conduct of national affairs, while others are of equal validity in the foreign-affairs area and domestic area.

The plan of organization embodied in the recommendations which follow is in some measure geared to the immediate future. Times change and organizational forms must be adjusted accordingly. Organization cannot be immutable and the recommendations herein cannot be regarded as having indefinite validity. Furthermore, the organizational problems of today are rarely all "black" or all "white," and many recommendations can do little more than indicate points at which future Government administrators must seek the proper shade of "gray."

Chapter II

ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations which follow are essentially recommendations of principles. Neither this report nor the supporting material purport to be a complete blueprint covering the many possible applications of these principles. Certain specific suggestions for organizational reform will, of course, be set forth, but the details of these reforms will generally have to be worked out by the men in charge of the various organizational segments. To a limited extent the particulars of certain suggestions will be amplified in supporting appendices, to which appropriate references will be made from time to time.

A. Recommendations Concerning the Congress

The general principles governing congressional participation in the conduct of foreign affairs presuppose the existence of general legislative-executive agreement, whether this comes about through common control of the legislative and executive branches by the same political party or, in the absence of such common control, through a spirit of bipartisanship in the present period of world crisis. They further presuppose an atmosphere of mutual respect and confidence in the sphere of legislative-executive relations, and that the President recognizes the signal importance of good administration and possesses the will to see that all segments of the executive branch are organized and actually operate in conformance with principles of good administration.

RECOMMENDATION 1

Legislation which grants new foreign affairs powers of an executive nature otherwise than to the President or to an established executive department or agency will normally cause serious difficulty in efficient administration, and such legislation should not be adopted unless there are overwhelming advantages in creating a new agency.

Each time the Congress creates a new agency with the power to employ a specified instrument of foreign policy, it weakens the executive establishment as a whole. Jurisdictional tides are immediately set in motion which increase the possibility of duplication and the burden of coordination. The latter is already so heavy on the President that many problems of coordination must be left untouched.

By giving the new powers to the President, the Congress would strengthen his executive power to integrate this new authority with already existing authority. By giving it to an existing department or agency, the burden of coordination would be transferred in large measure from the President to the head of the department or agency. Particular care, moreover, should be taken not to confer executive powers on independent commissions which are not responsible to the President. While the creation of independent bodies to discharge quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions will always be necessary, the grant to them of executive powers is contrary to the principles of sound organization and impedes the efficient conduct of foreign affairs.

RECOMMENDATION 2

Effective administration is not achieved by establishing by legislation the precise functions and membership of coordinating and advisory bodies within the executive branch.

The Congress has recently established or recognized in legislation several interdepartmental bodies with special powers over foreign affairs, e. g., the National Security Council, the National Advisory Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Air Coordinating Committee.

This practice tends to obscure the responsibility for making executive decisions, to make each of the bodies acquire the aspects of a new agency, and to encourage other interdepartmental groups to seek formal congressional sanction. All of these tendencies add up to weakening the power of the Chief Executive, a circumstance which in turn reduces his responsibility and complicates the administration of the executive branch. Such legislation does not assure better coordination in the executive branch, nor can it require the President to use the advice received. The Congress can, however, facilitate executive creation of coordinating and advisory bodies by enactment of general enabling legislation.

RECOMMENDATION 3

Legislation making specific grants of foreign affairs powers and of supporting funds below the level of the department or agency head should be avoided.

In the past the Congress on occasion has granted specific power and appropriated specific funds below the department or agency head level, as in the cases of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This practice tends to free the grantee from executive control, encourages him to establish independent channels of communication with the Congress, and aggravates the

problem of coordinating foreign relations activities both within individual departments and agencies and between different units of the executive branch.

The practice of appropriating funds directly to a constituent unit of a department or agency further limits the ability of the department or agency head to adjust the foreign affairs programs of his several bureaus or offices to meet changing international conditions and to reduce internal overlapping or duplication of effort.

RECOMMENDATION 4

The acceptance of other recommendations in this report would make necessary legislative amendments and certain new legislation, and the adoption of these amendments and this legislation is recommended.

By reference to the subsequent proposals of this report, it will be seen that many of them cannot be acted upon without organizational changes that are beyond the present powers of the President. Moreover, because the administrative processes involved in the conduct of foreign affairs are inseparably linked to those connected with the conduct of domestic affairs, it is necessary for the President to reorganize his branch of the Government with this factor in mind. In other words, it would be impractical for him to be given authority only to reorganize those segments of the executive branch engaged in foreign affairs activities.

B. Recommendations Concerning the Presidency

The general principles with respect to the role of the President and that of his Executive Office in the conduct of foreign affairs recognize the scope of the task of the Chief Executive and his importance as the director and chief administrator of the executive establishment.

RECOMMENDATION 5

Cabinet level committees should be established by the President to advise him on the conduct of national affairs, including both foreign and domestic aspects, whenever several departments or agencies of government are involved.

The national requirements of the United States, of which foreign requirements are but a part, are not easily ascertained, and sound national policies can only be formed by placing side by side for comparison, for example, a financial outlook, a natural resources outlook, a transportation outlook, a manpower outlook, and a security outlook. These committees would be at the Cabinet level but would function directly under the President and not as part of the Cabinet. The Cabinet as such is too large and includes too many individuals whose

interests are not affected to permit it to function as an effective high-level council to the President.

The establishment of Cabinet-level national policy committees by the President, on a regular or ad hoc basis as required, could well serve to provide him with a systematic device for receiving well-balanced advice, in the sense that in it all aspects of national requirements and objectives would be joined. The composition of these committees would do much to bring about the needed and desired balance, for their membership could reflect the important aspects of any given substantive consideration. Specific committees should not be established by statute, but general enabling legislation would be desirable to afford a flexible framework within which the President could act.

At present the most influential Cabinet-level interdepartmental bodies (e. g., the National Security Council, the National Advisory Council, and the National Security Resources Board) deal with segments of national requirements but within no carefully conceived and balanced framework of broad national objectives and policies. The National Security Council, the membership of which is heavily over-weighted with the military, deals solely with foreign policy matters with strong security overtones, but may do so with insufficient regard to other considerations such as natural resources or manpower. The National Advisory Council views foreign affairs largely through the instrument of financial assistance and so tends to ignore the agricultural or mineral aspects of the Nation's economy. Thus the President has brought to him proposals which have been formulated by a group of specialists whose outlook is perforce conditioned largely by the attitudes inherent in their specialized disciplines.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Specific institutional aids should be set up in the office of the Chief Executive, or associated with it, to facilitate the successful functioning of the advisory committees at Cabinet level as well as the many interdepartmental committees at other levels which are necessary.

The key to the successful functioning of the advisory committees suggested in recommendation 5 lies in (1) an effective executive secretary—with close relationships with the President but no substantive powers, (2) a process which uses the participating departments' and agencies' regular policy staffs in developing recommendations for the President (in lieu of creating a sizable, distinct new staff), and (3) an efficient documentation procedure. The present National Security Council (NSC) operation illustrates the type of executive secretary, staff work, and procedures proposed. It is emphasized that if the executive secretary undertakes to give substantive advice or

to make decisions on behalf of the President, the authority of the Cabinet members will be undermined and the plan of coordination will fail.

From the strictly foreign affairs viewpoint, the advisory committees would aid in integrating the viewpoints and requirements based largely on foreign considerations with those rooted in the domestic. These committees would serve as the means through which the Secretary of State, for instance, would review and comment upon the probable international consequences of a proposed domestic program as well as the means through which the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce could review and comment on proposed programs, such as European recovery, from the viewpoint of the capacity and willingness of the nation to meet the critical demands involved before they are announced as United States policy. These high-level committees could also establish a framework within which the present working level interdepartmental committee structure could be integrated and given supervision and guidance.

At present the Executive Office of the President provides insufficient coordination of the agencies and interagency committees active in foreign affairs matters. Of the 33 impartial committees in this field, only 8 were established by Presidential directive. Since their establishment, however, the President's Office has given them little, if any, attention or guidance.

The necessity for interdepartmental committees arises out of the fact that the separate power of one agency cannot be exercised without regard to the separate power of one or more other agencies. The establishment of a committee, therefore, indicates that the exercise of the power of each agency member taken separately must be checked and so, in effect, subordinated to the aggregate powers of all the committee members. It seems clear beyond argument that the President, therefore, should control the establishment and termination of, and give general direction to, such foreign affairs committees, because as Chief Executive he should determine the manner in which the several departments and agencies exercise their powers in relation to one another. The President could fulfill this recommendation by several means:

First, he could appoint an executive secretary with purely procedural and no substantive powers who, with the aid of a small staff, would service the national policy committees suggested in recommendation 5. Second, working level interdepartmental committees should have their work related to that of the Cabinet-level committees. A byproduct of this step would be the rationalization and proper interrelation of the present interdepartmental committee structure, which would enable a drastic reduction in the number of committees.

This recommendation does not mean that all coordination must be formalized through committees. Informal consultation will neces-

sarily still play a large part in interdepartmental coordination. As experience indicates, the existence of formal or semiformal committees will make for easier informal consultation.

C. Recommendations Concerning the State Department and the Foreign Service

The concepts of organization underlying this report require that the Secretary and Under Secretary of State have, first, an understanding of the broad basic roles of the President, the State Department, and the other departments and agencies in the conduct of foreign affairs, and, second, a live appreciation of the need for executive leadership and administrative direction. In the latter regard, they should not permit the overwhelming substantive responsibilities of their offices to obscure the vital role which good organization and administration can play in helping them to meet those responsibilities.

In any reorganizational endeavors the Secretary and Under Secretary should be vigilant to promote a wide understanding throughout the State Department and the Foreign Service of the objectives to be achieved. While seeking this general understanding, however, they must simultaneously realize that vested interests in both services will have to be dealt with firmly and decisively and cannot be permitted to delay reforms until the United States is once again in normal times.

RECOMMENDATION 7

The State Department should concentrate on the task of obtaining definition of proposed objectives for the United States in its foreign affairs, of formulating proposed policies (in conjunction with other departments and agencies where their interests are involved or where they have experience to contribute) to achieve those objectives, and of recommending the choice and timing of the use of various instruments to carry out foreign policies so formulated.

The ultimate responsibility in the determination of United States objectives and in formulating, executing, and coordinating foreign policies lies with the President. Under him the State Department is cast in the role of the specialist in foreign affairs and, pursuant to Presidential delegation, this role will involve leadership in defining and developing United States foreign policies, in determining the means of their accomplishment, in the recording of such policies, and in seeing to it that such policies are explained at home and abroad.

The State Department is not, moreover, the sole unit of the executive branch for determination of the objectives of the United States in world affairs or for formulating and executing foreign policies to

achieve those objectives. Many other governmental departments and agencies, by reason of the present-day blending of the domestic and foreign aspects of national problems and by reason of operations abroad, are sources of policy considerations in the conduct of foreign affairs.

RECOMMENDATION 8

The State Department should consult and advise with the other departments and agencies for the purpose of assisting them to administer their respective instruments of foreign policy in a consistent manner and to achieve approved policy objectives.

The State Department should consult with and advise the other departments and agencies whenever the latter have power over instruments or perform duties or functions, at home and abroad, which involve them in the conduct of foreign affairs, or whenever these other departments and agencies have information or experience to contribute. The State Department and the other departments and agencies should arrive, by common agreement or if necessary by reference to the President, upon policies and means of their accomplishment. The other departments and agencies will then understand and accept these policies as the executive conclusion and attitude of the United States Government and not merely as the views of the State Department.

At times since the end of World War II the State Department has appeared to be attempting in some degree to duplicate the work of departments or agencies with power over certain instruments of foreign policy. It is this tendency which has led, for example, to the growth in State of aviation, shipping, labor, welfare, petroleum, and educational staffs. Such a trend, if allowed to develop unchecked, would ultimately lead to performance on a large scale within the State Department of duties more appropriate to the other departments and agencies.

It is sound to adopt the principle that the department or agency with the power to exercise an instrument of foreign policy should be looked to and relied upon by the State Department to gather the necessary facts within the special competence of the other department or agency on a world-wide basis, to evaluate those facts, to propose policies or programs within its power to execute, and to execute the programs agreed upon in accordance with established policy. In the event the State Department deems a department or agency to have failed to discharge its responsibilities, the recourse should be reference of the matter to the executive office, not duplication of the activity within the State Department. The President, in turn, must be prepared to require the other agency to do its job.

The corollary to this principle is that the State Department should concentrate its attention on seeing, for example, that the instrument

of financial assistance is being executed in consonance with the instrument of export control. If this principle were generally followed, the State Department would be able to drop the bulk of the specialized functions it has recently been or is now performing with respect to aviation, shipping, labor, educational exchange, and the like. Thereby it would rid itself of the burden of supervising large functional staffs and consequently free its staff to concentrate on the far more significant problems involving the integrated use of foreign policy instruments by the other agencies.

It is recognized that part of the State Department's expansion through recruitment and use of specialists in fields in which other departments and agencies are involved (as for example aviation, fuel, food, and specific commodities) came about because there was a vacuum to fill. That is to say, no machinery existed for assembling information and skills in these areas and for using them in negotiations abroad. Some agencies, however well-skilled, were originally oriented to consider only domestic interests and pressures and so sometimes were unwilling or unable to act boldly and constructively in foreign affairs where national security required domestic sacrifice or untraditional steps. To some extent these difficulties, while greatly reduced, still remain.

The solution is not for the State Department to continue duplicating specialists and enlisting salesmen to translate its views into national foreign policy. This practice produces waste, bad feeling, and even resistance, and consequently inefficient performance by departments and agencies charged by the Congress with operational duties. The only workable solution lies in Presidential insistence that each department or agency discharge its responsibilities in a competent manner and in the creation of better machinery for coordination between the State Department and those other departments and agencies. Much progress has and is being made toward these ends. The many emergency steps taken by the State Department in the early postwar years are readily understandable and the State Department's position can be sympathized with, but they were invasions of good governmental practice and are the source of much of the criticism which today hampers the work and diminishes the influence of an indispensable and really very capable foreign office.

Two specific situations are sufficiently related to this recommendation as to merit comment. The State Department in Washington, in connection with the issuance of visas and munition export control, appears to be engaged in activities which could be better performed elsewhere in the executive branch.

The Visa Division of the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Justice Department appear to have overlapping duties in the control and issuance of visas. The unclear division of authority between the two could be resolved by a merger

in either direction, but the Justice Department has superior facilities to furnish and evaluate the security information on the basis of which visas are granted or denied. All visa responsibility, therefore, except with respect to diplomatic visas, should be placed in the Justice Department. Visa work presently performed by the Foreign Service abroad should be continued but in accordance with policies established by the Justice Department in consultation with the State Department.

As to munition export control, the Commerce Department administers all export controls except those involving arms and armaments which are under the State Department. All export control functions should be consolidated in the Commerce Department, with the State Department being consulted, as at present, through the interdepartmental coordinating machinery.

RECOMMENDATION 9

The State Department as a general rule should not have responsibility for operation of programs such as foreign assistance or propaganda programs except where the considerations for imposition of such responsibility are overwhelming.

A corollary to the preceding recommendation is that the State Department should not be responsible for the operational aspects of foreign programs. The other departments and agencies, when called upon by the President or the Congress, should administer these programs under the observation and with the advice of the State Department.

Where particularly sensitive situations exist in foreign areas, the policy guidance of the State Department will, of course, have to be much closer than otherwise. Only in exceptional situations involving overwhelming considerations should the State Department assume direct operational responsibilities.

The State Department has recently had or now has operational responsibilities in various degrees for numerous programs, including:

1. Economic and social assistance and rehabilitation programs such as the Greek aid program, the Philippine rehabilitation program, and the program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. With the establishment of the European recovery program, responsibility for the economic phase of the Greek aid program was transferred to Economic Cooperative Administration. Operational responsibility for the Philippine and inter-American programs similarly could be transferred to ECA or to some similar agency devoted to foreign program operation.

2. Propaganda and educational exchange programs, such as presently authorized under the United States Foreign Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. The propaganda operational responsibilities could be transferred to a Government corporation or Presidential agency and the educational exchange duties to the Fed-

eral Security Agency. In the former case, for the time being at least, close policy guidance by the State Department would continue to be necessary. In the latter, the Federal Security Agency would appear to require certain reorientation and reorganization in order to discharge these additional duties.

3. Engineering programs, such as presently involved in the Rio Grande River valley through the United States section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. The United States section, under the State Department, should concentrate on coordination, adjudication, and negotiation, but in engineering and construction work the services of other Government agencies already in the construction field should be utilized, as appears to be permissible under the protocol to the treaty between the United States and Mexico.

One of the largest and most difficult foreign programs in existence today relates to the administration of occupied areas in Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. Under the present scheme of organization, the State Department is responsible for the formulation of policy and the Army Department for the execution and administration of policy. This arrangement, for a variety of reasons, has not been satisfactory. The reasons are fundamental and attributable to both departments. They include, among other things, a lack of desire in both departments to be saddled with the operational function and the present budgetary arrangements whereby occupation funds are procured by the Army Department. Clarification of the issue of what is policy and what is administration has not been achieved and attempts in that direction have never risen above the Secretary level so that a Presidential decision could be obtained.

The principle contained in this recommendation points to the conclusion that the State Department should not assume operational responsibility for administration of the occupied areas. Coupled with the present critical character of United States-Soviet relations, it would appear preferable for the present for operational responsibility to remain within the National Military Establishment. Disputes which arise on the issue of policy versus administration should be worked out through the National Security Council or such other comparable cabinet level committee as may be created. In particular, the budget estimates for occupied areas should reflect agreement between the two departments as to the funds required and should be related to estimated needs for other foreign policy objectives of the United States. If these efforts are unavailing in removing the present frictions, if security considerations are no longer predominant, and if no other assignment of operational responsibility for occupied areas is possible (as, for example, to a new agency devoted to foreign program operations), the considerations for assumption by the State

Department of occupied area operational responsibility may be deemed so overwhelming as to require that step to be taken.

RECOMMENDATION 10

The role and activities of the State Department in the conduct of foreign affairs should be limited to the general areas indicated in recommendations 7, 8, and 9 and to its traditional representation, reporting, and negotiation responsibilities.

The role of the State Department under the President and in relation to the other departments and agencies has been outlined in recommendations 7, 8, and 9. In addition, the State Department, with an overseas arm, should continue to discharge its traditional responsibilities in the fields of representation, reporting, and negotiation. Its principal duties, under Presidential direction, should be:

1. To establish, man, maintain, and conduct the machinery of diplomatic relations, correspondence, conversation, negotiation, and agreement with other governments except where, in technical or special cases, parts of these activities are assigned to other departments or agencies, and even then the State Department should observe and counsel their conduct.

2. To recruit and maintain personnel adequate for its tasks at home and abroad, protected as a career service by tradition as well as law from invasion by political or other demoralizing influences, this service being pledged to refrain from partisan or political activity and to serve loyally whatever national administration may be in power—always as anonymously as possible.

3. To establish, maintain, inspect, and supervise our diplomatic and consular missions abroad, arranging their strength, personnel, functions, housing, equipment and supply, and providing all their personnel except when the President otherwise directs in exceptional cases.

4. To give guidance and direction to our diplomatic missions and delegations abroad, review and distribute to other interested agencies the intelligence gathered by them, see to it that their recommendations are acknowledged and considered, leaving to them wherever possible ways and means of accomplishment.

5. To aid the President in the selection of suitable persons other than career servants whenever he or the Congress determines they should be drawn from the public at large for particular purposes or particular missions.

6. To assume primary responsibility for foreign relations aspects of general policies followed by all peacetime missions overseas, including occupation forces and special missions and programs, and to this end to see that the activities and conduct of all American officers abroad

are reported to, and are observed and counseled by, the chief of the American diplomatic mission if such officers are temporary, and if permanent and not involving operational programs, that such officers are made part of the diplomatic mission itself.

7. To recommend to the President any participation by us and the extent of our participation in international bodies and conferences and to supervise our delegations when established except as the President or Congress otherwise determines in special cases. This involves consultation and coordination with other departments and agencies.

8. To preserve with the Senate and House a continuous working system of liaison and intercommunication on all matters affecting foreign affairs, in order to reach mutual comprehension, confidence, and agreement.

The organizational arrangements under which the above duties would be performed will be stated more specifically in Recommendations 11, 12, 13, and 14 below.

RECOMMENDATION 11

The State Department should be organized so as to permit the Secretary of State to provide executive direction, to divest himself from the pressure of day-to-day business, and to utilize staff assistance to the fullest possible extent. This should be accomplished by clearer and more definite demarcation of the general responsibilities of the various segments of the State Department, accompanied by a more liberal delegation of authority.


The recommended organization of the State Department can best be viewed in terms of three levels: (1) A top level of the Secretary of State and his alter ego, the Under Secretary of State; (2) a staff level on which some officials have purely staff responsibilities while others are essentially operational officers with staff duties; and (3) an operational level, operational being used not in the sense of program operation but in that of performance of the more limited functions by the State Department outlined in Recommendation 10 above.

The composition of these three levels is shown on chart I on the following pages. In summary it should be approximately as follows:


1. The top level, in addition to the Secretary and Under Secretary, should include two Deputy Under Secretaries, one to act in substantive matters pursuant to delegation by the Under Secretary, and one to serve on the administrative side as the general manager of the State Department in Washington and overseas. The latter in time might well acquire semipermanent status.

2. The staff level would contain: (a) Staff officers such as an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, an Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (domestic and foreign information policy), the Legal Adviser, and the chiefs of planning and intelligence; (b) an Assistant

CHART I—



Recommended Organization



Secretary with predominantly staff responsibility for multilateral or global affairs, for policy with respect to international organizations, for interdepartmental coordination, and for special advice from the global or functional point of view; and (c) an active high-level Operational Planning Committee under the direct supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary for substantive matters, assisted by an executive secretariat, which would insure coordination between the action and staff levels and provide correlation and operational planning.

3. The action or operational level would consist of four Assistant Secretaries of State, each assigned to head up a regional segment of the world, to whom the operating divisions should report without interposition of a level such as the present offices. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of multilateral affairs may from time to time have responsibilities at this level. The four regional assistant secretaries should be responsible not solely for political aspects of foreign affairs arising in their respective areas, as is the basic conception of the responsibility of the present geographic office directors, but for all aspects, whether they be political, economic, public opinion, intelligence, or administration. Their duties should include close liaison and collaboration with the staff level in arriving at over-all as well as day-to-day policy. They should also be responsible for the supervision of the field establishments in their respective regions.¹

RECOMMENDATION 12

The Secretary of State should take steps to define the fundamental foreign policies of the United States, and should delegate authority to the operational level to take action within the policies so defined.

Since the end of World War II the State Department has been too much concerned with details and not enough with policy. By giving more attention to the objectives and selection of instruments of foreign policy it can allay this criticism and bring breadth of vision to the proposed cabinet level policy advisory committees under the President. This attention would, moreover, facilitate delegation of authority within the State Department so as to eliminate confusion and delay.

In recent years the State Department has endeavored to reduce to writing the United States' objectives and foreign policies by countries and by areas of the world. Continued emphasis on this admittedly difficult endeavor, particularly in promoting more widespread appre-

¹ Recommendation 12 recommends a total of two Deputy Under Secretaries and seven Assistant Secretaries in addition to the Secretary and Under Secretary. It contemplates abolition of the position of counselor and transfer of the duties of the Assistant Secretary—Occupied Areas to the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary. In January 1948 the State Department was authorized to have six assistant secretaries, a counselor, and an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in addition to the Secretary and Under Secretary. The position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs has since been abolished. Therefore, this recommendation involves establishing two new positions, i. e., two Deputy Under Secretaries.

ciation of its importance and by making such written statements available to all concerned, will make possible the relation of objectives within and between countries and regions and will afford a basis for greater consistency of policy. It can, furthermore, provide a means for better understanding and closer cooperation between the State Department and the other departments and agencies within the executive branch, and can furnish more intelligent guidance to chiefs of missions abroad and free them from the necessity of referring all details to Washington. Finally, a clear understanding of objectives and policies throughout the State Department will help reduce the man-killing load carried by the present top personnel, and generally free the State Department from the dangerous condition of being able to handle only the day's more urgent matters and of determining policies in terms of day-to-day decisions.

With respect to the operational level, the major emphasis should be on delegation of authority and responsibility to the regional Assistant Secretaries and decentralization to them of the tools with which to do their jobs. While it is fully recognized that the trend in the conduct of present-day foreign affairs is toward multilateral dealings, it is nonetheless believed that the organization at the operational level must, as a practical matter, be primarily (but not exclusively) along regional lines, and, further, that a properly conceived regional scheme of organization is, on the whole, better suited to grapple with multilateral problems than one patterned primarily on functional lines.

Responsibility to the fullest extent possible for the formulation of foreign policy proposals, and for action in line with approved policies, should be placed on the four regional Assistant Secretaries but supplemented by the Assistant Secretary for multilateral affairs in matters transcending the regional spheres. The assignment of such responsibility must take place at the top level through the Deputy Under Secretary on the substantive side and through the Operational Planning Committee.

Within the regional and multilateral systems, the responsibility for recommending action in a given case should be assigned to a single officer below the Assistant Secretary level. This officer must consult (but never be required to secure the concurrence of) the other regional units and multilateral advisory groups affected, and then report the results of such consultation with his recommendation. Adequate machinery to enforce this consultation process should be developed through the executive secretariat. Every consultant should be allowed to attach to any document his comment, or protest if he dissents, after his views have been considered. The action on such recommendations should be restricted to the five Assistant Secretaries, the Deputy Under Secretaries, the Under Secretary, and the Secretary.

The present staffs of the economic and other functional units should be transferred in part to the new regional units and in part to the new

multilateral unit. The intelligence research divisions, presently organized on a geographic basis, under the Special Assistant-Research and Intelligence should be decentralized as intact units to the new regional units, preferably with some reduction in personnel. The new multilateral unit, in addition to such limited action responsibility as may be assigned to it from time to time, will have diverse responsibilities. As indicated above, it will provide functional advice from a multilateral point of view to the regional units of the State Department. It also will serve as the liaison between the State Department and the other departments and agencies. A very small group of functional advisers should suffice for these purposes and the multilateral specialists should not duplicate the staffs of other departments and agencies or the functional staffs of the State Department's regional units. It should rely upon the other departments and agencies for information within the latter's special competences, both domestic and foreign, and should, through the Secretary of State, call the President's attention to inadequacies of the other departments and agencies.

Finally, the unit under the Assistant Secretary for multilateral affairs should be the channel for instructions to and from United States representatives and delegations at the United Nations and all other international organizations and conferences. Policy proposals involving international organizations should, in the main, emanate from the regional units which should be required to consult other regional desks and also specialist advisers.

The signature of instructions or other action papers on policy should be restricted to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretaries, and the Assistant Secretaries for regional areas and multilateral affairs, except as they may individually authorize division chiefs to attach their names to specific types of correspondence, and thereby delegate power but not responsibility. Normally they should act by reviewing the recommendation of the officer assigned the responsibility of considering the question.

RECOMMENDATION 13

The Secretary of State should continue the present high level planning activity under a planning adviser, with special emphasis on freeing him and his staff of current problems, upon providing him with broad gage staff, and upon utilization by him of competent advice from outside the government.

The present Policy Planning staff has been a valuable aid to the top command of the State Department, especially as an "anticipator" of problems. At present, however, its effectiveness appears to have been lessened by a tendency of the top command to utilize it on day-to-day problems, by its almost exclusive reliance for its staff on

individuals with Foreign Service backgrounds, and by its reluctance to draw sufficiently upon the resources of other departments and agencies except possibly those of the National Military Establishment. These weaknesses should be corrected.

In addition, the Secretary of State should endeavor to bring together a small group of highly competent and reliable individuals from outside the Government to counsel the Planning Adviser. This group should not, either on request or on its own initiative, give affirmative advice as to what the world objectives and foreign policies of the United States should be, but it should concentrate on problems submitted to it by the Planning Adviser and on advising him of the probable consequences of various proposed courses of action. This group might include former ambassadors, other former government officials, leaders from business, commerce and labor, and educators.

RECOMMENDATION 14

The Secretary of State should retain top-level policy control of the tools of administration, but should decentralize the actual utilization of these tools to the operational level insofar as possible.

The delegation of substantive authority to the four regional Assistant Secretaries and the one multilateral Assistant Secretary at the operational level requires that these officers have the necessary tools of administration with which to carry on their work with respect to missions overseas and at international organizations. This is particularly true in the case of regional Assistant Secretaries, each of whom should be responsible within the policies established by the Deputy Under Secretary on the administrative side for organizational planning, personnel administration, budgetary and other matters.

The Deputy Under Secretary on the administrative side would have under him various units responsible for organization, personnel, budget, and other managerial and housekeeping functions. Each of the regional Assistant Secretaries would have corresponding units under his direct control to serve the overseas missions. The units under the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration should provide policy guidance to the decentralized units on the regional side, should be responsible for coordinating over-all policies and administration for the State Department as a whole, and should assume direct responsibility for all administrative matters for the Department and for overseas phases of administration for which decentralized administration is not advisable.

This recommendation contemplates that the Deputy Under Secretary will provide capable centralized staff development of administrative policies, standards, and controls. The Secretary and Under Secretary must appreciate their executive task in which the Deputy

Under Secretary for Administration is not a trivial adjunct but an active aide who, through use of good administrative techniques, can increase intradepartment efficiency and remove many of the frustrations which now are present in the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION 15

The personnel in the permanent State Department establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a single foreign affairs service, divided into grades and divisions, obligated to serve at home or overseas and constituting a safeguarded career group administered separately from the general Civil Service as it now exists.

The State Department and the American embassies, legations, and consulates abroad, which together make up the diplomatic and consular machinery of the nation, are now served by two separate groups of men and women, one "The Foreign Service of the United States" and the other enrolled under the ordinary civil-service system. The two groups, in terms of American citizens, are approximately equal in size. This division of forces between a Foreign Service centering on a so-called "elite corps" of officers, mostly stationed abroad but partly in key positions in Washington, and a group of employees who work chiefly at home is a source of friction and increasing inefficiency. Such a division of personnel in foreign affairs has been abandoned in all but a handful of countries. Among those where it still exists, the United States is the only great power.

The division leads to jealousies, a sense of social distinctions, and of inequality of compensation among people doing much the same work. The Foreign Service, through long periods of service abroad, undoubtedly loses, in some degree, contact and sympathy with American domestic conditions and sentiments. The civil service employees, who seldom or never serve abroad for any long period, fail often to understand other nations and appreciate foreign conditions. The Foreign Service officers, who have high capacity but rather uniform character, who are chosen by a stiff competitive process and who soon develop esprit and fraternal allegiance to each other, contrast sharply with the employees, specialists, and administrators at home who have quite a different outlook, possess little corporate feeling, are in many cases unwilling to serve abroad, and are inclined to discount the viewpoint and problems of those who do.

The present conditions also lead to the existence of two administrative offices, one for each body of public servants, but both in the same household and dealing frequently with the same personnel questions. The Foreign Service is in law and practice largely self-administered, is to some degree even independent of the Secretary of State, and sometimes shows a tendency to be conscious of its own

interests as against those of the Department or even the Nation—a natural and familiar fault of any military or civilian elite corps.

The amalgamation of these two services has been proposed repeatedly for years.

The consolidation should proceed on the following principles:

1. A single career service, for which the title "Foreign Affairs Corps" is used in this statement, should be established by amendment of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, preserving the features and procedure of that legislation, except as hereafter suggested.

2. The consolidation should be gradual in order not to weaken the morale and the present high quality of the Foreign Service or discard too abruptly many civil-service employees of long service. It should however be mandatory and progressive, under legislative enactments which cannot be avoided by unsympathetic administration and which contemplate a complete consolidation within about 5 years.

3. The consolidation should exclude at the top the Secretary and the Under and Assistant Secretaries and other officials of Assistant Secretary rank, and in the lower ranks mechanical or subsidiary employees such as janitors, engineers, guards, and messengers. It should exclude ambassadors and ministers, but the President, in nominating such officers and ministers from outside the foreign affairs corps, should by tradition explain his special reasons. It should exclude all alien employees of whatever rank. All other governmental officers and employees in the permanent establishment at home and abroad should be included.

4. This new corps should staff both the State Department and the overseas missions, should be pledged to accept both types of service and should be required to serve both at home and abroad. The division of time between Washington and the field should, for the bulk of the personnel, be as nearly equal as the number of posts in the Department and the field permit, although in very limited instances, as in the case of lawyers, the proportion of home duty will probably be greater than on the average.

5. The execution of the consolidation should be entrusted to a special temporary board appointed by the Secretary of State with a suggested membership of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration as chairman, one senior member of the present Foreign Service, one senior civil-service employee of the Department not theretofore connected with the administration of the Foreign Service, one representative of the Civil Service Commission, and one member of the general public (perhaps a former ranking State Department official or ambassador now retired). This Board should establish over-all policies and standards governing transfer, classification, examination, promotion, and retirement which will be required to accomplish the consolidation. It should not administer the new corps.

6. The new corps should be administered by the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Since no reason will exist for the position of Director General of the Foreign Service, it should be abolished.

7. The corps should consist of four categories of personnel, as follows:

a. A general officer category with classes or grades similar to the seven classes in which the Foreign Service officers are now enrolled.

b. A special officer category with six classes or grades equal in all respects to classes 1 through 6 of the present Foreign Service officer category.

c. A staff category with clerical, fiscal, custodial, minor administrative and similar responsibilities, corresponding to the present Staff employee category but including only personnel drawing compensation of not higher than \$4,500 per annum.

d. A temporary (or "reserve") officer category similar to the present reserve category but designed to serve the needs of the other departments and agencies and to meet temporary or emergency needs of the United States overseas.

8. The general officer category of the new corps should comprise initially all the present Foreign Service officers in their present grades.

9. The present civil-service personnel of the State Department should be transferred to the general and special officer categories of the corps on application and oral examination, liberally administered. A large number of them should be transferred as general officers. The special officers should comprise men and women who have specialized training in such fields as agriculture, minerals, trade, finance, labor, public relations, propaganda, law, administration, and other similar skills but who do not have the full general qualifications. Those not transferred, either by reason of failure to apply or failure to pass the oral examination, should be assisted in making transfers to other departments and agencies or should be retired under civil-service rules within 5 years.

10. After the consolidation is undertaken, no person should be employed by the Department except through enrollment in the corps either as a general officer, special officer, temporary or reserve officer or staff.

11. Except as respects eligibility for the grade of career minister, general and special officers should be given equal status in every respect, including compensation and retirement rights. Recruitment, especially for general officers, should normally be by competitive examination at the bottom, although new and wholly different examinations will be necessary to recruit the type of individuals desirable for the special officer group. Special officers should be enlisted and promoted without requiring of them the versatility and elasticity expected of general officers but with due attention to development in their specialties and to the personal qualities necessary in an overseas service. Provision for transfer from the special to general officer class by sup-

plemental examinations after 4 years of service should be permitted, especially in the higher grades where a special officer has demonstrated general qualifications.

12. The members of the present staff category now drawing compensation over about \$4,500 should, upon application and oral examination, be transferred to the new general or special officer classifications and the staff category should hereafter be restricted to clerical, fiscal, custodial, and similar personnel drawing compensation below that approximate figure. The staff should hereafter be recruited by examinations, oral or written, appropriate to the limited character of the duties contemplated. There should be provision for transfer from the staff classification to both the general and special officer classifications by supplemental examination after 4 years of service, on application. Members of the present staff drawing compensation above \$4,500 who cannot qualify as general or special officers should be retired or transferred to other departments of the government within 5 years unless they elect to remain in the new staff category without further promotion at their present salaries until retirement.

13. The temporary or reserve officer classification should be open to (a) representatives of other departments and agencies nominated by them but acceptable to the State Department on personal and similar grounds who will serve abroad as technical reporters and attachés in the small number of cases where this service cannot be adequately performed by the new corps; (b) personnel to implement special programs such as the European recovery program or in other temporary capacities; and (c) applicants for admission to the general or special officer classifications who have passed the necessary examinations but who are awaiting appointment, the length of service in such instances not to exceed 2 years and only when urgently needed. These temporary or reserve officers should have status identical with the general and special officers of corresponding grade and should be paid and supported like other members of the corps, the funds, in the case of representatives of other departments and agencies, to come from grants to the corps from appropriations of the other departments and agencies. Diplomatic status, that is accrediting, and all privileges abroad should be determined by the post occupied in the mission and not by classification as a general, special, or reserve officer.

14. The administration of promotion and assignment in the corps should not be oriented (as now) chiefly to the development of chiefs of missions (ambassadors, ministers, consuls general) but should recognize that the career offered may culminate in senior positions either in the Department or overseas and as administrative officers and other technical specialists as well.

15. As the present system of examination and admission of Foreign Service officers tends to emphasize basic scholastic achievement with suitable personal culture and agreeableness and the hope of versatility,

but fails to search effectively for the resourcefulness and executive ability necessary in what is now a much expanded and more aggressive service, and as these last qualities may only be revealed by time, we recommend that the present oral examination be enlarged to include a brief inspection of the candidate in residence on the British model, and by the provision that a portion (perhaps one-fifth) of each group admitted to the general officer class be transferred to the staff category within 4 years of acceptance, thus extending the competition for officer classification for a trial period. Staff members so transferred should be subject to readmission to the officer group as in the case of other staff members.

16. The corps should not be self-administered but governed for the purpose of establishing recruitment, examination, retirement, and similar procedures by a Board on which its representatives have less than a majority vote. The State Department only should be represented on the Board, as the occasion for including other departments is eliminated by the procedure for attachés suggested. Advice to the State Department on the requirements of other departments and agencies of the new foreign affairs corps with respect to reports and the like should be handled through the interdepartmental committee system outlined in recommendation 6. Assignments of personnel to posts should rest with the Secretary of State on the recommendation of the chief administrative executive of the Department.

RECOMMENDATION 16

The State Department should establish a coordinated program of congressional liaison under the supervision of an Assistant Secretary with no other duties.

Recent experience has demonstrated the need for a full-time Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. The present unsatisfactory status of State Department-Congressional relations indicates that the job cannot be done on a part-time basis by one of the Secretary's top-level advisers.

The Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations should actively participate in top-level policy formulation in the Department. He should be able to marshal personnel anywhere from within the Department to present to the Congress special phases of its programs. In this work he must have adequate staff to aid in the preparation of material, in following important issues, and to perform helpful services for the members of the Congress.

RECOMMENDATION 17

The State Department should continue to have a high-level official responsible for public liaison at home, informing foreign peoples, and bringing public opinion aspects, both domestic and foreign, to bear on the policy decisions of the State Department.

The function of the office of the Assistant Secretary—Public Affairs should be continued so far as it concerns domestic publicity by the State Department, including the publication of its documents, the presentation of national policy to our people, and contact with the press, writers, scholars, and organizations concerned with public affairs. Special attention should be given by this Assistant Secretary to explanation of the background of objectives and policies to the press and other channels of contact with the public. Under him also should be the function of current news releases and of managing press conferences for the Secretary. If, as recommended elsewhere, the details of foreign information and propaganda programs and of educational exchange programs are transferred out of the Department, the Assistant Secretary—Public Affairs must still continue to serve as a point of contact and policy guidance for foreign programs by press and radio media.

RECOMMENDATION 18

The chief of each United States foreign mission should be, in effect, the American spokesman for the area or country to which he is assigned and should be responsible for administration of all aspects of the mission in that area.

Since the 1939 consolidation of the Commerce and Agriculture overseas services with the Foreign Service, there has been little serious questioning of the desirability of having all members of a foreign mission responsible to the chief of mission. The post-World War II establishment of dual missions in various countries, such as the Greek Aid Mission or the ECA missions, is directly contrary to this sound principle.

If special operational tasks abroad are assigned to other departments or agencies, whether they be economic, social, or otherwise, they may be separately headed and administered at home if considered necessary by Congress or the President, but it is unworkable and dangerous to have American spokesmen and operators abroad who are not responsible to our ambassador or minister for supervision and coordination. This added task will call for a greater degree of executive ability on the part of American chiefs of mission, including the use of administrative aids and techniques. This is a further reason for decentralization of administration to the regional Assistant Secretaries so they will be able to lend substantial help to the chiefs of mission in this added responsibility.

This contemplates that the chief of each mission will initiate a suitable personnel program for locally employed personnel, for maintaining efficient high morale for his operation, and for developing the potential of individuals assigned to his command. At present the chiefs of mission have widely varying concepts of their responsibilities for developing the officers assigned to them. The mission chiefs should see that the personal and social problems of American staff and clerical personnel are systematically given attention. The easy-going ways of our former small missions will not do for the large and active diplomatic and consular establishments which we now maintain. The turn-over in clerical ranks abroad is alarming and indicates an ineffective personnel-relations program.

In the previous recommendations it has been proposed that a small number of specialist attachés who, as part of their work, fill the information needs of the other departments and agencies, be nominated by those other departments and agencies. Such specialists, however, while with the overseas missions, should be responsible to the chief of mission for their work, department, and for purposes of administration. This "line" relationship to the chief of mission is essential.

The chief of mission's authority should include:

- a. The power to return to the United States any specialist on duty for reasons related to improper deportment or for unsatisfactory work performance.
- b. The right to veto assigning a given individual to the mission.
- c. The right to express disagreement with (but not prevent transmission of) reports of specialists assigned by the other agencies.
- d. The ultimate authority overseas with respect to program operations, such as those currently being performed by ECA.

RECOMMENDATION 19

The Department of State should constantly review multilateral agreements to which the United States is a party, and consult with and advise the appropriate agency with respect to carrying out the United States commitment where jurisdiction is clear, and recommend to the President in difficult cases which agency or agencies should carry out the United States commitment.

There appear to have been some gaps in the fulfillment by the United States of international commitments. For example, the question of whether the Coast Guard or Air Force will carry out the United States air search and rescue commitment languished in dispute in the Air Coordinating Committee (ACC) for many months. Under this proposal the responsibility for the necessary follow-up is clearly located. Because of sporadic agency attendance at international conferences, it appears desirable also that the State Department more fully inform all interested agencies of the results and significance of international conferences.

RECOMMENDATION 20

The State Department, in conjunction with the Bureau of the Budget, should devote more attention to the preparation of budget estimates for funds in support of United States participation in international organizations and conferences in an effort to keep these expenditures within proper bounds.

In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, the appropriations in support of United States participation in international organizations and international conferences were in excess of \$151,000,000 (of which more than \$70,000,000 represents the annual United States contribution to the International Refugee Organization) or approximately equal to the total appropriations for the State Department and the Foreign Service. For the current fiscal year the appropriations for international activities are estimated at almost \$160,000,000 or over 56 percent of the total State Department, Foreign Service, and international activities appropriations. The 1949 estimate, moreover, is over 3,000 times the amount of the actual prewar expenses.

The necessity in the world of today for international organizations and for positive and active United States participation therein is not questioned. The fact remains, however, that this participation has grown since the end of World War II and it would appear that, based upon the amount of expenditures involved, more attention should be devoted to this area of our budget. The Bureau of the Budget, the State Department, and the other segments of the executive branch which are involved must aggressively seek to see that these appropriations are kept within proper bounds.

D. Recommendations Concerning the Other Departments and Agencies

A substantial overhauling of the foreign affairs structure of the departments and agencies other than the State Department is also necessary if the organizational philosophy of this report is to be carried out. The issue as to the future seems clear-cut. The deficiencies of the other departments and agencies must be cured or the conduct of foreign affairs will have to be managed by a combination of the State Department, ECA, and other new agencies, which, together, would duplicate on the foreign side the numerous departments and agencies in the domestic area.

RECOMMENDATION 21

The other departments and agencies should consider the possible foreign impact of all proposed major policies and programs, and consult with the State Department in regard thereto.

The present attitude of the other agencies is that they do not want the State Department to formulate foreign policies or programs

without consulting with them. Although the State Department has made sincere efforts to do this, the other agencies feel it is their sole prerogative to initiate a domestic policy or program and that the State Department need not be consulted. It seems needless to labor the point that in a world as economically and socially interdependent as ours, an agricultural price-support program, for instance, is not without consequence to foreign states. Each agency should, moreover, constantly bear in mind that the instruments of foreign policy should always be used to achieve objectives of foreign policy and not as methods of determining foreign policy.

RECOMMENDATION 22

The other departments and agencies should each establish an officer or office directly responsible to the department or agency head for coordinating its foreign affairs activities.

Few departments and agencies have recast their organizations to meet effectively their increased responsibilities in foreign affairs. Some of the bureaus or offices within the major executive establishments have had to operate largely without benefit of topside direction. This situation has placed an added administrative burden upon the State Department as it often has had to try to coordinate constituent parts of a department, or to sit silently in interdepartmental committees, while contending bureaus of one agency resolve their internal differences. One of several illustrations of this is the National Security Council where the Army, Navy, and Air Force argue their points before the Secretary of State because of the absence of a National Military Establishment position.

Important tasks for such a department or agency coordinating officer to perform would include supervision and improvement in its committee participation; assurance of the development of a departmental or agency viewpoint before its representative speaks in an interdepartmental conference; follow-up on departmental or agency committee and international conference commitments; functioning as the department's or agency's focal point for liaison on foreign affairs matters; fostering of required cooperation and working relationships; review of departmental or agency legislative proposals to determine impact on foreign affairs; overcoming of insular or domestic perspective of departmental or agency personnel performing substantive work involving foreign and domestic considerations; avoidance of departmental or agency attempts to separate domestic and foreign aspects of work; and coordination of all departmental and agency report requests to overseas missions.

PART TWO

Chapter I

THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE WORLD OF TODAY

The post-World War II period has been one of continuing international crisis. The United States is today one of the two great world powers, and in the interests of self-preservation and of safeguarding our national liberties and ideals, we must be prepared to furnish leadership for the democratic nations of the world. In this task the Government faces vast and complicated problems on a scale hitherto unknown in our history. It is a new role for the United States and the time is significantly appropriate to appraise the adequacy of our organizational machinery for the task which lies ahead.

In this new role of the United States in world affairs, our international relationships have developed certain new characteristics. First, the objectives and policies of the United States are today by necessity fundamentally positive in nature rather than negative or declaratory as in the past. No longer can a Monroe Doctrine be merely announced and made effective with little positive implementation. By way of contrast, the Truman doctrine requires positive commitments in terms of dollars and of personnel.

A second prime characteristic of the United States present position in world affairs is the cooperative nature of our foreign relations. Unilateral action by the United States without obtaining agreement of other nations is now the exception rather than the rule. International cooperation, mainly on a multilateral basis, is the order of the day as the attainment of United States objectives is being sought in increasing measure through agreements reached in the United Nations and other international organizations. Today, in the popular mind, this second characteristic is at times obscured by what appear to be purely bilateral dealings between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the major issues between these two leading powers are not bilateral but involve many countries, and multilateral dealings between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and others are ordinarily the prelude to any bilateral dealings between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹

¹ See "Major Problems Between the United States and the U. S. S. R. are not Bilateral but Involve Many Countries," State Department Bulletin, XVIII, p. 705.

A third characteristic of the new role of the United States is that today the conduct of foreign affairs is the business not of the President and the Department of State alone but of the President supported by almost the entire executive branch of the Government. Few conceptions are more firmly rooted in the mind of the man in the street than the one that the State Department conducts, single-handed, our foreign affairs. This involvement in foreign affairs of departments and agencies other than the State Department has always existed to some extent, but today it is of major proportions. It is a consequence, moreover, of the disappearance of the line of demarcation which hitherto has existed between domestic and foreign problems. Foreign aspects of problems today in almost every field of Government activity—agriculture, labor, commerce, health, transportation, civil rights—almost invariably have significant domestic ramifications, and conversely most domestic problems have come to have foreign aspects.² It is little wonder then that departments and agencies whose major work heretofore has been in the domestic field now find that performance of those same domestic functions takes them into the domain of foreign affairs.

It is perhaps an understatement, however, to say that foreign affairs today is the business of the entire executive branch of the Government. As never before it has become the business of both the executive and legislative branches. While the Congress has always possessed significant powers in the area of foreign affairs, the potentialities of its powers have never been so clearly recognized. The growing activity of the United States as a world power again and again requires supporting legislation and expression of congressional confidence. Since a large part of domestic legislation must be considered with international implications in mind, the significance of the present role of Congress is tremendous and its impact on organization of the executive side of the Government cannot be ignored.

The positive character of the United States objectives in world affairs and the requirements involved in cooperative dealings with other nations on an increasingly multilateral basis, in and of themselves, have implications in terms of organization. Coupling them with the present-day blending of domestic and foreign problems and with the involvement in foreign affairs of almost the entire executive branch of the Government and of the Congress, makes it obvious that a comprehensive and resourceful approach must be made to the problems of Government organization in the foreign affairs area. The concern of the Commission on Organization is not merely one of

² For example, both of the principal candidates for the Presidency in the recent campaign stressed world peace as the greatest issue of the time. President Truman stated at Newark, N. J. on October 7, 1948, that "peace in this world" is the "most important thing with which we're faced." See New York Times, October 8, 1948, p. 4, col. 3. Governor Dewey in his Salt Lake City speech on September 30, 1948, said that "our greatest domestic issue * * * is the problem of the peace of the world." See New York Times, October 1, 1948, p. 17, col. 1.

organization of the Department of State or of the Office of the Presidency. It is a concern with the entire executive branch of the Government from the President down through the departments and independent agencies, linked throughout with a constant appreciation and understanding of the vital and significant role of the Congress.

The conduct of foreign affairs by the United States in its new position in world affairs is not a single process but a series of four inter-related processes. First, the conduct of foreign affairs involves the making of decisions as to the fundamental objectives of the United States. Second, it involves formulation of policies which will achieve those objectives. Third, it involves the execution of the policies thus formulated. And finally, with the conduct of foreign affairs Government-wide in scope, all three of the foregoing processes must be supported by an overriding process of integration or coordination which serves to integrate the Government in determining its objectives and in formulating and executing policies.

The present organizational structure of the Government for the conduct of foreign affairs has at least five major components:

1. The President and his executive offices.
2. The Department of State.
3. The departments and agencies in the executive branch other than the State Department.
4. The interdepartmental arrangements, in some instances informal, in others through formal arrangements or organizational units such as the various councils and committees.
5. The Congress, not in the sense of its own organization but of its role in the conduct of foreign affairs and the relationships therein between the Congress and the executive branch.

Chapter II

THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE NEW ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS IN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

The new role of the United States in the world has had a tremendous impact on the organizational machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs. The positive and cooperative nature of our foreign policies have greatly increased the traditional burdens of the President and the State Department. The large-scale participation in the conduct of foreign affairs of other departments and agencies has created organizational problems for these new participants and additional organizational problems for the President and the State Department. In the Congress the emergence of the House of Representatives as a powerful force in the conduct of foreign relations has become strikingly apparent.


Tangible manifestations of the complexity of present-day organizational problems are to be found on all sides. In the Presidency the official White House group has expanded and some of the new elements, particularly the Chief of Staff to the President and the anonymous Presidential assistants, exercise considerable influence over the conduct of foreign affairs. New institutional aids to the President have also come into existence in the form of statutory interdepartmental bodies such as the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, all of which are today substantial factors in the conduct of foreign affairs.

In the State Department the organizational requirements of the present day have manifested themselves in terms of substantial requirements of men and dollars, both at home and overseas, and in terms of new functions. In 1938 the total personnel strength of the State Department in Washington was 963. Today it is 5,652, or an increase of 487 percent.¹ Overseas the increase was from 3,749 Americans and aliens in 1938 to 12,294 in 1948, an increase of 230 percent. Dollar-wise the changes over the past 10 years are even more striking. A comparison of the appropriations for fiscal years 1938 and 1948 reveals an increase in the case of the State Department in Washington of from some \$2,600,000 in 1938 to over \$33,700,000 in 1948, an


¹ The figure of 5,652 is as of September 1, 1948. This represents a decrease of 22 percent from the 1946 peak figure of 7,623.

CHART II

THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE
INCREASE IN PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1938 AND 1948



STATE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATIONS (*Excluding Foreign Service*)



increase of almost 1,200 percent. (See chart II, p. 41.) If the appropriations to the Foreign Service and for the support of international organizations in which the United States participates are also taken into account, the increase is from approximately 20 million dollars in 1938 to over 300 million dollars in 1948, or a percentage increase of 1,465.² (See chart III, p. 43.)

These increases in personnel and appropriations in part reflect the assumption of new responsibilities by the State Department. The participation of the United States in the United Nations and affiliated international organizations has required the creation of two liaison units, the Office of United Nations Affairs in Washington and a special mission to the United Nations in New York. The responsibility for the foreign information programs carried on during World War II by the Office of War Information was assumed in 1945. Similarly in 1945, by transfer from the wartime Office of Strategic Services, the State Department assumed functions in the intelligence area. Today the Public Affairs and the Intelligence units in the State Department contain over 25 percent of the personnel of the entire Department.

The participation in the conduct of foreign affairs by departments and agencies other than the State Department manifests itself in numerous ways. Within the executive branch there are 59 departments, agencies, commissions, boards, and interdepartmental councils under the President, of which the work of at least 46 (including the State Department) involves some aspects of the conduct of foreign affairs. The organization chart of the executive branch on the following page indicates by the shading the organizational units which participate in foreign affairs. (See chart IV, facing p. 44.)

These other departments and agencies participate in the conduct of foreign affairs overseas as well as at home. In June 1948 they had in their employ over 89 percent of the total of approximately 128,500 civilian employees (American citizens and aliens) of the entire Government stationed overseas. The small balance constitutes the Foreign Service and the State Department. If the civilian employees on occupation duty for the Army and on base duty for the Navy be


² The appropriations for fiscal years 1938, 1948, 1949, as shown in Department of State—Statement of Appropriations for the fiscal year 1938 to and including 1949, are set forth below. The classification international activities consists of appropriations for the support of United States participation in international organizations and international conferences—

Purpose	Fiscal year 1938	Fiscal year 1948	Percent increase 1948 over 1938	Fiscal year 1949	Percent increase 1949 over 1938
State Department.....	\$2, 610, 220	\$33, 732, 250	1, 192	\$20, 624, 000	690
Foreign Service.....	12, 353, 833	122, 332, 750	891	99, 879, 000	708
International activities.....	4, 667, 512	151, 181, 535	3, 139	159, 950, 000	3, 326
Grand total	19, 631, 566	307, 246, 535	1, 465	280, 453, 000	1, 328


CHART III

STATE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATIONS INCLUDING
FOREIGN SERVICE AND UNITED STATES SUPPORT
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

*Millions
of Dollars*



DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL OVERSEAS IN 1948
(Civilian Personnel Only)



excluded, the departments and agencies other than the State Department have a substantial 28 percent of the United States citizen employees abroad. If, on the other hand, military personnel on overseas duty be added to the total of civilian employees abroad, on the basis that the former may also be an important arm of the United States for the conduct of foreign affairs, the departments and agencies other than the State Department are found to have an overwhelming percentage.

The participation of the other departments and agencies is also apparent in terms of appropriations. For fiscal year 1949 the President's budget estimated an expenditure of 7 billion dollars for international affairs and finance, a figure which constitutes 18 percent of the total budget and a per capita cost of \$48 a person. Of this 7 billion dollars, approximately 95 percent represents amounts earmarked for the other departments and agencies. If the two largest single items, 4.4 billion dollars for the European recovery program and 1.25 billion dollars for occupation responsibilities in Germany and Japan are eliminated as abnormal or unique, over 51 percent of the balance consists of appropriations for foreign affairs activities of departments and agencies other than the State Department.³

Additional manifestations of the participation of other departments and agencies and of the resulting organizational complexities within the executive branch are found in the participation in international organizations and meetings and in the interdepartmental committee structure. Prior to World War II the average number of international meetings at which the United States Government was represented was less than 75 a year. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, the United States participated in 394 multilateral meetings at which 46 percent of the United States representatives came from departments and agencies other than the State Department, 25 percent from the State Department, 2 percent from the Congress, and the remaining 27 percent from nongovernmental sources.

The interdepartmental committee structure is noteworthy for its size and for its high-level participation in the conduct of foreign affairs. At the present time there are some 30 committees which actually or potentially have a significant part in the conduct of foreign affairs. The chairmen of approximately two-thirds of these committees come from the State Department and the remainder from other departments and agencies. In the calendar year 1947 these committees held over 700 meetings, and over 50 percent of the actual participants were secretaries, under secretaries, or bureau and office directors.

³ In actual fact, such an elimination is more academic than real because the abnormal or unique presumes a norm that is not definable and a norm that presupposes United States foreign affairs can become static in the sense of pre-World War II.

From the foregoing data two major observations are striking. First, the State Department is now a large organization with functions to perform which never before have been under its aegis. Second, the conduct of foreign affairs within the executive branch is now a task which is being shared in highly significant proportions by the other departments and agencies and by the Department of State.

Chapter III

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The basic pattern for the conduct of foreign affairs is fixed in the first instance by the Constitution. It is frequently assumed that under the Constitution the President is solely responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. This statement is always subject to the qualification that, under the constitutional system of separation of powers, not only the determination of United States objectives in world affairs but also the formulation and execution of foreign policies is, in the main, divided between the executive and legislative branches.

This constitutional division is not at all clear-cut in its assignment of foreign affairs powers to the President and the Congress. Indeed, one commentator has remarked:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand, it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.¹

In the case of the President this lack of precision is especially true because his power over foreign relations to a considerable extent must be derived from general grants of executive power. Aside from the provisions in article II, sections 2 and 3, relating to the presidential power "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties" and to appoint ambassadors, ministers, and consuls and to the power to receive "ambassadors and other public ministers," no reference is made by the Constitution to specific presidential powers in the foreign affairs field. Hence the basic source of the President's powers lies in the general provisions of article II vesting "the Executive power" in the President, making the President the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, authorizing the President to require written opinions from the principal officers of the executive departments, directing the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" and authorizing the President to "commission all the officers of the United States."

The President undoubtedly derives additional authority in the field of foreign affairs by reason of the distinction between the powers

¹ Edward S. Corwin, "The President: Offices and Powers" (1940), p. 2.

of the Federal Government with respect to foreign affairs and domestic affairs. As observed by Mr. Justice Sutherland in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*,² in domestic affairs, the Constitution reserves to the States those powers not vested in the National Government. In foreign affairs, the various States never possessed powers of external sovereignty and the National Government does not depend upon affirmative grants of such powers by the Constitution. Consequently, with respect to foreign affairs, the Constitution has left a great area of unassigned powers in which someone must act for the United States from time to time, and in the absence of any other assignment the President, in his capacity as Executive, is the only one able to act.

The powers of the Congress, on the other hand, are somewhat more precisely set forth by the Constitution. The explicit confirmation power of the Senate with respect to treaties and the appointment of ambassadors and ministers has been referred to above. The express power to regulate foreign as well as domestic commerce, to fix import duties, and to declare war gives the Congress a further foothold in the field of foreign affairs. Most important of all for present purposes is the congressional power to appropriate funds, the exclusive character of which has been clear ever since 1795 when, in connection with the Jay treaty, the Congress almost failed to appropriate funds to carry out the treaty notwithstanding its ratification by the Senate. As the United States during and after World War II assumed an active part in the affairs of the world and as domestic and foreign affairs came more and more to involve the same or closely related issues, these congressional powers assumed correspondingly greater significance. Indeed, after a long period of substantial domination of the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive branch, which led one authority to say in 1917 that the outcome of the executive-legislative contest was "decisively and conspicuously in favor of the President,"³ we are now in a period of strong counterassertion of legislative authority.

While the initiative in the conduct of foreign affairs still lies largely with the executive branch, the Congress comes in at many levels of the process. The necessity for its approbation of the objectives of the United States in world affairs has never been more clearly demonstrated than by the Fulbright and Connally resolutions placing both the Senate and the House of Representatives on the record as favoring United States participation in an international peace organization, followed in 1945 by congressional approval of the United Nations charter. Similarly, under the appropriations power, the Congress has put its essential stamp of approval on programs of economic assistance for Europe, such as the British loan in 1946, the Greek-

² 299 U. S. 304 (1936).

³ Edward S. Corwin, "The President's Control of Foreign Relations" (Princeton, 1917), p. 203.

Turkish aid program in 1947, and the European recovery program in 1948. In the last-named instance, it should be noted, congressional participation went beyond the mere objective and extended beyond the formulation of policy to the dictation of the form of organization through which the economic assistance program should be administered and by provisions for the auditing of such administration by the creation of a special "watchdog" committee.

Other instances of present-day congressional participation in the conduct of foreign affairs are to be found on all sides. Under its constitutional power to impose tariffs, it has shared since 1934 in the reciprocal trade-agreement programs. Through its over immigration it has played a part in policy formulation on the entrance of displaced persons. By the National Security Act of 1947 it has prescribed the process of policy formulation and coordination with respect to the utilization of the instrument of force in the conduct of foreign affairs.

With the line between present-day domestic and foreign affairs so indistinct, various departments which were created primarily to perform functions in the domestic sphere now find themselves, in part by reason of the exercise of their basic statutory powers, vitally involved in foreign affairs. Hence, just as the Congress recently determined the location in the executive branch of ECA as an instrument of financial assistance, so also has it in some measure fixed the location of other instruments through which United States foreign affairs are conducted.

To recapitulate, under the Constitution the President has an area in the conduct of foreign affairs in which he is independent of the Congress. The present character of the United States position in the world, however, has tended to restrict this sphere. The result is that while to a very considerable extent the initiative remains with the President, the Government-wide conduct of foreign affairs requires joint legislative-executive cooperation, both in determination of objectives and to a lesser extent in formulation and execution of policies.

Chapter IV

THE PRESIDENT

The role of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs must be appraised in the light of his personal participation and of his institutional aids. Among the latter are not only the official White House group but also the Department of State, numerous other departments and agencies, and the new interdepartmental advisory bodies referred to briefly in chapter II.

As a personal participant, the President's present role is fundamentally the same as in the past. Under the Constitution, to paraphrase the title of a current book, the President has always been and today "is many men."¹ Some Presidents in the past, like Franklin D. Roosevelt from about 1938 on, have personally been extremely active in the foreign field. Others, like most of the Presidents, have delegated the major responsibilities and intervened only on occasion. In either case the President nonetheless remains the one elected official in the executive branch, the only official who must account to the people of the United States.

The presidency, as such, by and large, has no formal organization for the conduct of foreign affairs. The President, in his role as initiator, formulator, negotiator, and coordinator, acts mainly in a personal capacity, and the principal problems arise out of his personal relationships with the Congress, the State Department, the other departments, and agencies, and interdepartmental councils and committees. Insofar as formal organizational problems are concerned, such as those involving the Department of State, the National Security Council, and other high-level interdepartmental committees, a more accurate and meaningful presentation can be made in the discussion of those organizations, and will be deferred until that time. Likewise, the President's relationships with Congress in the conduct of foreign affairs can best be analyzed at a later point. The personal relationships of the President within the executive branch and two institutional aids to the President, the Executive Office and the Cabinet, however, require consideration at this stage.

A. The President's Personal Role

Within the framework of the Constitution, the President has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. As the only elected official in the executive branch, he can be held accountable by the electorate for the manner in which he discharges his responsi-

¹ Merriman Smith, "A President Is Many Men." (New York, 1948).

bility. This is true whether the President acts personally or through a deputy.

The Congress has been singularly conscious of the President's special role in foreign affairs under the Constitution. The Department of State, for example, has never had either its duties or organization prescribed by the Congress, its organic act merely providing that the Secretary of State shall perform such specified duties as the President from time to time may assign to him. Where other departments or agencies are given an explicit role in the foreign field, as in the case of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Congress has been careful to make clear that they are subject to the direction of the President.

In the conduct of foreign affairs, the President may personally participate in a great variety of ways. He may address messages to rulers of other countries, and he may meet the heads of other governments in conferences. He appoints the American diplomats to foreign countries, and he determines the eligibility of foreign diplomats sent to the United States. In addition to formal representation of the United States abroad, he may appoint personal agents for special foreign missions. At home he appoints the principal domestic officers concerned with foreign affairs. He controls the recognition of foreign governments, and he may make treaties subject to Senate confirmation, and may make Executive agreements which may or may not require congressional backing. Through his press conference and through messages to Congress and the public, he is able to initiate and to give direction to the course of our foreign policy.

Throughout American history the President has participated personally by the means described above. Today the scope of his personal participation has been remarkably increased by recent developments in communication and transportation. World War II saw the telephone become a powerful stimulus to the President's personal participation through Franklin D. Roosevelt's special transatlantic wire to Winston S. Churchill. The radio has enormously increased the numbers of the electorate able to hear discussions of foreign policy by the President. The airplane, moreover, has immensely facilitated the personal participation of the President as well as his deputies in diplomatic activities abroad.

The President's chief personal role in the conduct of foreign affairs today involves the functions of initiation or formulation of foreign policies and of negotiation and other action to implement foreign policies already decided upon. In addition, it may involve coordination of the entire executive branch so as to make sure that all requisite views are taken into account in formulating foreign policies, and that in carrying out these policies the segments of the executive branch which are concerned are working as team and not at cross-purposes.

Conclusions

The conclusions to be drawn as to the President's personal role in the conduct of foreign affairs and his relationships therein with the executive branch involve, in the main, two types of judgments. The one relates to the manner of the President's personal participation in the conduct of foreign affairs and the other to the heavy burdens which today he must necessarily assume in connection with this participation.²

The personal participation of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs, particularly in the role of policy initiator and formulator, is marked with many pitfalls. History, as well as the present, bears witness to the validity of the principle that the President should consult his foreign policy advisers in the executive branch before committing the United States to a course of action. One example is William H. Taft's decision in his Presidency to initiate and carry out negotiations with President Diaz of Mexico. Diaz was ousted from the presidency within 18 months after the Taft-Diaz meeting. Taft did not consult the State Department, and thereby Taft did not obtain specialized knowledge which might have pointed out the precarious nature of the Diaz regime and which might have led Taft to adopt more cautious tactics. Similarly the Secretary of State should be consulted on the sending of special emissaries abroad, and the Secretary of Defense as well as the Secretary of State should be consulted before initiation of a policy involving national security risks.

In carrying out foreign policies as a negotiator, the President should likewise consult with his advisers in the executive branch. Furthermore, when a President either personally formulates a foreign policy or personally by negotiation carries a policy into execution, the Secretary of State and other officials in whose sphere the subject matter lies should be kept informed. Secretary Byrnes was in office for some time and has been endeavoring to formulate a Chinese policy when, for the first time, he learned of the "top secret" United States-Soviet protocol at Yalta which made substantial commitments to the U. S. S. R. in the Far East in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan.

In the coordination of the foreign affairs work of the executive branch, the President, except in unusual circumstances, such as existing wartime, must personally be the arbiter of high-level disputes. Successful coordination, however, involves more than settlement of disputes. The President should also, through appropriate machinery, see that unresolved disputes are brought up for resolution. The bitter controversy between the State and Army Departments over who is making policy for occupied Germany should not be permitted to go unresolved as it has for an indefinite period. Even more important, through appropriate coordinating devices the President

² Other conclusions can better be stated in connection with the discussions of the interdepartmental organization and the State Department organization.

should see that he gets properly integrated advice on all important questions of national affairs. Today the advisory mechanism is out of balance, with the Presidency "overorganized" for foreign affairs advice in certain fields and "underorganized" in other areas of vital concern to the Nation. This last conclusion will be discussed further in connection with the interdepartmental organization of the Government.

The second type of conclusion involves the workload of the President. In foreign affairs today, as in other business of the Government, the President is overburdened. The solution is not to be found by removing from the President any of his basic functions. Such a remedy is precluded by the Constitution and, in any event, it is undesirable to take functions away from the only member of the executive branch who is responsible to the electorate. Furthermore, distinctive advantages in the conduct of foreign affairs can be obtained only by the President's personal participation. Hence the President's present workload in both foreign and domestic affairs must be reduced through the careful addition of new institutional aids to provide staff assistance and by improving the quality of all staff assistance to the President.

B. The Executive Office

The executive office of the President contains three organizational units which from time to time are concerned with foreign affairs, namely the White House office, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. None of these units is organized with a view to assisting the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Council of Economic Advisers, established by statute in 1946 to advise the President on the national economic picture, has confined itself to the factual picture of the balance of trade and the effect of foreign trade on the domestic economy.

The White House office today contains the President's personal, technical, and administrative advisers, his secretaries and the administrative machinery, and the Chief of Staff to the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief. Being intimates of the President, these individuals are in a position to exercise considerable influence on the President's decision-making in the foreign relations field. Today, as was generally true in the past, the secretaries to the President are not a major influence in Presidential policy-making. The administrative assistants, on the other hand, in the period since their authorization in 1939, have from time to time been important factors. In the current administration the Assistant to the President, John R. Steelman, has acted as an arbiter of disputes between agencies, including those in the foreign affairs field. Members of his staff from time to time have been active on interdepartmental committees concerned with the Greek-Turkey aid program and other foreign aid

programs. Other administrative assistants also occasionally play a part in foreign policy, as is borne out by instances where their advice has prevailed over that of Cabinet members. The Chief of Staff to the President, a position created in 1942 and the original incumbent of which, Admiral Leahy, is still in office, is especially strategically situated to influence foreign policy where the national security is involved. Again his influence rests not so much on the position he holds as on a close personal relationship with the President.

The Bureau of the Budget, established by statute in 1921, performs functions which have significant consequences on the conduct of foreign affairs. In the all-important matter of appropriations, the Budget Bureau initially fixes budget ceilings for the various departments and agencies. For example, on the fiscal year 1949 budget it fixed ceilings for the State Department and the Foreign Service with a minimum of prior consultation with those organizations. Serious difficulties were obviated by a personal conference between the Secretary of State and the Director of the Budget. For fiscal year 1950 the Budget Bureau is setting a combined ceiling for the State Department and the Foreign Service, but only after relatively extensive prior consultations which have been satisfactory to both sides.

The Budget Bureau also is drawn into foreign affairs today to an increasing extent by reason of its legislative clearance procedure through which all executive branch legislative proposals are screened before being transmitted to the Congress. This process is not always followed, however, as was demonstrated by the enactment of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 based upon the original proposal conceived by the Foreign Service instead of the version which went through the Budget Bureau.

The Budget Bureau further acts as a roving critic over a wide range of the foreign affairs organization. For example, on January 1, 1945, the Budget Bureau made recommendations to the President on inter-departmental committees in the international field and on procedure for international conferences. In 1948 it sought to iron out a particularly bitter jurisdictional row between the Commerce and State Departments. It has also been active in endeavoring to work out a systematic pattern for participation in international organizations.

One World War II institutional aid to the President, the Office of War Mobilization (OWM), warrants mention. It was headed by a Director (first James F. Byrnes, later Fred M. Vinson, and still later John H. Snyder) who was to be advised by a War Mobilization Committee with which the Director was required "to advise and consult." The committee was composed of the Director, the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Chairmen of the War Production Board and the Munitions Assignment Board, and the Director of Economic Stabilization. The Director was empowered to "request the heads of other agencies or departments to participate in the deliberations of

the committee whenever matters specially affecting such agencies or departments are under consideration."

The committee met in the Cabinet room of the White House with the President personally presiding over most meetings. Only the highest official of an agency could attend, a rule which was strictly observed. The meetings were conducted pursuant to an agenda circulated in advance. The President, or the Director, made all decisions; the committee itself made none. The Director found the committee most useful as a sounding board to test decisions previously formulated.

The function of OWM was to arbitrate disputes between the departments and agencies and to render authoritative and final decisions. In the foreign affairs field it became particularly active in foreign economic matters, as, for example, the settlement of a dispute between the State Department and WPB over stockpiling of critical mineral supplies. Its usefulness under Byrnes has been attested to,³ although the authority of the Director created resentment among the Cabinet officers.

Conclusions

The Executive office is at present only casually organized to provide staff assistance to the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. The President today bears a heavier burden than ever before and requires much more adequate staff assistance to enable him to discharge his responsibilities as a negotiator, as a formulator of foreign policy, and as a coordinator of foreign policy execution. He needs machinery to bring about the prompt resolution of interdepartmental disputes and also to bring to the Presidential level unresolved disputes which, because of their unsettled status at lower levels, may impair the effective conduct of foreign affairs by the United States.

The Bureau of the Budget administrative and organizational services are not presently adequate to deal with organizational problems in and between the departments and agencies involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. In part this is a consequence of the Budget Bureau giving relatively greater attention to budgetary than to management problems, in part to the lack of an aggressive and continuous program for the betterment of governmental machinery.

C. The Cabinet

The Cabinet is so firmly fixed in the mind of the man on the street as a deliberative council of advisers to the President that its role merits special mention. No mention is made of the Cabinet in the Constitution. Its origin goes back to 1793 when, in the diplomatic

³ See Stimson and Bundy, "On Active Service" (N. Y. 1948), p. 500, where it is said: "Stimson believed that the shrewd and skillful work done by Byrnes in his Office of War Mobilization was of vital importance in the operation of Mr. Roosevelt's fantastically complex administrative mechanism."

crisis of that year, Washington called his three Secretaries and the Attorney General together to render advice on United States neutrality in the war between England and France. While wholly extra-Constitutional, the Cabinet soon became part of the institutional framework of the Government.

In the early history of the United States, the Cabinet tended to play a leading role in formulation of foreign policy. Its part in the development of the Monroe Doctrine was particularly significant. Since Monroe's time, however, its record has been uneven and of decreasing importance. In Lincoln's presidency, the Cabinet was used on some major issues and on others it was ignored. In Cleveland's administrations, it also tended to act as a high-level council of advisers considering foreign policy matters. Under Wilson the Cabinet was for a time consulted, but after the entry of the United States into World War I, it lapsed into insignificance. In recent times, and currently, it is not playing an important part in foreign affairs.

Conclusions

Throughout American history the Cabinet has not served continuously as a source of advice to the President on foreign affairs. On the whole its performance has been highly erratic, and only occasionally impressive. Today it is particularly ineffective.

The reasons are not hard to find. The Cabinet can be used or ignored by the President. It has no collective responsibility, and where Cabinet members have been influential it has been because of personal relationships with the President and not through the Cabinet. The caliber of its membership is frequently defective. Many Cabinet members come from and return to private life and thereby cannot provide the vital continuity of experience that is required of a council of Presidential advisers. Too often Cabinet members do not know what goes on in their own departments. The Cabinet has been weak in recent times, moreover, because of omission from its membership of representatives of important policy-making agencies. Certain Cabinet members have no interest whatsoever in foreign affairs or an interest in only limited aspects. As such, they are wholly disqualified from advising the President on foreign policy. Finally, it lacks organization. Its meetings are characteristically unplanned and the participants are unprepared. There is no agenda and little, if any, organized procedure.

Chapter V

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The most striking present-day feature of the organization of the United States Government for the conduct of foreign affairs is the participation in all its phases of departments and agencies other than the State Department. This participation consists of furnishing advice to aid in the formulation of foreign policies and of insuring coordinated action in the execution of these policies. It has resulted in the creation of new interdepartmental organizational arrangements, including an elaborate structure of interdepartmental committees.¹

In the past the State Department constituted the principal source of advice to the President on foreign policy formulation within the executive branch. Consequently Government-wide integration of advice was a process for which there was little need. This is not to say that the President did not seek advice and aid on international matters from sources other than the State Department, and American history is replete with instances where he has turned to Secretaries other than the Secretary of State and to individuals outside the Government. These sources, however, were utilized primarily because of personal or political relationships, whereas the State Department was a source of advice and aid in an institutional sense.

The requirement of coordinated action in the conduct of foreign affairs, furthermore, is not an historical feature of American foreign relations. In large measure foreign policies in earlier periods were carried into execution by the President, either in the role of negotiator or through the Secretary of State. On the relatively infrequent occasions when other parts of the executive branch were involved, consistent and integrated action was obtained through informal liaison frequently at, or just below, the Secretary level. A request from the Secretary of State in days past carried with it a quality of Olympian majesty which usually evoked a quick response. Today, in sharp contrast, coordinated action by the State Department and the 45 other units of the executive branch having roles in foreign affairs is a *sine qua non* for the effective conduct of the varied and numerous United States foreign affairs activities.

¹ Other departments on occasion in the past have, of course, taken active parts in foreign affairs. As early as 1792 the Post Office Department negotiated an international postal agreement.

A. The Statutory Framework

The statutory authority of the State Department and that of the other departments and agencies in the conduct of foreign affairs is markedly different. The role of the State Department has never been prescribed by the Congress. Its organic statute of 1789, which is still its basic charter, did not specify the duties of the Secretary of State. It provided:

The Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined or entrusted to him by the President relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of the United States shall assign to the department, and he shall conduct the business of the department in such manner as the President shall direct.²

This statute clearly fixed the role of the Secretary of State as an arm of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs. Since 1789 his basic authority has remained fundamentally unchanged, the Congress has been careful to leave the duties of the State Department largely undefined, and in grants of substantive power to the Secretary of State it has explicitly recognized on many occasions the special prerogatives of the President by provisions that the Secretary of State shall act under the direction of the President.³ The great bulk of congressional grants of authority to the State Department will be found to be ministerial in character. As one authority has said: "The whole question of the Secretary's powers was left to the President and the way left open for the 'impulse to action' to come solely from that source."⁴

The participation of the other departments and agencies in the conduct of foreign affairs, in sharp contrast, arises largely from direct grants of authority from the Congress. In many instances the Congress appears to have granted these powers with the domestic situation primarily in mind. The result today, with the disappearance of the line of demarcation between domestic and foreign affairs, is that these other departments and agencies have been carried into the foreign field. In other cases the Congress has made direct grants of foreign-affairs powers as such or has appropriated funds to these other departments and agencies. An example of the former is the extension of the Agriculture Department's domestic duties to the foreign field in connection with the foot-and-mouth disease in Mexico.

² 5 U. S. C., sec. 156.

³ One of the few notable exceptions to this pattern has been the recent grant by Congress of power to the Secretary of State to conduct foreign informational and educational programs. U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, P. L. 402 (80th Cong., 2d sess.).

⁴ C. G. Thach, "The Creation of the Presidency," series XL, Johns Hopkins University Studies No. 4 (1922).

Examples of the second type include the powers of the Export-Import Bank with regard to loans for international purposes,⁵ and the Civil Aeronautics Board's powers of recommendation to the President with respect to authority for United States air carriers to operate internationally and for foreign air carriers to serve the United States.⁶

The powers granted by the Congress to the Department of State are intrinsically different in character from those granted to the other departments and agencies. The State Department's organic statute gives it power over the means of conducting foreign relations; the organic statutes of the other departments and agencies provide them with substantive powers, i. e., powers with regard to fissionable materials, loans, communications, shipping, hydroelectric power, exports, etc.

B. Foreign Affairs Activities of the Other Agencies

The roles in foreign affairs of the other departments, agencies, commissions, boards, and interdepartmental councils differ in substance and importance. At one extreme are the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce, and such interdepartmental bodies as the National Security Council and the National Advisory Council. These organizations have powers in the exercise of which highly significant decisions affecting foreign policy are made and executed. At the other extreme are agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Smithsonian Institution with relatively minor influence on the conduct of foreign affairs.

The variety of foreign affairs activities carried on in the executive branch, exclusive of the State Department, may best be indicated by a few illustrations:

1. The Agriculture Department, in order to meet United States sugar consumption requirements, establishes quotas for foreign states;
2. The Commerce Department administers export control and the China Trade Act;
3. The Interior Department takes the initiative in obtaining coordination and unification of Federal policy and administration with respect to activities relating to petroleum carried on by various Federal agencies;
4. The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department takes censuses of waterfowl population in certain Caribbean countries;
5. The Office of Alien Property of the Justice Department vests the property of foreign nationals and liquidates vested property;
6. The Treasury Department collects and evaluates data as to the international financial position of the countries with which the United States is concerned;
7. The Bureau of Federal Supply of the Treasury Department purchases strategic and critical materials for the national stock pile, as well as commodities for the ECA and for the Greek-Turkish aid program;

⁵ 12 U. S. C., sec. 635.

⁶ 49 U. S. C., secs. 481-482.

8. The Labor Department, through the Bureau of Labor Statistics, obtains and publishes information on foreign labor conditions;

9. The Atomic Energy Commission purchases or otherwise acquires fissionable material or any interest therein outside the United States;

10. The Civil Aeronautics Board recommends issuance of foreign carrier permits;

11. The Federal Communications Commission regulates foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio;

12. The Export-Import Bank makes loans for international purposes;

13. The Public Health Service controls the export and import of biological materials applicable to the treatment of human diseases;

14. The Maritime Commission determines the ocean services, routes and lines from points in the United States to foreign markets, and determines the size of the American merchant marine; and

15. The Federal Reserve Board charters and supervises foreign banking corporations in the United States.

The role of these other departments and agencies in the conduct of United States foreign affairs is one that is not fully understood either within the Government or by the American public. A query representative of certain elements in the State Department is: "Who, other than the President and the State Department, has any interest in the conduct of foreign affairs?" This view is unrealistic, for it fails to recognize the significant role in the Government's total foreign affairs activities of the other departments and agencies. A clear appreciation of this participation is, of course, a prerequisite to effective organization and administration.

C. The Foreign Affairs Task

The phrase "foreign affairs" or "foreign policy" eludes precise definition. The intrinsic difficulty can be shown most clearly by asking a representative question: "Is a governmental decision to permit the export of steel or of building materials to France at the present time a foreign policy decision or one of domestic policy"? The answer to this question, and to countless others, is that it is neither one nor the other, but it is a matter of national policy, involving consideration of both foreign and domestic requirements. From an organizational and administrative viewpoint, it thus becomes clear that the problem is to formulate and carry out foreign policies within a framework of national policies, which integrate in a consistent manner both the foreign and domestic objectives and requirements of the Nation.

The process of formulating foreign affairs policies and programs is the subject of consideration here. As stressed earlier, the conduct of foreign affairs is composed of several different major steps: (1) The determination of fundamental foreign policy objectives; (2) the formu-

lation of policies and programs to achieve those objectives; (3) the execution of these various and variegated policies and programs; and (4) the support of all three of the foregoing by integration and coordination throughout the executive branch.

There is on occasion a lack of appreciation in the high councils of Government of the necessity of these steps and of the role of the President, the State Department, and the other departments and agencies in each of these steps. As an illustration, there is the statement by a high official of the State Department before a congressional committee in 1946, in part as follows:

The Department of State, under the direction of the President, in cooperation with the Congress is responsible for the achievement of our foreign policy objectives. Other Government agencies, such as War, Navy, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture departments, are also concerned with foreign relations. * * * Effective coordination under the Department of State of all foreign relations activities is essential if we are to achieve our foreign policy objectives.

This statement, perhaps because of its capsule quality, is deficient in many respects. First, the State Department may or may not be "responsible for the achievement" of United States' foreign policy objectives. It is in the achievement of objectives that departments and agencies other than the State Department play their most significant part. Second, the statement does not even attempt to define how the other departments and agencies are "concerned with foreign relations." Third, it says that coordination of "all foreign relations activities" is the job of the State Department. Yet in fact other departments and agencies may have the prime responsibility for coordination of specific foreign affairs activities between departments and agencies, as in the case of the National Advisory Council in international financial affairs. Furthermore, when several units within a single department or agency are concerned with problems having foreign aspects, internal coordination of the activities of those units must be achieved by the appropriate department or agency head.

D. Responsibility for Conduct of Foreign Affairs

Where, in fact, does the ultimate responsibility lie within the executive branch for the conduct of foreign affairs? In the President. He alone is ultimately responsible for defining foreign-policy objectives, for initiating policies and programs designed to realize these objectives, and for effecting the necessary coordination between the operative programs.

Since he cannot perform all these activities in his own person, he must, as the chief executive, establish such machinery and processes as the Congress permits that will aid him in fulfilling his gigantic responsibility.

1. THE DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN-POLICY OBJECTIVES

Today the machinery and processes currently available for determining foreign-policy objectives are informal and highly unsystematic. If the President should desire to reconsider and review the broad aims of the United States vis-a-vis, for example Brazil, he could turn to the Secretary of State. The inadequacy of this move is apparent when one realizes that a determination of objectives with respect to Brazil involves a multiplicity of specialized knowledge scattered throughout the executive branch. Financial data are in Treasury, trade and commerce data in State, Commerce and the Tariff Commission, agricultural information in Agriculture, and military data in the National Military Establishment, to cite only a few obvious illustrations. Unless the Secretary of State sees fit to call in these agencies—and the heads of the State Department have not always sought close collaboration with the other departments and agencies on matters of “high” foreign policy—their knowledge and viewpoints will not be brought to bear upon the issue. Moreover, by turning only to the Secretary of State the President would be acting on the false assumption that our foreign-policy objectives toward Brazil could be intelligently formulated without regard to their impact upon our domestic scene. This observation need not be labored, for it is obvious that such an objective, for example, as aiding in the industrialization of Brazil, would have consequences on United States trade and manufactures far different from an objective that contemplated aiding Brazil to develop its agriculture along new and different lines. And no objective could last for long if the consequences to the American public had not been calculated reasonably carefully and adjudged to be acceptable.

2. THE FORMULATION AND COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The machinery and processes for formulating specific policies and programs are little, if any, more adequate than those now available for advising the President on foreign-policy objectives. When Secretary of State Marshall made his address on European recovery in June 1947, he, in effect, proposed a program of United States economic assistance. Whatever discussions within the executive branch preceded his announcement, it is clear that they were not geared into any interdepartmental mechanism which would assure systematic consideration of all the major pros and cons. That such consideration would have been desirable is apparent if one takes cognizance of the possible effects of the policy on security or military plans and policies, on Federal fiscal and budgetary policies, and on domestic economic policies. That the Secretary of State alone could not be expected to pass judgment on all these matters needs no argument. Events of

this kind dramatize the administrative inadequacies in the determination of foreign policies and programs, inadequacies that are largely due to mechanical defects which, happily, are readily subject to improvement.

Ultimate responsibility for the coordination of foreign-affairs policies and programs within the executive branch also resides in the Chief Executive. It is this coordination which constitutes a problem of major proportions because it must comprehend so many programs and must proceed on a day-to-day basis. We turn now to an examination of the devices currently available for effecting the necessary coordination, and of the administrative concepts underlying their creation and use.

(a) *Interdepartmental Committees*

1. *General Characteristics.*—The most important and widely used coordinating device is the interdepartmental committee. In the foreign affairs field 33 such committees were sufficiently important to warrant special study.⁷ Over 20 or two-thirds of these were created since the end of World War II.

Methods of Establishment.—Of these 33 committees, 6 were established by acts of Congress, 8 by Presidential letter or Executive order, 13 by exchange of letters between Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries, and the balance by such means as departmental orders and informal arrangements. The trend since World War II has definitely been toward statutory establishment, as evidenced by the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (hereinafter referred to respectively as NSC, NSRB, NAC), and most recently by the statutory recognition of the Air Coordinating Committee (ACC), which has practically the same effect as statutory establishment. This trend appears to indicate a congressional desire for better coordination within the executive branch. The impetus for this statutory aegis, however, often comes from the committee members or staff, who seemingly seek to have the sanction which carries the greatest disciplinary potentialities.

The desirability of such statutory establishment is highly questionable. The President, as the Chief Executive and as the possessor of certain constitutional prerogatives in the conduct of foreign affairs, should not, as for that matter cannot, be directed to receive advice from certain designated sources or to coordinate action within the executive branch in certain specified ways. Statutory establishment of a committee, moreover, tends to endow it with an independent existence of its own and give it the status of a new agency of the executive branch. The unfortunate qualities of this result are found, for example, in the National Security Council, which has tended to

⁷ This number is as of July 30, 1948.

to consider foreign policy questions over which the Secretary of State might well be expected to have principal control, yet his voice is in the minority on the Council. Another example is the staff of the National Security Resources Board, which has insisted that it be represented on interdepartmental committees even though the Board itself is composed of representatives from different agencies. In this case it is clear that the staff of the NSRB has, in effect, become another independent unit of the government and not simply the agency or representative of the Board members for which it is supposed to work, nor of the departments and agencies which the Board members are designed to represent.

The creation of interdepartmental committees by statute has also acted to weaken those established by the President. This was the effect upon the Executive Committee for Economic Foreign Policy when the National Advisory Council was created. Finally, although the problem has not yet arisen, it is almost certain that some of the interdepartmental committees established by the Congress may continue their existence long after their usefulness has expired.

The President has established only 8 of the 33 committees studied. Nineteen others have been established by the action of one or more departmental representatives. This latter method indicates a failure on the part of the executive office of the President to take the initiative in creating interdepartmental bodies when they are needed to bring about necessary coordination. It is obvious that coordinated action on the part of several agencies should not be left up to those agencies alone, for without question that is a Presidential responsibility.

The President and the executive office have, moreover, paid little attention to the workings of the existing committees. Interest has been limited, by and large, to attendance at committee meetings by Budget Bureau representatives, usually in the capacity of observers, a category which permits participation without responsibility for committee actions taken. Furthermore, the Budget Bureau's observers have been irregular in attendance, and some of the 33 subject committees have received practically none of the elusive benefits of their observations. The principal unhealthy result of this attitude has been that no one associated with the committees has the difficult responsibility for making certain, by reference of the issues to the President if necessary, that decisions are made within a reasonable period of time. This task not only involves seeing that issues before a single committee be promptly resolved, but also that jurisdictional problems between committees not be allowed to stagnate.

Determination of Membership.—This matter poses a difficult problem because a committee's membership must be kept to workable size, and yet all interested and affected departments and agencies should be accorded participation. At present the practice is to grant member-

ship to those with so-called primary interest, and to have the committee invite nonmember departments and agencies to individual meetings when the committee deems the interest of such nonmembers to be involved. This practice is resented by the nonmembers on the ground that no one can determine as well as the department or agency itself whether or not its interests are involved.

A further question is that of the level of membership. Upon the establishment of a committee the initial effort is almost always directed at obtaining the highest level of agency representation possible. At present, high-level representation (the Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, or Office Director level) constitutes 62 percent of the membership of interdepartmental committees, and in 1947 made up 53 percent of the active participants in the meetings of these committees. If only the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary levels be considered, the percentage of membership is 44 percent and the percentage of active participation is 32 percent. These figures include, however, many recently established committees, and experience indicates that after an initial period of 6 months to 2 years, a deterioration occurs in two stages, first by members being represented by alternates, and second by alternates being represented by substitutes.

This tendency apparently results from two factors. First, the higher level officials cannot attend all the committee meetings called and still be able to administer the activities over which they have authority. Second, each member agency seems to prefer not to throw into a committee a matter which it feels it can dispose of unilaterally, thus bringing about a decision more to its liking than one emanating from the committee.

Under these conditions it is seen that the executive office of the President could do much by preventing the establishment of unnecessary or overlapping committees, by exercising some control over the matters to be considered by the committees, and by assuring that the agencies with generally marginal interests will be brought into the discussions when their interests are direct and substantial.

A notable anomaly in the interdepartmental committee structure is that the independent agencies, such as the Tariff Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Maritime Commission are not an integral part of the executive branch and yet their foreign affairs activities in particular need to be meshed with those of the rest of the executive branch. Thus these independent agencies are represented on the interdepartmental committees but they are not subject to the same degree of Presidential direction and discipline. One commission, for example, has effectively thwarted the development of an integrated foreign policy by sending a representative to committee meetings without authority to speak for the commission itself.

Subcommittees.—By recent count there were found to be 142 subcommittees or ad hoc working groups organized under the 33 subject interdepartmental committees. This proliferation is an indication of the scope of the committees' work as well as of the relatively uncontrolled establishment of subcommittees. Examination of the work of these subcommittees reveals that duplication and overlapping are well-entrenched practices. It has also been observed that there is a strong tendency for the decisions to be made by the subcommittees, with a consequent weakening of the parent committee. Furthermore, some departments and agencies often encourage the formation of subcommittees as a means of obscuring the responsibility for decisions.

Secretariats.—Each interdepartmental committee has a secretariat. Four main types exist. First, a secretariat may be located within the substantive office of one of the departments which is a member of the committee, the office personnel doing the secretariat job on a part-time basis. The Trade Agreements Committee is a good example of this type of secretariat. A second is a secretariat established within a department for the sole purpose of managing the committee's business. The State Department has been particularly active in setting up full-time secretariats of this type, where the scope and business of the committee is sufficiently important to require this full-time concentration of personnel. A third type is a separate central secretariat, located in the committee itself and supported by dollar contributions from member agencies. A fourth type is a secretariat composed of personnel detailed from the member agencies. This last type, as exemplified by the SANACC secretariat, is a dubious device because the secretariat tends to be much larger than might otherwise be the case. It operates on the principle that each member must have a member of the secretariat present to take care of the member's business.

Attention should be called to the existence in the State Department of a committee secretariat staff in the Executive Secretariat. This committee secretariat staff has among its responsibilities the providing of secretariat services for interdepartmental committees shared by the State Department and also services for the Department's internal committees. Since 1944 this staff has become a professional group which has systematized committee organization and procedure to a considerable degree and which, by making available centralized and standardized services, has reduced the personnel needed for secretariat work on interdepartmental committees. Furthermore, it has been of assistance to other secretariats as a source of professional advice. The value of this executive secretariat staff was demonstrated in the course of the European Recovery Program preparations, which were carried out by widespread, systematic departmental and interdepartmental consultation.

2. High-Level Committees.—The three high-level interdepartmental committees created by the Congress are especially significant in the conduct of foreign affairs today. These three are the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), and the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (NAC).⁸ These three bodies are new institutional aids to the President. The relationship is especially close in the case of the first two, which are officially part of the executive office of the President. NSC and NSRB were both created by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President, the former on "the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security," and the latter on "the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization for war."⁹ NAC, created by the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945, advises the President on the general policy to be followed by the United States representatives to the International Bank and International Monetary Fund in international financial matters, and coordinates the policies and operations of such representatives, the Export-Import Bank, and all other agencies of the government in the making of foreign loans and in other international financial matters.¹⁰

An interesting characteristic of these three bodies is their partially interlocking memberships. State is represented on all three; Commerce and Treasury are on both NSRB and NAC; and the Chairman of NSRB sits on the NSC. It should also be noted that the representative from each agency is the agency head.

The general level of attendance at meetings of these committees is very high. At NSC meetings the Secretaries invariably attend. In the case of NSRB the same is true except for the State Department, which is usually represented by the Assistant Secretary-Economic Affairs. The attendance at NAC is at the agency-head level except for the State Department, which is usually represented by the Under Secretary or the Assistant Secretary-Economic Affairs.

The NSC has been the subject of attack on the score that it has taken over from the State Department important phases of the control of American foreign policy. The four to one ratio of the military Secretaries to the Secretary of State (excluding the Chairman of the NSRB) is viewed with alarm, especially since the one State Depart-

⁸ The following table shows the full membership:

NSC	NSRB	NAC
The President (CH).	Chairman.	Treasury (CH).
State.	State.	State.
Defense.	Commerce.	Commerce.
Army.	Treasury.	Export-Import Bank.
Navy.	Agriculture.	Federal Reserve.
Air Force.	Labor.	ECA.
NSRB.	Interior.	

⁹ 50 U. S. C., secs. 401, 402, and 404.

¹⁰ 22 U. S. C., sec. 286b.

ment voice is the World War II Army Chief of Staff. This criticism is so sharp and comes from so many different sides that the role of NSC in the conduct of foreign affairs can be profitably analyzed in some detail.

The real danger appears to be potential rather than immediate. In the present troubled state of the world, military considerations necessarily must occupy a prominent place in the conduct of foreign affairs. Hence the President desperately needs advice which, in the terms of reference of NSC, is based on "the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security." For example, the problem of what to do in Germany and Korea should not be "funneled up" to the top by subordinating the military establishment to the State Department and having the latter present the picture to the President. After all, the Constitution does say that the President is the Commander in Chief, and if he wishes to assign all foreign affairs matters to the military establishment and relegate the State Department to a minor role, as Franklin D. Roosevelt came near doing in World War II, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent him from doing so.¹¹

The terms of reference of NSC are so broad that in the name of security it can and does get into numerous matters of foreign affairs which are strictly not its business. The difficulty, however, lies not so much with NSC as in the unbalanced structure of the machinery for advising the President. If the executive branch were properly organized, matters which are not NSC business would be the business of similar councils or cabinet-level committees in other fields. The fact is today there are no such other bodies, except NAC in the financial field, and NSC is endeavoring to fill a void.

NSC at the present time, moreover, is an unusually well-conceived and well-run organization. It has only 11 full-time staff personnel—3 officers and 8 clerical. It draws upon the existing departments for its staff and for a group of consultants. The consultants are the top planners of the departments represented on NSC. In the case of the State Department the Director of the Policy Planning Staff is the consultant, and in the case of the Army Department the Chief of Plans and Operations is the consultant. The staff of nine members, drawn from the member departments, initiates the policy paper process, but much of the actual work is done in the various departments represented. Before a paper is presented to the members of NSC, it is referred back to the several departmental policy and planning groups for study. The final NSC staff paper is also circulated, and in the case of the State Department is referred to all heads of

¹¹ A common misconception is that the Constitution requires the President to look to the civilian departments rather than the military establishment so far as foreign affairs are concerned. For example, Sumner Welles in a column in the Washington Post on September 28, 1948, entitled "Foreign Policy Under the Brass," creates this impression by his general statement that the civil authorities were "designated by the Constitution" to control United States foreign policy.

substantive policy units, so that a Department position is worked out in advance and the Secretary of State comes to the NSC meeting fully advised. This process works very satisfactorily, and the testimony of the top command in the State Department is that it is effective in enabling the State Department to perform its proper role in the conduct of foreign affairs.

The fact that NSC, as it operates today, is an effective mechanism and that the State Department has not been subordinated to the military establishment does not mean that this situation will continue. The weight General Marshall personally carries with the military establishment can be rarely duplicated again. The same is true in the case of Mr. Lovett, probably by reason of his wartime service as Assistant Secretary for Air in the War Department. The executive secretary of NSC possesses unusual qualifications of self-effacement and a close personal relationship with the President. These, too, may be hard to duplicate in the future.

Given these uncertainties and with the prospect that at some future date nonmilitary considerations may again dominate United States foreign policy, it must be concluded that NSC can easily slip into a highly improper role. The President of the future, as the President of the present, will sorely need integrated advice for the conduct of national as well as of foreign affairs. This advice must be integrated, not through a hit or miss system but through the use of other committees, similar to NSC, coordinating in other areas.

In addition to its integration function, NSC has an executive function by reason of the establishment under NSC of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the function of which is to coordinate the intelligence activities of the government. The director of CIA is appointed by the President, but the duties of CIA are performed under the direction of the National Security Council. The resulting situation is that of a unit of the executive branch being supervised by a committee which has the President as its formal chairman and an executive secretary as its real executive.

NAC also is a highly effective mechanism. It coordinates advice to the President on international financial matters, as well as the financial policies of the United States through the International Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Export-Import Bank, and other agencies of the government which make, or participate in the making of, foreign loans and foreign financial transactions. It has a staff committee, drawn from the departments and agencies represented on NAC, which functions very effectively.

NAC is directed by its terms of reference solely to international financial matters, and no comparable device exists for the coordinated consideration of domestic financial matters. It is also to be observed that while the State Department is represented on NAC, the practical situation is that foreign financial policy of the United States is largely

determined by the Treasury Department which "chairs" NAC, and not by the State Department.

NSRB, on the other hand, appears to be the complete antithesis of NSC and NAC in terms of conception and nature of operations. Instead of drawing on the other departments and agencies for personnel, it is becoming a separate agency in its own right. As of September 1, 1948 NSRB has a staff of approximately 200¹² full-time personnel which carries on work which tends to overlap in some degree that of other departments and agencies. A feeling appears to exist on the part of some of the departments which are members of NSRB that the NSRB staff undertakes work and issues reports without approval of the full Board. Further difficulties seem to arise from a certain isolation of NSRB from the rest of the executive branch which prevents a general understanding and appreciation of the task of NSRB. As a result it has not been able to fulfill its role as an important source of advice to the President on the significant problem of mobilization policies and plans.

(b) Interdepartmental Relations Other Than Through Committees

Interdepartmental relationships other than those conducted through committees consist in the main of day-to-day dealings involving such things as joint research, arrangements for international conferences, discussions on replies to be sent to queries that originate in United States foreign missions, and the like. Most of these relationships are informal, though of course on important matters letters are exchanged.

As these relationships occur at all levels of the departmental and agency hierarchies, considerable difficulties have arisen, both within the State Department and the other departments and agencies. These may develop when subordinates exceed their authority and claim to be stating a department policy when in fact it is a bureau, or perhaps only a personal, policy.

Furthermore, these interdepartmental relationships have grown to a large extent casually or without a soundly conceived plan. For example, on more than one program under the jurisdiction of the State Department the other departments may be approached by as many as four or five different State Department offices, each of which presents a different viewpoint. On the other hand, the State Department may have to deal with two or more offices in another department or agency, each of which disagrees with the other.

Finally, endless arguments may arise over cables and dispatches between Washington and the missions. These may involve questions as to whether communications originating in the overseas missions should be routed by the State Department to another department or agency, which of the other departments or agencies should receive communications so routed, which department or agency is responsible

¹² In addition, there are 95 consultants and w. o. c. employees.

for preparing the reply, and which offices in the State Department must initial, and thereby approve, a reply before it can be sent. The present system is wholly without rationale, a fact that results basically from a lack of understanding of the role of the State Department in contrast with that of the other departments and agencies. That the State Department cannot be permitted to decide unilaterally such questions as those posed above needs no elaborate argument.

(c) Organization of Departments and Agencies Other Than the State Department

A further complicating factor is the organization of the other departments and agencies which participate in the conduct of foreign affairs. It is well known that a single department or agency, such as Interior, Agriculture, or Commerce, embraces more than one bureau or office that is involved in foreign affairs. In such cases, logically, it is clear that the agency head is responsible for achieving the necessary coordination of the foreign affairs activities conducted by the constituent units of his agency. Through such coordination he is able to relieve the President of some of his burdens of coordination.

An examination of the larger departments and agencies shows that varying degrees of coordination are exercised at the level of the agency or department heads. The principal types of organization are:

1. In the office of the Secretary of Agriculture there is a Director of an Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, while in the Department of Labor there is an Assistant Secretary for International Labor Affairs, who has attached to him a small office of International Labor Affairs. Since these two officers report directly to their respective Secretaries, the coordinating task is carried on in a positive manner and the influence of the Secretaries is felt throughout their departments.

2. Similarly, an Office of Interagency and International Relations is located in the Office of the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency. The Director of the Office of Interagency and International Relations acts largely in an advisory capacity, however, while in the examples in (1) above, the two top officials in practice usually exercise the power of command over the operating bureaus.

3. The Department of Commerce offers a rather complicated arrangement at the level of the Secretary. There is an Assistant Secretary for foreign and domestic commerce, an Assistant Secretary for foreign and domestic air commerce, and a Coordinator of International Cooperation Programs. All three are concerned with various parts of the Secretary's total responsibility in foreign affairs, but none is charged with the full responsibility for reviewing all departmental programs and proposals for the Secretary.

4. In the Treasury Department the Office of International Finance has defined international responsibilities. It differs from the above

examples in that it lacks full authority to coordinate the foreign affairs programs of the other Treasury bureaus, although it does exercise influence over such programs if they impinge upon its own.

5. In other agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency, there is found a single staff officer with responsibility for advising the agency on foreign affairs issues.

6. In the greatest number of agencies surveyed, no official or office was found to have full responsibility for coordinating international activities. Even the Interior Department, with six bureaus carrying international responsibilities, and the Post Office Department, with two, lacked any central point which might give positive direction or guidance to the constituent bureaus.

Below the level of agency head, few bureaus or offices were found to have designated an officer or an office to coordinate and guide the bureaus' international activities. Although in some agencies a full-time official might not be warranted, it is desirable, as a minimum requirement, for a bureau to charge one officer, even on a part-time basis, with the responsibility for coordinating the foreign affairs activities of that bureau.

This looseness of organization within departments and agencies, and within their constituent bureaus or offices, has brought about two undesirable developments. First, the wealth of relevant information and viewpoints possessed by most departments and agencies has not always been crystallized and focused on current foreign policy questions and issues. Unless this is done, of course, the President and his top advisers will perforce make decisions without the benefit of all available facts and opinions. Second, the State Department has sometimes been placed in the role of a coordinator over two or more bureaus in another department or agency.

E. Conclusions

1. The conduct of all aspects of foreign affairs within the purview of the executive branch is the ultimate responsibility of the President.

2. Since the establishment of the State Department in 1789, the Congress has created numerous other agencies and endowed many of them with powers which take them into the sphere of foreign affairs. There appears to be no workable concept now current in the executive branch which at least establishes with broad strokes the role of the State Department in contradistinction to the role of the other agencies and departments. Of the several ineffective efforts to delimit the two roles, the chief one, which still persists, describes the role of the State Department as "policy making" and that of the other agencies as "operations." This distinction is defective and illusory, not only because it oversimplifies a complex situation but

because it ignores the obvious. The operation alone of any given program involves policy decisions of sundry kinds. Some are of the highest importance, others less so, and still others of very minor importance.

3 A useful concept for distinguishing between the role of the State Department and that of the other agencies may be found by classifying by functions the various powers granted by the Congress to the several departments and agencies. Such a classification reveals that the other departments and agencies have been granted either directly or by Presidential delegation such powers as financial assistance, the occupation of enemy countries, controls over commercial and financial transactions, and controls over the rights and movements of persons. In contrast, the State Department, with the exception of its powers over the foreign information and educational exchange programs, has been granted only circumscribed powers that relate to negotiations and communications with foreign states, powers that are not at all substantive in the same sense as the powers to make a loan or to send occupation troops onto foreign soil.

4. There is no administrative machinery now in existence which enables the President and his top officials systematically to:

a. Formulate national objectives that are based upon an integrated articulation of the foreign and domestic requirements and policies of the nation;

b. Coordinate the operation of foreign programs with one another and with domestic programs.

Chapter VI

THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The State Department in Washington and the Foreign Service overseas, unlike the remainder of the executive branch, devote themselves almost wholly to the conduct of foreign affairs.¹ They are not a single unified organization but two distinct organizations, each with its own personnel, appropriations, and administration. As a consequence, while they play parts of a common role, particularly in that Foreign Service officers serve in key posts in Washington as well as abroad, they must be analyzed in large measure as two separate organizations.

A. Responsibilities of State Department in Foreign Affairs

The role of the State Department in the executive branch as a whole, as observed earlier, is that of an arm of the President. In this capacity the State Department at home and through the Foreign Service abroad has traditionally performed four detailed responsibilities. These responsibilities, which are not exclusively performed by the State Department but are participated in by other departments and agencies, are as follows:

1. The responsibility for providing information upon which to enable the United States to conduct its international relations. The Foreign Service collects and reports information of all kinds to the State Department where it is sorted, some remaining in the State Department, some going to other departments and agencies. Today the information reported includes not only traditional political, commercial, and agricultural data, but also material on specialized economic problems and on labor, aviation, communications, and many other topics. New sources of information have arisen, particularly the United Nations and other international organizations of a specialized nature, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization.

¹ In the organic act of 1789, the State Department was originally named the Department of Foreign Affairs (1 Stat. 28). Two months later certain domestic duties were assigned to it and the name was changed to the Department of State (1 Stat. 68). At one time these domestic duties included patent and copyright issuance, census returns, administration of territories, public land patents, and others. Its current domestic duties are so basically ministerial that they do not warrant discussion. They include such functions as custody of the seal of the United States, publication of all statutes, and receipt of certificates from state executives of the ascertainment of Presidential electors.

2. The responsibility for representation of the United States in the bulk of its relations with other governments. This responsibility is discharged both by the State Department in Washington and by the Foreign Service abroad. It may involve a reply in Washington to a protest from the Soviet ambassador regarding the seeking of asylum from a Russian consulate in this country by a Madame Kasenkina, or it may involve representations to the Lebanese Government in regard to the removal of American citizens from an American ship in a Lebanese port.

3. The responsibility for negotiation with foreign governments both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. This may involve negotiation with the Icelandic Government for an air base in Iceland or negotiation with many countries for the establishment of an international trade organization.

4. The responsibility for participation in the formulation of United States foreign policy. This responsibility involves the use of information collected from the missions abroad and from sources in the United States, the evaluation of such information, and the formulation of foreign policy based on these evaluations.

Two additional major responsibilities have also been added to those of the prewar era. One is the responsibility for a large share of the integration and coordination of foreign policy formulation and execution through interdepartmental committees and other interdepartmental arrangements. The other is the responsibility for furnishing to the American public and peoples of foreign countries information as to the nature and purposes of the United States objectives and policies in the world of today. Providing information to the American public is a recognition that with our new position in the world the support of an informed public is essential, as was amply demonstrated in 1945 in the case of the United Nations charter and again in 1947-48 in that of the Marshall plan.² Similarly, furnishing information to foreign peoples through radio (the Voice of America), publications and motion pictures may be an important ingredient of an effective foreign policy.

B. The Internal Organization

The foreign office of every government tends to be a ready target for criticism in times of international crisis. The State Department in times past has fared somewhat better than some of its European counterparts, apparently because in the United States foreign affairs were relatively more removed from the public eye and because with basically negative foreign policies the United States could avoid involvement in international complications.

² Prior to World War II the State Department provided information on the domestic scene in the limited sense of publishing the Foreign Relations series and other material of value to scholars. Such activities, however, can hardly be called an information program.

The State Department's day of reckoning came in the post-World War II years with a barrage of criticism from both houses of Congress, the White House, other departments and agencies, and the press. Within the State Department itself the feeling exists in many quarters that the Department is in a serious state of disorder. Some of these indictments are directed at improper organization and others at the absence of administration. Much of the criticism appears well-founded, but some is little more than nostalgia for the prewar days when the Department was small and compact.

1. AN OUTLINE OF THE PRESENT STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

The current organization of the State Department, in terms of the standard organization chart (chart V, following p. 76) consists of four layers, in order of precedence, as follows: (1) The Secretary's office, (2) 6 Assistant Secretaries and 1 Special Assistant, (3) 19 offices, and (4) 79 divisions. Not shown on the chart is a fifth category of more than 225 branches. In theory the branches report to the divisions, the divisions to the offices, the offices to the Assistant Secretaries, and the Assistant Secretaries to the Under Secretary and Secretary. In practice this chain of command indicated by the chart is only partially true.

A more accurate picture of the State Department's organization may be obtained by looking at it in terms of three main segments, as follows:

1. A "*top command*" segment.—This is composed of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Counselor, the Legal Adviser, the Policy Planning Staff, the Press Relations Special Assistant, the Coordinator for Foreign Aid, and the central coordinating staff known as the Executive Secretariat. Partially within this segment are the Assistant Secretaries who have shifted from a prewar staff role of advisers to the Secretary of State to a postwar dual capacity of advisers and of administrators and operating heads of the major policy and operational subdivisions of the Department.

2. A *substantive affairs* segment.—This consists of the organizational units concerned with substantive problems of policy and operations on a secondary level and of other units with supporting functions. These units serve to divide up the State Department, partly on a geographic and partly on a functional basis, into the major subdivisions of political affairs, economic affairs (including transportation and communications), occupied areas, public affairs (the informational programs), research and intelligence, and United Nations affairs. These subdivisions are headed up by four Assistant Secretaries, one Special Assistant, and five office directors (four in political affairs and one in United Nations affairs). As noted above, these individuals

also have advisory or staff responsibilities with respect to the top command of the Department.³

3. *The administration and services segment.*—Except for the Office of Controls, this consists of the housekeeping units concerned with personnel, budget, and administrative services matters. Through these services this segment also had a voice in policy formulation, and the Assistant Secretary for Administration, particularly in congressional matters, plays an active part at the present time. In addition, the Office of Controls with its passport and visa divisions represents an active operation of the State Department.

The personnel strength of the three main segments above, as of September 1, 1948, and that of certain roughly comparable categories 10 years prior, are as follows:

Category	1948	1938
Secretary's Office:		
Secretary and Under Secretary	15	(1)
Executive Secretariat	115	(1)
Legal Adviser	95	(1)
Other	56	(1)
Total	281	21
Substantive Affairs segment:		
Political or Geographical	318	112
Economic	(2) 551	127
Research and Intelligence	508	-----
Public Affairs	994	98
United Nations Affairs	133	-----
Occupied Areas	50	-----
Other	-----	162
Total	2, 554	499
Administrative segment:		
Departmental Administration	1, 793	(1)
Foreign Service Administration	346	(1)
Office of Controls	674	(1)
Total	2, 813	443
Grand total	5, 648	963

(1) No break-down available.

(2) Of this 551, 85 are in the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner which is a specialized and temporary operation. Elimination of these 85 makes the total economic personnel 446. Other individuals with economic qualifications are to be found in Research and Intelligence, Political Affairs and elsewhere.

³ In terms of organization, the heads of the subdivisions in this second segment do not all conform to the same pattern. Three of them, the Assistant Secretary-Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-Public Affairs, and the Special Assistant-Research and Intelligence, are the supervisory heads of subordinate functional offices, which report through them to the top command. The Assistant Secretaries for Transportation and Communications and for Occupied Areas, on the other hand, are no more than heads of offices who report directly to the Secretary of State, as does the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.

The position of Assistant Secretary-Political Affairs is still different for it exercises little supervision over the four geographic offices except to the extent that it serves as an arbiter of controversies in the political affairs area between those four offices. The four geographic offices, namely, the Offices of American Republic Affairs, European Affairs, Far Eastern Affairs and Near Eastern and African Affairs, are theoretically under the Assistant Secretary-Political Affairs, but the head of each office in practice deals directly with the Secretary-Under Secretary level. Hence, like the Assistant Secretaries, these office directors serve in a dual staff and supervisory capacity instead of merely in the latter capacity as they appear to do on the organization chart.

2. THE TOP COMMAND LEVEL

(a) *Its Organizational Weaknesses*

Generalizations on the top-command level of the State Department are especially dangerous because so much depends on the particular President and the Secretary of State. Certain characteristics of the post-World War II State Department, however, have been frequent targets of criticism. These characteristics are:

1. The inability of the top command to give attention to other than day-to-day business.
2. The failure of the top command to provide executive direction.
3. The lack of any systematic procedures by the top command to utilize staff.

All three of these characteristics are related and arise from much the same source. The Secretary and Under Secretary of State are required by the nature of modern world affairs to devote almost their full time to the day-to-day aspects of foreign affairs. International negotiations, for example, have been a heavy burden. This is borne out by the fact that while James F. Byrnes was Secretary of State he was at international conferences 350 out of the 562 days he spent in office, or 62 percent of the time,⁴ and Secretary Marshall, up to October 15, 1948, similarly had devoted 228 out of 633 days to international conferences, or 36 percent of the time. With the Secretary of State away from the Department for such substantial periods, the Under Secretary is the acting head of the Department and must serve as the decision-maker with respect to the host of daily questions which arise as well as be available for meetings with ambassadors and ministers of other countries and with heads of other departments and agencies. This load on the Under Secretary has been accentuated under Secretary Marshall because he has freely delegated responsibility both for substantive policy and executive direction to the Under Secretary. Delegation further down the line, however, has not taken place, in part because of deficiencies in the organization at the top-command level itself and in part because the substantive and administrative levels of the Department are not organized to permit such further delegation.

The lack of adequate utilization of staff aids is particularly evident on the substantive side. The staff of the Secretary and Under Secretary consists not only of the other officials at the top-command level but also the assistant secretaries, office directors, and special assistants at the second or substantive policy level. The Secretary and Under Secretary should have the benefit of staff advice from these sources

⁴ James F. Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly" (N. Y. 1947), p. 245.

on important policy matters, but the machinery for assembling and correlating this advice in any systematic fashion does not exist. Conversely, many of the heads of substantive policy segments are left with very incomplete knowledge of top-level decisions or of the reasons for such decisions. The staff committee created by the 1944 reorganization never proved effective and the present arrangements appear to fall far short of the needs.

At the present time the Secretary, although he talks frequently with members of his staff on an individual basis, has no regular staff meetings. The Under Secretary does hold meetings twice a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays, of approximately 2 hours' duration. These meetings are usually attended by approximately 30 individuals, including all 6 assistant secretaries, the 4 geographic office directors, 2 of the economic office directors, the Counselor, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, the Special Assistant for Press Relations, and others of comparable rank. In addition, the meeting may be attended by almost anyone a regular participant wishes to bring with him. No planned agenda exists and most participants are reluctant to bring up matters of real importance. For example, the geographic office directors seem to feel that representatives of the functional units are not to be trusted while the functional representatives often feel that if a problem is raised it may be seized by the geographic offices and settled with the top command via the back door. It is almost universally felt throughout the Department that these meetings are too large, that attendance is not restricted to a high enough level, and that meetings should be more frequent, preferably daily.

(b) Means of Correcting the Weaknesses

The consequences of the Secretary and Under Secretary's being required to give so much of their personal attention to immediate problems have been recognized in the State Department. The situation has been alleviated in important respects by the creation of the Executive Secretariat and the Policy Planning Staff but further relief is urgently needed. The Executive Secretariat was originally created in 1946 as the "Central Secretariat" and it was renamed and substantially revitalized by Secretary Marshall in June 1947. Its prime function is to make sure that no paper comes to the Secretary or Under Secretary requiring action unless all the necessary clearances at the lower levels have been obtained. The top command of the State Department is protected in its action by the knowledge that the item has had clearance with all the necessary units at the operating level. The Executive Secretariat has made considerable progress in breaking down the tendency of certain elements in the Department to create and operate within exclusive preserves of activity.

The Policy Planning Staff was established on May 7, 1947. It came about as a direct result of the dramatic measures which had to be

resorted to on aid to Greece because of the failure to anticipate the British withdrawal, a possibility which was perfectly obvious, which had occurred to various people, but concerning which no planning had been done.

The Policy Planning Staff has been incorrectly publicized as a long-range policy planning unit when, in fact, it was set up to anticipate policy problems which might be faced by the Department in the future, whether it be 1 week, 1 month, or 1 year hence. This responsibility for short-range as well as long-range planning is confirmed by the Staff's actual pattern of operations. It is, however, also drawn into current operations and its Director is personally called upon in connection with many current problems, a result in part of the lack of sufficient experienced personnel at the very top level to advise the Secretary and Under Secretary. While there is considerable doubt as to whether the Policy Planning Staff has been as effective a staff unit as it would like to be or could be, the fact remains that for the first time in recent years the top command has had a staff "looking around the corner" of today's business, and the dangers of the top command devoting its time almost solely to day-to-day operations are thereby lessened.

The problem of getting the necessary staff advice at the top command and, conversely, of enabling the operating heads to know what goes on at the top level has been of great concern within the Department during the current year. Progress appears to have been made since 1946 in reducing to writing policies towards given countries, but such policy statements still do not seem to have been made known sufficiently to persons at the action level. Moreover, as yet no effective high-level policy coordinating arrangements have been put in force. Various internal reorganization plans which have been under consideration by the Department for a number of years have contemplated the establishment of a high-level policy committee of approximately 10 to 15 members which would meet daily and would be thoroughly serviced by a secretariat in terms of prepared agenda, recording of action, and follow-up on decisions reached. The successful establishment of this sort of committee, however, would require, first, the firm hand of the Secretary or Under Secretary to make the committee function in the desired manner, an effective secretary who remained in the background but saw that the matters on the agenda would attract high-level attendance; a reorganization of the Department so that those entitled to attend the meeting could be accurately determined, and last of all the inculcation by persuasion and disciplinary measures of the necessity for mutual trust and teamwork on the part of the participants.

(c) Public Opinion and the "Top Command"

The broad democratic basis upon which the United States must conduct its foreign affairs today makes American public opinion a vital factor both in the determination of fundamental objectives and in the formulation and execution of policy. Whereas in Great Britain foreign affairs have long been of intimate concern to the British public, the State Department for a long period worked in a relatively quiet cove unaffected by public sentiment. Today it is forced not only to ascertain what American public opinion is but also to win its acceptance and support. Furthermore, it has found that the opinion of the peoples of foreign countries, as contrasted with their governments, also bears upon the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

The top command level in the State Department has gone a considerable distance in recognizing the importance of the public-opinion factor. The appointment of an Assistant Secretary-Public Affairs in 1946, and the fact that the personnel under him represent 17 percent of the total strength of the State Department (a larger single segment than any other except for that under the Assistant Secretary-Administration), give concrete evidence of this recognition. Nonetheless, neither the top command level nor the Public Affairs units are presently organized to deal with public opinion in an adequate manner.

The public opinion problem is twofold in nature. First, it requires the State Department to ascertain the status of American and foreign public attitudes and to use public opinion data as one of the factors in policy determination. Second, it requires the State Department to make its own position known to the public so as to gain acceptance and support.

In the former instance the Office of Public Affairs seeks to tap and evaluate American public opinion. Summaries of public opinion developments drawn from press and radio sources are regularly prepared and circulated within the State Department and to the missions overseas. Data from public-opinion polls are utilized and on occasion special surveys are made of public opinion on particular subjects. In general this machinery seems to be adequate for ascertaining American public attitudes. But while the top command is interested in the data produced, the present mechanism is not adequate to insure that such data will be regularly employed as one of the factors in top command policy machinery.

In the second respect, that of the State Department's making its position known to the public, liaison is maintained with many private organizations, speakers are sent out to private groups, letters and inquiries are handled, and a considerable body of material on foreign

relations is made available through the State Department Bulletin and other publications. On the whole, however, it appears that this process has not been as fully developed as is desirable. The private organizations in the international affairs field feel they could be more helpful if their facilities were used more fully. Use of private organizations in other areas, such as agriculture and labor, appears to be relatively nominal despite the fact that they afford access to a large and politically significant portion of the public.

The weakest link with the American public appears to lie in the fact that the State Department has no high official responsible for the vital contacts with the press correspondents and other writers and for giving them essential background material. The Special Assistant for Press Relations, who handles the regular press releases, cannot fill in policy background for the press because he does not participate in the high-level decisions. Likewise, the Assistant Secretary Public Affairs, by reason of his burden of broadcasting and other operational duties, is not fully informed on the background of top-command determinations. Hence, the press is forced to get its background on United States foreign policy objectives and decisions as best it can from the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Counselor, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, or whomever else happens to be available at a particular time.

At a minimum, two steps appear desirable to insure that adequate attention is paid to public opinion at the top-command level. First, and in accordance with the basic general role of the State Department, operational responsibilities for the foreign information and educational exchange programs should be placed elsewhere. This step would make possible the second, which is to have the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs serve as a staff officer focusing on the State Department's problems from a public opinion and public relations standpoint. This would involve the three-fold responsibility of: (1) Advising the Secretary and Under Secretary, directly and through a high-level planning committee, on the public opinion aspects of any problem, (2) explaining the conduct of foreign affairs to the American public through the press and public liaison activities, and (3) observing and giving general guidance to foreign information and education exchange programs operated elsewhere in the executive branch.

3. THE SUBSTANTIVE AFFAIRS SEGMENT

The major organizational problems of the State Department at the secondary level of substantive policy formulation and program operation can be classified under three headings:

a. The problem of coordinate authority, with geographical and functional units having power over the same subject matter. This involves the question of the necessity for the present economic

functional units, not only from the standpoint of the internal State Department organization but also in terms of the responsibility of the State Department vis-a-vis other departments and agencies.

b. The problem of intelligence within the State Department, involving the question of whether there is any function to be performed by the present separate research and intelligence unit and, if so, what its job should be and how it should be organized.

c. The problem of whether the State Department should engage in operational tasks such as are involved in the foreign information and educational exchange programs, and other programs such as would be involved if the State Department had been designated to administer the European recovery program or were to assume the responsibility for the administration of occupied areas.

(a) *The Problem of Coordinate Authority—Geographical vs. Functional Organization*

1. *The Background of the Problem.*—The work of the Department of State, in terms of substantive policy and programs, is carried on by two types of units, geographical (political on the chart) and functional (economic on the chart).⁵ Both have responsibilities which cut across all the processes of the conduct of foreign affairs.⁶ They share in the shaping of the United States objectives in the world. They participate actively in the formulation of foreign policy, as is reflected by the saying that United States foreign policy is made "on the cables" between the State Department and our missions abroad. Both types of units on frequent occasions are deeply immersed in the execution of foreign policy, as is evidenced by the participation of the units of the Office of European Affairs in the negotiations for postwar United States air bases in the Azores and in Iceland, and by that of the Office of International Trade Policy in the postwar negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements with Sweden, Mexico, and other countries. The problem is heightened by the fact that Foreign Service officers hold the key positions in the geographic units whereas Departmental personnel in the main man the functional units.

Historically considered, the pattern of State Department organization has been one of specialization along geographic lines, this form having been initiated as early as 1833 by the creation of a Diplomatic Bureau with three employees dividing up the work by areas. The present quadripartite division dates from Secretary Knox's 1909 reorganization. Specialization on economic program lines is very recent, its real origin lying in the establishment in 1935 of a division

⁵ The public affairs or informational units are also functional in character, but they are presently much more remote from the formulation of policy.

⁶ Other special units, such as Office of United Nations Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-Occupied Areas, share, of course, in certain phases.

of Trade Agreements to implement Trade Agreements Act of 1934.⁷ As a result the economic personnel rose from 8 in 1934 to 41 in 1935 and to 99 in 1938.⁸ Today the total is 466, or over 8 percent of the entire department.⁹ By comparison the 318 personnel in the geographic units today represent less than 6 percent.

Certain features of these two type of units warrant brief attention. As to the geographic units, first, their own organization demonstrates the fallacy of any notion that the world can be wholly partitioned into neat segments. In practice the responsibilities for various regions overlap. For example, the Division of Northern European Affairs, through its branch responsible for the Netherlands, gets deeply involved in Indonesian matters, and from time to time crosses swords with the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Secondly, these geographical units display a tendency to set up functional subdivisions. Six of the seven divisions of American Republic Affairs have economic branches, and the same characteristic in lesser degree is found in Far Eastern Affairs and Near Eastern and African Affairs.

On the functional side the fragmentation below the division level in some cases follows the pattern of function to its logical conclusion. In three important instances, however, functional divisions subdivide in part on a geographic basis and in each case the pattern of geographical subdivision is not only different from that of the other functional units but also from the area break-down of the geographic units.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the argument that the different geographical divisions of each functional unit are supportable in terms of differences in the respective functions, the fact remains that this lack of order contributes to the difficulties of both intradepartmental and interdepartmental work.

A comparison of the pattern of the day-to-day relationships of the geographical and functional units is enlightening. The geographical units operate in terms of individual countries and participate in the conduct of foreign affairs by serving as the channel of communication between those countries and the United States. The functional units, on the other hand, operate on a multilateral basis and serve as the

⁷ Prior thereto, specialized economic work has been done through the Office of Economic Adviser, created in 1921, and certain antecedent positions, although before 1931 economic work for the most part was commercial in nature and consisted of supervision of foreign trade reporting by the consular offices abroad. The Economic Adviser from 1921 to 1935 largely lived up to his title, that is, he acted in a staff capacity and did not serve as the supervisor of substantive programs.

⁸ These figures are intended to represent only persons in economic as distinguished from commercial work.

⁹ This figure is exclusive of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, which is temporary and out of the main stream of the Department's work.

¹⁰ The three functional units involved and their geographic branches are:

1. Division of Commercial Policy with four branches: (a) American Republics; (b) British Commonwealth and Empire; (c) Europe, and (d) Far and Middle East.

2. Division of Financial Affairs with five area branches: (a) British Commonwealth; (b) Western Europe; (c) Eastern Europe; (d) Far and Middle East and Africa; and (e) Latin America.

3. Division of Investment and Economic Development with six branches: (a) British Commonwealth Africa, and Middle East; (b) Western Europe; (c) Eastern Europe; (d) Central Europe; (e) Asia and Far East; and (f) American Republics.

State Department's channel of liaison on foreign affairs' matters with the other departments and agencies of the Government. For example, of the State Department representatives on the 33 interdepartmental committees discussed in part V, 18 come from the economic units, none from the geographical units. The functional units are also an important channel of communication with international organizations of which the United States is a member.

Three aspects of the geographic-functional conflict will be singled out for discussion. The first is the consequences of the coordinate authority pattern of organization in terms of operating relationships within the State Department. The second is whether the geographic and economic units are both performing functions properly those of the State Department. The third is whether a single form of organization can be adopted to remove the defects of the present pattern.

2. *The Consequences of Coordinate Authority.*—Today with the distinction between the political and economic aspects of foreign affairs almost wholly evaporated, the consequences of a structure with two units having coordinate authority are obvious. Few problems are 100-percent political or 100-percent economic. Is the export of tin plate to Finland a matter for the Finnish desk in the Northern European Division of the Office of European Affairs, or for the Coal, Iron, and Steel Section of the Industrial Raw Materials Branch of the International Resources Division of the Office of International Trade Policy? Today it has to be considered at all these various levels in order to reach a decision.

These consequences can be briefly summarized:

a. Coordinate authority requires an elaborate system of lateral clearance between the geographic and functional units. If complete clearance is obtained it may be so time-consuming or confusing that serious delays result. If it is not obtained, decisions will be made by the geographic units on the basis of too narrow a perspective or by the functional units without taking into account vital considerations with respect to certain foreign countries.

b. Coordinate authority means that no single unit at the operating level, geographic or functional, can be held solely responsible either for taking action or for the action taken. It is always possible to say, "Mr. A is handling that matter."

c. Coordinate authority often means that there is no level below the Under Secretary at which important decisions can be made, and as a result too many disputes have to go up to the Under Secretary. On occasion, disputes will be settled at the "top command" level on ex parte presentation by one side or the other. The dispute will have been resolved but a trail of bitter feeling is left behind. On the other hand to avoid the necessity for such an appeal, unsatisfactory compromises are too often made at the operating level.

d. Coordinate authority has resulted in a tendency for the geographic offices to have their own functional advisers; the functional offices in turn have tended to subdivide themselves on a geographic basis. This necessarily involves some undesirable duplication.

e. Coordinate authority has produced friction between the personnel in the geographic and functional offices. Coupled with the additional differences resulting from the former being staffed largely by Foreign Service personnel and the latter by Departmental personnel, the result is distinctly detrimental to the efficient dispatch of departmental business.

Jurisdictional quarrels are inevitable in any large organization, particularly one concerned primarily with the decision-making process. These quarrels occur in the State Department, moreover, even when the geographic-functional factor is not present as is demonstrated by the existence of quarrels between geographic units or between the academic personnel and the business personnel in the economic units. The significant query on the geographic-functional controversy, however, is whether the form of organization itself does not produce unnecessary conflicts.

We must not deceive ourselves that this problem is peculiar to the United States State Department. It exists today in varying degree in the foreign offices of many other countries. With the difficulty of classifying matters as political or economic and the increasing necessity of conducting foreign affairs in global rather than regional terms, other foreign offices likewise have found themselves with a pattern of organization characterized by both geographical and functional units, responsible to different chiefs having coordinate authority over the same subject matter.¹¹

One solution of the geographic-functional dilemma is to make one or the other predominant. Old line diehards in the State Department would solve it by abolishing the economic units. Impartial observers, however, find difficulty in making up their minds which should dominate.¹² Another solution, favored by the present State Department organizational experts, is to evolve a new type of geographic or regional unit manned in such a fashion as to merge the best qualities of the present dual structure. With a basic regional structure at the action of line level, manned by the present operators from both the political and economic units, the higher level economic or global experts would be moved up to an advisory or staff level where they would still serve as a source for advice on global considerations and as a liaison mechanism with the other departments and agencies.

¹¹ The British Foreign Office today has geographic and subject departments; the French Foreign Office has a geographic-functional split; and the German Foreign Office in 1945 had a political office and an economic policy office, both subdivided on a geographical basis.

¹² The Nelson report inclined toward favoring the functional offices but made no recommendation. At the time of that report the economic offices appear to have been stronger in terms of prestige than they are today.

3. *Are the Functions of the Geographic and Economic Units Proper State Department Functions?*—The question here is whether the functions now performed by the geographic and economic units of the State Department properly belong in the State Department or elsewhere in the Government. It can be quickly disposed of so far as the geographic units are concerned. Since the organic act creating the State Department in 1789, part of its business has been to provide a channel of communication through which to deal with other countries. It is the Secretary of State who is responsible for having at hand intelligent sources of specialized knowledge on every foreign country. Other departments and agencies may need technical information on foreign countries, but no other department or agency has sought or should try to assume the general responsibilities now discharged by the geographic units of the State Department.

The economic units are another matter. The Commerce Department has contended that several economic units of the State Department duplicate the work of its Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. The Labor Department has questioned the need for the Division of International Labor and Social Affairs. The Interior Department has expressed doubts as to the need for the Petroleum Division and for the mineral sections of the International Resources Division. The Agriculture Department has cast a suspicious eye on the agricultural commodities work of the State Department.

These complaints must be considered not in terms of separate grievances but in the light of the general role of the State Department and that of the other departments and agencies. In relation to the other departments and agencies, the State Department's general role demands that it concentrate on obtaining definition of objectives of the United States with respect to foreign regions and countries, of formulating policies in conjunction with other departments and agencies to achieve those objectives, and of guiding the choice and timing of the use of various positive instruments of United States foreign policy. The general role of the other departments and agencies is to provide advice for the State Department where their interests are involved or where they have experience to contribute and, when called upon by the President or the Congress, to administer specific means or instruments of carrying out United States foreign policy but under the observation and with the advice of the State Department. An appraisal of the present functions of the State Department's economic units in the light of these general roles can best be made in terms of a specific area controversy. The conflict between the State Department and the Commerce Department, for example, involves, among others, three disputes over whether the State Department's economic units should work on the formulation and negotiation of trade agree-

ments, on the planning, drafting and negotiation of commercial treaties, and on commodities.¹³

The first two of these disputes involve in part a traditional responsibility of the State Department, namely, negotiation with foreign countries. From a historical standpoint, moreover, formulation of commercial treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with respect to the rights of United States citizens in foreign countries and of foreign nationals in the United States have long been viewed as in the State Department's domain; as for trade agreements, it was Secretary Hull who had taken the initiative in pushing the reciprocal trade program. Thus, the leadership of the State Department in formulation and negotiation in these two instances appears to be in keeping with its general role. This conclusion is strengthened by the Commerce Department's concession that such was the case. In regard to both commercial treaties and trade agreements, however, the economic units of the State Department were going further and doing statistical work and handling inquiries from American business, the clientele of the Commerce Department.¹⁴

The third dispute involves work on commodities, which represents a more recent development in the State Department. Since the end of World War II, although in diminishing volume, the economic units, and to some degree the intelligence units, have been doing basic commodity research even though such research duplicates the type of research (although apparently not the same specific research) being done in other departments and agencies. This practice is defended by the State Department on the ground that the commodity research of the other departments is in large part unreliable and is oriented in terms of special domestic interests rather than from a foreign policy standpoint. It can lead, however, to the duplication on the foreign side of great portions of the activities of the other departments and agencies.

¹³ An attempt to mediate or arbitrate these disputes was made in the spring of 1948 under the auspices of the Bureau of the Budget. The project was under the direction of Mr. Royden Dangerfield, executive vice president of the University of Oklahoma. A report entitled "A Study of Relationships Between the Departments of State and Commerce" (Bureau of the Budget, June 23, 1948), discusses the various disputes in detail and furnishes the basis for a considerable portion of the text above.

The project was carried on in a very competent manner and the report is an excellent analysis of State-Commerce relationships. The interviews and discussions which took place were helpful in promoting better understanding between the two departments and certain constructive results may be expected. On the other hand, certain major suggestions of the report had not been accepted by either department as of October 8, 1948. This nonacceptance appears not to be a consequence of a lack of merit in the suggestion but an indication that until the broad general roles of the two departments are understood, mediation or arbitration at lower levels will be ineffectual to solve the fundamental difficulty.

¹⁴ Part of the confusion arises from the practical difficulty that while the Commerce Department was created as a service agency for American business, it has been difficult for the State Department, since the 1939 amalgamation of the Commerce Department's overseas service with the Foreign Service, not to deal directly with business. Up to the creation of the Commerce Department in 1903, moreover, the State Department for a number of years had a Bureau of Foreign Commerce which performed for American business and trade the functions now performed by the Commerce Department. At present, then, Commerce acts as a liaison agency between the State Department and American business and inevitably the intermediate step will, on occasion, be eliminated.

Today responsibility for commodity work should be dispersed throughout the Government, and it is not feasible to centralize it in any one agency. In the conduct of foreign affairs this commodity work must be coordinated and integrated through interdepartmental committees and informal means. In this process the State Department will need some commodity experts to discharge its share of the task. Its requirements to do this job are well stated in the Bureau of the Budget report as follows:

State must be staffed with specialists sufficiently versed in the commodity field in order to (1) assemble the viewpoints of other agencies so as to enable the formulation of United States positions to be taken in foreign states, (2) anticipate needs for the formulation of policies, (3) inform other agencies of the United States foreign policies, (4) cause such policies to be implemented, and (5) plan and participate in international negotiations.

These three instances point to the State Department, through the economic units, as responsible for policy formulation and negotiation, but with the other departments and agencies furnishing advice and statistical information as to its execution. On other occasions, however, it may be appropriate to reverse these roles and have another department or agency primarily responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the negotiation with the other country, aided throughout with staff assistance from the State Department in the form of either geographical specialists or functional specialists. In international telecommunications, for example, the Federal Communications Act of 1934 charges the Federal Communications Commission with responsibilities in the foreign as well as domestic areas. After the war, as it became clear that international telecommunication agreements would have to be negotiated, it was found desirable to set up a telecommunications unit in the State Department. A similar development in aviation eventually brought about the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary—Transportation and Communications, to whom were assigned responsibilities for telecommunications, aviation and shipping. As time went on, the Federal Communications Commission assumed increasingly substantive responsibility for shaping United States foreign policy in international communications and in the actual negotiation of international telecommunications agreements. This trend culminated in the meeting of the International Telecommunications Congress at Atlantic City in 1947 at which the United States delegation was headed, not by a representative of the State Department, but by the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, who had as his deputy an officer from the State Department.

The conclusions on this point may be summarized as follows:

1. The State Department's economic units, in their rapid growth, have assumed certain statistical, technical and research functions which are duplicated elsewhere in the executive branch.

2. The State Department will always need economic specialists to serve as a medium for obtaining information from other departments and agencies and for serving within the State Department in an advisory but not an executive capacity.

3. The other departments and agencies must be required by the President to organize themselves so as to be able to discharge effectively their foreign affairs responsibilities.

4. *Should the Basic Organization of the Substantive Policy Segment of the State Department be Geographic or Functional?*—The State Department, in order to discharge its general responsibilities, will inevitably require that one of its segments be organized geographically in order to furnish adequate sources of specialized knowledge on various foreign areas and countries, and to provide an efficient channel through which, in conjunction with American missions abroad, to deal with foreign countries. The economic units, however, do not have so clear a case.

Again analysis can be most effectively made in terms of a specific case. The economic units in the State Department are headed by two Assistant Secretaries, one for Economic Affairs and another for Transportation and Communications.¹⁵ Transportation and Communications has been attacked by other departments and agencies for duplicating their technical aviation and communications staffs. It has been criticized by geographic units within the Department for setting up aviation and other specialists for certain areas of the world. As the responsibilities of Transportation and Communications became clearer, it has attempted a deliberate policy of organizational reform which ultimately will meet the criticisms from both of the foregoing sources. Over the past year it has been eliminating activities of a technical nature, such as participation in technical conferences which are the primary responsibility of other agencies, and the maintenance of a file of current information on transportation and communications policies of foreign governments. It has more and more drawn on other departments and agencies and on individuals outside the government to represent the United States in international negotiations and conferences. Within the Department, Transportation and Communications is taking steps to transfer area specialists (actually relatively few in number) to the appropriate geographic unit. Likewise it contemplates transferring certain service functions, such as the Telecommunications Facilities Survey, to the Federal Communications Commission, certain records and files to the administrative side of the Department, and the functions of clearing nonscheduled air

¹⁵ The establishment of the latter took place in 1946 because of the heavy burden involved in negotiating postwar aviation agreements and because of pressure from aviation interests for an Assistant Secretary to concentrate on air transportation problems. This Transportation and Communications segment is not large. It has recently dropped from a personnel strength of 104 to 77. As noted earlier, it is in reality no more than an office.

transport flights in the United States to the Office of Controls on the administrative side of the Department.

Upon the completion of these various steps, Transportation and Communications will consist of a functional group and a small administrative staff. The retention of the functional group is necessary in the fields of aviation, telecommunications, inland transportation and shipping to discharge three responsibilities. From an intra-departmental standpoint the functional staff would bring together the various views within the Department and develop over-all transportation and communications foreign policies. Second, from an interdepartmental standpoint the functional group would represent the State Department on interdepartmental committees so as to discharge the State Department's Government-wide responsibilities. Third, from an intergovernmental standpoint the functional group, in collaboration with the Office of United Nations Affairs, would backstop from the State Department standpoint United States representatives on international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunications Union.

The developments in Transportation and Communications illustrate clearly the need for the continuation of functional units with substantive and not merely advisory responsibilities. With the objectives of the United States in world affairs being attained to an increasing extent through multilateral dealings, the simple country-to-country approach of past areas is no longer adequate. Furthermore, even in the case of bilateral dealings, as is illustrated by the negotiation of international air transportation agreements, global or at least regional considerations are involved, and not simply considerations peculiar to the United States' relationship with a particular country.

Against this background certain conclusions can be drawn:

1. As the approach of the geographic units is broadened by greater emphasis on economic as well as political considerations, and on regional as well as country considerations, the work load of the functional units should be decreased and part of their attention focussed on serving in a staff capacity as advisers to the geographic units and as points of integration and liaison with other departments and agencies and international organizations. Likewise, the use of area specialists in functional units should be eliminated and such specialists transferred to the broadened geographic or regional units. In present terms this would involve the transfer of the area specialists from Transportation and Communications and from the Division of Commercial Policy, the Division of Investment and Economic Development and the Division of Financial Affairs to geographic units. It will further require a definition and understanding of the difference between policy and operating decisions so that the staff advice can be obtained on the former. A system to insure that such advice is obtained in advance will also be necessary.

2. The geographic units, however much they are broadened in outlook, will never provide the complete organizational answer to all the problems in the conduct of foreign affairs today. This defect is inherent and unavoidable because on a country-to-country, or even a regional, basis their perspective necessarily remains narrow. The fact that the perspective of the present geographic offices is further narrowed today by their emphasis on political rather than economic considerations is a situation that time can cure. The answer to the problem of formulation and execution of global foreign policies, while not impossible through the geographic device alone, can better be found in other ways.

3. The significant over-all conclusion to be drawn from the above is that in the world of today the conduct of foreign affairs at the substantive policy level requires both the geographic and the functional expert. At times one must take the lead, at times the other. The answer to the geographic-functional controversy does not lie in making one predominant over the other for all purposes, but in the careful assignment within the State Department of responsibility for action as distinguished from the giving of advice. Whatever the scheme of organization, at times action must be taken by a geographic unit, at others by a functional, or more accurately a multilateral unit. The assignment of this action responsibility must come from the "top command" level coupled with firm enforcement of the consultation process.

(b) Problem of Intelligence Organization in the State Department

1. *The Background of the Problem*—The Special Assistant-Research and Intelligence supervises the activities of a total of 508 personnel in the field of research and intelligence. This unit came into being in the fall of 1945 upon the transfer to the State Department of the research and analysis branch and the presentation branch of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS).¹⁶

The transfer of OSS personnel to the State Department was made on the basis of a Budget Bureau report.¹⁷ This report took the view that the State Department was in special need of a competent foreign intelligence program which could catalog information and make it quickly available. It further took the position that while an extremely centralized intelligence operation such as OSS was not needed in peacetime, some machinery to coordinate interdepartmental intelligence was necessary. Hence, instead of setting up a new central agency, it contemplated that the State Department would provide the focal point for leadership in Government-wide intelligence activi-

¹⁶ The coordinating and research functions of OSS in World War II (whereby it served as a body to correlate information from various intelligence sources, to fill in gaps in available material, and to provide the President with adequate intelligence from an over-all perspective) has been obscured in the popular mind by its "cloak and dagger" reputation. The personnel who were transferred to the State Department were in the main the researchers, and by accepting them the State Department did not embark on a large-scale program of covert intelligence.

¹⁷ "Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government" (September 20, 1945).

ties. Accordingly, on September 20, 1945, President Truman by Executive order abolished OSS, transferred some of its functions to the Army and others to the State Department. In a letter to the Secretary of State, written simultaneously with this Executive order, President Truman defined the role of intelligence in the State Department in part as follows:

I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a *comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies* concerned with that type of activity. This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval * * *. [Italics supplied.]

Other forces, principally connected with the Army and Navy, were concurrently at work on United States postwar intelligence organization. A few months after the creation of the State Department's intelligence unit, a National Intelligence Authority (a four-man committee composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the President's Chief of Staff) was created by Presidential direction on January 22, 1946 with an operating arm known as the Central Intelligence Group. It was directed to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and in practical effect was to be the point of synthesis for the foreign intelligence activities of all Government departments. On July 26, 1947, the National Security Act was passed and the Central Intelligence Group became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Under the supervision of a top-level interdepartmental committee, the National Security Council, CIA clearly became the central coordinating point for intelligence from all the departments.¹⁸ In addition, CIA was authorized "to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be most efficiently accomplished centrally."

Thus, the State Department intelligence program, after an ambitious course had been initially charted, was diverted into a purely departmental program of considerably smaller proportions. Even so, it was beset at once with further difficulties within the State Department, which in its own right has always considered itself, and to a certain extent has been, an intelligence agency. Any particular policy decision is based on intelligence in that it is an evaluation or a considered conclusion made upon the basis of assembled facts. In this sense, intelligence has been the *raison d'être* of the State Department since its establishment. Upon its arrival, therefore, the new intelligence unit was greeted with suspicion and hostility by the traditional elements of the State Department, largely in the geographic

¹⁸ Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that CIA is to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government, using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities. * * * Provided further, that the departments and agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. * * *"

units, who were unwilling either to admit the need for the new activity or to accept the new personnel as members of the State Department team.¹⁹ An immediate battle ensued as to whether the intelligence program should be organized as a separate unit or in large part distributed geographically to the various political desks. For a few months the intelligence program remained centralized, but on April 22, 1946, the so-called Russell plan went into effect under which the research functions of the research program were decentralized as self-contained nonoperating divisions to the four main geographic offices. When General Marshall became Secretary of State, this decentralization philosophy was promptly reversed and the research divisions were once again regrouped as a centralized unit. Since then no major organizational changes have been made in the intelligence area.

2. *The Organization of the Intelligence Program Within the State Department.*—Under the Special Assistant-Research and Intelligence, the State Department's intelligence program is presently organized in two general offices: (1) The Office of Intelligence Research with personnel of 285, and (2) the Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition with personnel of 177. Attached to the Special Assistant's immediate office is the special projects staff, which disseminates to appropriate officials special intelligence from interdepartmental sources and performs certain general services for other departments as well. This staff performs valuable services and its work should be continued. The Office of Intelligence Research is composed of five main divisions, four organized on a regional basis and the fifth on a functional basis. The former are the Divisions of Research for American Republics, Europe, Far East, and Near East and Africa and, as their names indicate, they are designed to correspond with the four political offices on the geographic side. The functional division, International and Functional Intelligence, handles a variety of interregional and technical subjects and its relationships are with the economic units.

The Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition obtained its present name on July 27, 1948, when the State Department's library was transferred to it from the public affairs area. This transfer added the library functions to its original responsibilities for acquisition, procurement, and dissemination of information.²⁰ Its Biographic Information Division, for example, collects, catalogs, and has readily available biographic data on innumerable foreign individuals, particularly in the political, sociological, and economic fields. The encyclopedia services of this Division are not limited to any particular

¹⁹ At no time have any substantial number of Foreign Service officers been assigned to the intelligence area in the State Department. At present only one appears to be regularly assigned.

²⁰ The object in creating it was to provide a central point of correlation of information flowing into the State Department from missions abroad and from other departments and agencies in Washington. Hence, its original name, the Office of Collection and Dissemination.

part of the State Department, nor to the State Department alone. It is an exceptional example of interdepartmental coordination and cooperation in the intelligence field.

3. *The Problems of the State Department Intelligence Program.*—The functions presently performed by the Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition are generally admitted to be valuable. Certain of them, however, do not necessarily have to be in the State Department. For example, this Office at one time had a map intelligence division, but upon a substantial appropriation reduction for fiscal year 1948 this division was transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In this way 108 individuals were transferred out of the State Department. It is generally conceded that the functions of this Office should remain centralized.

The real problem is the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), which at present has over 50 percent of the entire personnel of the intelligence area. These research divisions have few customers for their product in the geographic and other traditional parts of the Department.²¹ It is conceded by those critics that the physical separation of the geographic and research units is a major factor in the barrier that seems to exist.

The present centralization of the research units, from the standpoint of the geographic desks, serves little useful purpose. Much research is completed and it is carefully edited, but few people read it. Whether the fault lies with the geographic units for not reading or the research division for producing unreadable material, the fact remains that maintenance of the research activity for the benefit of the geographic desks is an expensive luxury, if, as appears, they do not use the material produced.

On the other hand, the economic units in the State Department vigorously uphold the value of the work of the research divisions. The large size of a typical research division enables it to make detailed economic analyses which the economic units find extremely helpful. A substantial proportion of the personnel in both the economic and research units have similar academic background and use the same techniques, and a tie between the two is thereby furnished. There are signs, however, that the research units are being used by the economic desks as extensions of the latter to carry on research for which the economic units lack personnel. This tendency probably reflects a combination of several factors: A reluctance of the geographic units to use intelligence facilities, the over-staffing of the research divisions, and the too heavy involvement of the economic units in the performance of detailed economic functions.

4. *The Relationship With the Central Intelligence Agency.*—CIA's

²¹ There is evidence, however, that increasing use of the research divisions is being made by certain geographic desks, such as some of those in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs where the Foreign Service officers and the research specialists have the common bond of language specialization. Similar evidence can be found in the Policy Planning Staff in connection with Far Eastern matters.

responsibilities entail correlation, coordination, evaluation, and dissemination of departmental intelligence from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and State Departments. It also has the right to embark on independent ventures where necessary. Through these means CIA seeks to provide adequate and impartial intelligence estimates, sufficiently authoritative to eliminate what might otherwise be a mass of conflicting opinions, on which the President and the National Security Council may make policy determinations in regard to national security.

As a customer for departmental intelligence produced by the State Department, CIA has a definite interest that the State Department produce a timely, thorough, and generally adequate product. But as an independent intelligence source, CIA may well duplicate some of the existing intelligence activities in the State Department. It thereby constitutes an additional threat to the State Department's intelligence program. This duplication occurs in the main in the responsibilities of CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates and the State Department's research divisions.

CIA, while critical of State's research divisions on the ground that they produce academic research rather than intelligence evaluations, strongly defends the necessity for a research program in the State Department as an important source of material. For this same reason CIA is reluctant to see any decentralization of State Department's intelligence staff. Its fear is that decentralization would place intelligence at the mercy of the geographic units, which are unsympathetic to CIA as well as to the State Department's research divisions and would thereby weaken CIA's principal servicing unit.

5. *Conclusions.*—The State Department should have an intelligence organization to fulfill its own needs and to discharge its responsibilities to CIA as part of the Government-wide intelligence program. Its present intelligence organization, however, is not functioning satisfactorily. The reason in part lies in the intelligence units themselves and in part in the attitude of the geographic units. The research divisions, in particular, require further scrutiny as to size and as to "made work". A further reason is the tendency of CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates to do basic research, especially political, which can be more appropriately done in the State Department.

The intelligence research function is one of the tools of policy determination. In order that it be used as such, the present wall between the geographic units and the research divisions must be broken down. Placement of the geographic and research units in close physical proximity would be one step in the right direction. Decentralization of the research personnel, as intact units, to the four regional offices, as recommended in part I of the report, would further help to accomplish this objective.

A Special Assistant—Research and Intelligence is required as a source of policy guidance to all State Department intelligence activi-

ties, whether centralized or decentralized, and as a focal point for contact with CIA. To enable him to discharge these two responsibilities and to enable him to serve in the proper staff capacity at the "top command" level, the Secretary of State should cause this Special Assistant to be made a member of the top command team in all respects. The present functions performed by the Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition require centralization and should remain under him in their present form.

The Policy Planning Staff should work out a systematic procedure for making more constant and effective use within the State Department of the work of all elements of the intelligence organization.

(c) The Problem of the State Department as a Program Operator

The State Department, in the period 1945-48, has tended more and more to assume responsibility for program operations either as the direct operator or as an active coordinator. The varied nature of its activities is apparent from the six following major programs in which the State Department has been engaged since 1945.

1. Liquidation of United States Foreign War Surplus Property.
2. United States-Mexico Boundary and Water Commission operations.
3. Greek-Turkish Aid Program.
4. Institute of Inter-American Affairs.
5. Philippine Islands Rehabilitation Program.
6. The Foreign Information and Educational Exchange Program.

Of these six programs, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs programs, and the Philippine Islands Rehabilitation Program relate to economic assistance in various forms to different parts of the world. Their objectives are akin to those of the European Recovery Program, the administration of which is under ECA.²² The liquidation of World War II surplus property at overseas points, now in the winding-up stage, involves both policy responsibility and operational responsibility for property representing an original cost to the United States of ten billion dollars. The United States-Mexico Boundary and Water Commission, originating as a body to adjudicate the shifting boundary along the Rio Grande River, in 1945 became involved in dam construction, sanitation, irrigation and other large-scale engineering functions. The Foreign Information and Educational Exchange programs, assigned to the State Department by the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948,²³ take the State Department into radio broadcasting and many other activities.

The assumption by the State Department of responsibility for operating programs has evoked criticism from many quarters. The

²² The economic assistance portion of the Greek-Turkish Aid Program was transferred from the State Department to ECA in July 1948 in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.

²³ The Smith-Mundt Act, P. L. 402 (80th Cong., 2d sess.)

attack takes various forms. Some feel that the State Department is inherently and temperamentally incapable of administering operative programs, particularly where business judgment is involved. It was this attitude on the part of the Congress that in large measure led to the creation of ECA as a separate agency to operate the European Recovery Program. Others believe that the administration of operating programs, even though within the capacities of the State Department, diverts it from its primary responsibilities in the field of policy formulation. Still others feel that certain operating programs, such as the foreign information program, are beneath the dignity of the State Department in that they descend to the level of propaganda. Finally, there are those who believe that the foreign information program and other operating responsibilities involve so many opportunities for missteps that they render the State Department extremely vulnerable to attack on what are essentially minor points and thereby unnecessarily weaken the State Department in the discharge of its fundamental task at a highly critical time.

In fact, the State Department has been conducting these programs with various degrees of success. The Greek-Turkish Aid Program and the United States-Mexican operation both appear to have been well-run and seem to disprove the contention that the State Department is inherently incapable of assuming operational responsibilities.²⁴ Considerable criticism, on the other hand, has been voiced with respect to the management of the foreign information program, the Philippine Islands Rehabilitation Program and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

1. *The Foreign Information and Educational Exchange Programs.*—The foreign information and educational exchange programs illustrate the difficulties faced by the State Department as a program operator. The programs involve the employment of a large number of persons, they are by nature controversial, and they readily give rise to missteps. The congressional investigations of May 1948 into the Voice of America broadcasts to Latin America afford a dramatic instance of this last point. There a slip at the purely operational level by employees of a private broadcasting company to which the State Department had contracted preparation of radio scripts, led to the association of the State Department in the public mind with inept operation as well as faulty supervision.

These two programs are perhaps not the fairest mediums for testing the State Department as a program operator. Both are inheritances from two World War II agencies, the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). During the war, OWI, with some 11,000 employees, was essentially an instrument of psychological warfare. Its objectives were the undermining of

²⁴ A case study of the Greek Aid Program was made by the Task Force staff and is available in the files.

enemy populations, stimulation of resistance forces, support of neutrals, and promotion of a better understanding of the United States among our allies. OIAA, on the other hand, directed its efforts at Latin America and carried on a good neighbor program in cultural, agricultural, social and commercial fields as well as in the informational area. The foisting of activities of this nature on the State Department could not be expected to be done without criticism.

The foreign information program is located in the State Department in the Office of International Information under the Assistant Secretary—Public Affairs. Its total personnel as of September 1, 1948, represented approximately 9 percent of the entire personnel.²⁵ Through three media divisions it is engaged in day-to-day operations in radio, press and publications, and motion pictures. With over half its personnel located in New York City, the obstacle of physical separation is also involved in complicating coordination between the policy source in Washington and the operational level in New York.

The Office of Educational Exchange (OEX) is also essentially a program operator. One division is the backstop unit for 74 overseas information libraries in all parts of the world and 30 cultural institutes in Latin America. It also assists some 400 American-sponsored schools abroad through grants-in-aid and materials. Another division promotes interchange of teachers and students under programs sponsored by Congress, and is responsible for working with private organizations in the same field.

A common complaint, directed particularly at the foreign information program, is that it prevents the top public affairs officers from assuming vital staff responsibilities at the top command level in the State Department. The Assistant Secretary—Public Affairs, for example, is very understandably forced to devote much of his personal attention to the handling of complex radio broadcasting operations. He is left with little time to provide the Secretary of State and the others in key positions with an adequate appreciation of either the foreign or the United States public opinion aspects of a given situation.

2. *Conclusions.*—Propaganda is nothing more than one of the means or instruments of foreign policy. There is nothing that requires all such instruments to be located in the State Department. Indeed, two of the principal instruments, financial assistance and force or the threat of force are respectively in ECA and the military establishment. The State Department can and should be active in determining the choice and timing of the use of instruments of United States foreign policy and in furnishing guidance in their employment from the foreign relations standpoint. It does not, however, have to assume responsibility for the operation of the propaganda medium. This would seem to be doubly true where the operational responsibility

²⁵ This number will increase sharply during this current fiscal year because of additional personnel taken on to carry out the \$28,000,000 program of the Smith-Mundt Act.

makes the State Department vulnerable to congressional and public attack and lessens its ability to perform its more important tasks.

It would appear, therefore, that it would be desirable to separate the bulk of the operational responsibility for the present foreign information and educational exchange responsibilities from the State Department. In both cases the State Department would continue to have major duties in setting fundamental policies and furnishing guidance in their execution. The Foreign Service would continue, moreover, to discharge the overseas responsibilities. As to the foreign information program, with no existing agency suitable for taking on such a program, a government corporation would seem to offer the best organizational means, especially as it could be kept more responsive to State Department policy guidance. As to the educational exchange program, the Federal Security Agency already has duties in the area and, with proper reorientation, it could probably assume a greater operational load. Greater use could be made, moreover, of the facilities of the various private organizations in this field.

4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEGMENT

The Secretary of State requires two main types of assistance in directing the Department, namely, substantive assistance and management assistance. As pointed out previously, the main structure of the Department is organized and staffed with varying effectiveness to supply this vital substantive assistance on matters such as trade, finance, cultural affairs, political affairs, international organization, and intelligence. The management assistance, it is stressed, is as necessary to the successful functioning of the Department as the substantive assistance, for without a system, "expertise" cannot be made effective. This fact is too little recognized in the State Department today and too many officials are inclined to wash their hands of administrative paper work. The present organization chart, moreover, with the two action units, political and economic, separated as far as possible from the administrative units, is a further reflection, in some measure inadvertent, of this attitude.

At present the Under Secretary of State is in fact the *alter ego* of the Secretary. As such, he serves as the managing head of the Department both substantive policywise and managementwise. The heavy load on his shoulders, therefore, demands that he delegate to the Assistant Secretary for Administration a large share of his over-all management responsibility. Thus this Assistant Secretary is vested with the tools of management, that is, budget, methods, organization, personnel, and other administrative controls.

The effectiveness of the administration of the Department would seem then to depend largely upon the executive ability of the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Administration and on a close working relationship between the two. Other factors, however,

complicate the picture. A major one is the separate Departmental and Foreign Service personnel systems with the Assistant Secretary for Administration having little more than perfunctory control over the Foreign Service system. Others include the deep antagonism between Departmental and Foreign Service personnel, the related cleavage between the geographic and functional units, and the gulf between the geographic units and the intelligence and information units. Added up, they make effective management of the Department well-nigh impossible.

The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Administration extend to the development of operating practices and administrative doctrines; enforcement of compliance with administrative policies throughout the Department; review of administration of all offices and foreign posts; direction of administrative services; and personnel and budget administration and management planning. In spite of his over-all management responsibilities, however, the Assistant Secretary—Administration ranks no higher than other Assistant Secretaries and special assistants whose programs he is responsible for justifying before Congress in terms of manpower and dollars. Moreover, it is his duty to evaluate the effectiveness of program execution and to guide operations. Furthermore, he must watchdog the use of funds, reconcile jurisdictional disputes, and authoritatively control organization and personnel. The existence of coordinate authority, stemming from the Department's horizontal organizational pattern, particularly hinders sound management in that it leads to multiple coordination and correlation problems. The solutions to all these problems, it appears, are at present merely offered as suggestions by the Assistant Secretary for Administration rather than ordered by him as an arm of the Under Secretary.

(a) *Organization of the Administrative Area* ²⁶

The Assistant Secretary for Administration is in charge of four administrative offices. Since the Office of the Foreign Service is discussed elsewhere, the other three "housekeeping" offices will be described here. These three offices are: (1) The Office of Budget and Planning, (2) the Office of Departmental Administration, and (3) the Office of Controls.

1. *Office of Budget and Planning.*—This office is responsible for the management, budgetary, and fiscal programs of the Department of State, the Foreign Service, and international commissions, boards, and other bodies affiliated with the State Department. As it is charged with presenting and justifying the budget program to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, and as it supervises all

²⁶ Personnel strength as of September 1, 1948, was 367 distributed as follows: The Division of Organization and Budget, 105; the Division of Finance, 253; Office of Director, 9.

management programs, the Office has a singularly important role to perform.

A detailed evaluation of the manner in which this Office has discharged its duties is beyond the scope of this report. It is important to point out, however, that the office is the immediate unit charged with the administrative management of the Department and that it handles this assignment on a highly centralized basis with little delegation of management functions to other units in the Department. For instance, the budget and management problems of one of the four political offices are substantially the responsibility of one of the branches of the Office of Budget and Planning; the same problems of one of the economic offices are the responsibility of another branch, and so forth.

This centralization of the Department's administration is a measure of expediency since the awkward organization structure, the barriers of coordinate authority, and the existence of internal conflicts make administration impossible on any other basis. The centralized administration localized in the Office of Budget and Planning has been in operation for less than two years and has not proved altogether successful. Unquestionably, however, the administration of the Department has considerably improved during the Office's short trial period, and signs indicate that further improvements will be made. Yet, it is doubtful that budget and management functions can ever be efficiently performed on as centralized a basis as exists in the State Department. The Department's organization analysts recognize this problem, and for some months have advocated decentralization of administration insofar as possible. Contingent upon these recommendations, however, is the conviction that decentralization should not be effected until the entire Department's organization is modernized and placed on a sound operational basis.

The main weakness of the Office of Budget and Planning lies in the neglect of its administrative management duties. Specifically, it has directed its attention to budgetary matters at the expense of management. Consequently, much needed improvements of methods, procedures, and administrative planning have not been effected. Shortcomings in this connection are due in part to the continual Congressional pressure on the Department's budget and the requirements for exceedingly detailed budget justifications before the Bureau of the Budget and several congressional committees. This has tended to cause the drafting of both management and budget analysts for budget work and to let management work slide. Also, the lack of concentration on managerial improvement is due to inexperience of personnel and to the difficulty involved in replacing incompetent personnel.

2. *Office of Department Administration.*²⁷—With the exception of the personnel program which is considered elsewhere in this report, the functions of the Office of Departmental Administration are performed with admirable effectiveness. The office provides general services including languages and administrative services, communications, records, and cryptographic services. It also supervises the New York Regional Administrative Office.²⁸

The communications system of the Department is under the control of the Division of Communications and Records. Great progress appears to have been made in the last two years in increasing the efficiency and economy. Slip-ups do occur from time to time but the improvement since 1946 has been tremendous. Communications in the field, however, administered and directed by the Foreign Service appear to lack aggressive management, up-to-date and standard procedures. Unquestionably both systems should be combined and the over-all system placed under the control of the Office of Administration for the sake of standardization and efficiency.²⁹

In spite of recent efforts to improve departmental management, which to the credit of the administrative offices have borne considerable fruit, there is still a need for more managerial improvement. To a considerable extent this need arises from an outmoded and completely unrealistic organization pattern. Undoubtedly the organizational impediments to sound management must be removed. Organizational reforms within the State Department and consolidation of the State Department and the Foreign Service, a subject discussed elsewhere, will make it imperative that the central management and service facilities now divided between the Office of Foreign Service and the other two administrative offices³⁰ be merged and placed under an executive for administration whose rank is a cut higher than Assistant Secretary. These consolidated facilities should serve both departmental and foreign establishments.

Coupled with the over-all recommendations of this report, this step should pave the way for:

a. An improved personnel program. Neither the Departmental nor the Foreign Service personnel programs have proved adequate. Both have been unaggressive and often haphazard and casual. The

²⁷ Personnel strength as of September 1, 1948: 1,411 distributed as follows: Office of Director, 6; Division of International Conferences (since transferred to Office of United Nations Affairs), 65; Division of Language Services, 74; Division of Departmental Personnel, 98; Division of Central Services, 367; Division of Communications and Records, 658; Division of Cryptography, 33; New York Regional Administrative Office, 110.

²⁸ The New York Regional Office provides administrative services for the Department's activities in the New York area including the United States Dispatch Agency, broadcasting, moving pictures, and shipments to foreign countries. Its personnel strength is 110.

²⁹ The Division of Communications and Records contained 658 employees as of September 1, 1948. This large number of personnel, however, is not considered exorbitant since the Division services the entire Government, not solely the State Department. Commerce, ECA, and others use the State Department Communications system on a reimbursable basis.

³⁰ Namely, Office of Budget and Planning, the Office of Departmental Administration.

separate Foreign Service system unquestionably has contributed to the failure of the Departmental personnel program.

b. Decentralization of a substantial share of management responsibilities to regional line offices³¹ and also to foreign establishments. This does not preclude a strong over-all management office. It does say that this office should be fairly small and that insofar as practicable, management functions should be delegated to line operations rather than being retained centralized.

c. Improvements in coordination and organization and modernization and simplification of methods and procedures. The organization and methods units should be revitalized. The lethargic manner in which these functions are now being performed is far from conducive to an effective State Department.

d. Ultimate reduction of personnel. Good organization and sound management inevitably lead to increased effectiveness and the best utilization of personnel and funds.

A final but very important point which has a marked and often determining influence on departmental management and departmental functioning is quality of personnel. In some of its operations the State Department is hampered by its inability to get rid of incompetent or ineffective personnel. The State Department is to be commended on the relatively high calibre of its personnel. Yet, the Department has some dead wood, and more flexible authority for their removal is a necessity.

3. *Office of Controls.*—This office³² is comprised of the Passport Division, the Visa Division, the Division of Protective Services, the Division of Security, and the Munitions Division.

The issue of passports for travel of United States citizens abroad is believed to be an appropriate function of the State Department although some have argued to the contrary.³³ The autonomous manner in which the Department's Passport Division functions have been conducted, however, has been subject to criticism from time to time. That the Division acts rather as a law unto itself is generally the reason for the criticism, and as a practical matter there is some justification in this censure. The Division is subject to the line of authority as much as any other Division and should be controlled accordingly.

³¹ Viz, the four proposed area offices.

³² Personnel strength as of September 1, 1948: 674 distributed as follows: Office of Director, 10; Passport Division, 210; Visa Division, 130; Division of Protective Services, 104; Division of Security, 178; Munitions Division, 20; (Field Passport Agency, 22).

³³ These arguments are based primarily on the fact that the issue of passports for obvious security reasons, is predicated upon information concerning the applicant. This information is generally furnished the State Department by agencies such as the Department of Justice which are equipped to render such services. Passports, however, are properly issued in the name of the Secretary of State, and to remove the passport function from his jurisdiction would not only mean that State Department offices to travel abroad on official business would have to go outside of the Department for permission, but also the issue of passports in the name of, say, the Attorney General, would probably be subject to misinterpretation abroad.

The Visa Division, on the other hand, presents a problem of another nature. It is responsible for establishing standard requirements and practices for the administration of immigration and other laws governing the entry and departure of aliens and their travel to and from the United States. These duties, however, must be performed in collaboration with the Department of Justice, which has similar functions. At present the State Department is responsible for issuing visas which permit aliens to come to the United States, while the Department of Justice, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is responsible for admitting aliens into the United States. This situation merits analysis at this point.

In addition to providing general administrative direction to the American consular officers in the discharge of their statutory obligations with regard to operation of the visa system, the Visa Division maintains control over the allotment of immigration quotas. Again, in collaboration with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, it develops policies governing alien travel to and from the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, has statutory control over the admission of aliens into the United States.³⁴ Moreover, most of the information on which visas are granted or denied is furnished by the Department of Justice.

Thus, the situation in connection with the issuance of visas is confusing because of the division of authority between the Departments of State and Justice. Specifically, both have joint policy, regulatory and procedural responsibilities in the issue of visas, and whereas the State Department grants the initial visa to an alien the Justice Department has the final authority to approve or disapprove the visa on the basis of its independent judgment. Furthermore, there has been considerable criticism of the manner in which the visa system operates, and this criticism appears to have some merit. The State Department, for instance, has not brought its visa regulations and procedures up to date nor have consular officers or visa division personnel been adequately trained.

The logical solution to the visa problem lies in the transfer of the Visa Division functions to the Department of Justice. Diplomatic visas, however, should remain under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State.

The Munitions Division.—The functions of this Division mainly concern the export of arms and armaments. Hence, the function is an export control function. The Department of Commerce at the present time is accorded export control over everything except muni-

³⁴ Prior to 1924 aliens wishing to enter the United States bought passage and presented themselves to Immigration and Naturalization officials at the port of debarkation for admission to the United States. The Immigration Act of 1924 was designed to relieve aliens of the unnecessary expense of coming to this country if they were unqualified for entry. Therefore, the Act places the responsibility of issuing visas on consular officials so that an alien could proceed to the United States with reasonable assurance he would be admitted upon arrival.

tions. The State Department maintains, however, that the issue of licenses for the export of munitions is so closely allied to its other foreign affairs functions that it should retain this control.

These arguments are not wholly convincing and it would appear that the export control of munitions should be vested in the Commerce Department. This is not to say that the State Department should not have a substantial voice in the formulating of munitions export policy through interdepartmental mechanisms and even, if the President sees fit, the final say as to whether munitions should be exported to a specific country. It does say that the arms and armament licensing function along with other export control functions, can better be handled by a single department.

Other functions of the Office of Controls involve security investigations and protection of the rights of American citizens abroad. These are carried on through the Division of Security and the Division of Protective Services and are part of the State Department's responsibility.

Chapter VII

ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

The Foreign Service is a fundamental part of the governmental organization for the conduct of foreign affairs. The basis for its existence lies in the provision of article II, section 2, of the Constitution that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors" and "other public Ministers and Consuls." Under this provision, implementing legislation and long tradition has made the Foreign Service, together with the State Department, an arm of the President in the foreign affairs area. Its basic task is to man the overseas missions which today consist of 47 embassies, 18 legations, and approximately 250 consular posts.

As emphasized earlier, the State Department and the Foreign Service are two distinct organizations, each with its own personnel, appropriations and administration. This dual structure makes the United States today the only major power with its foreign affairs organization divided into two segments. The single unified organization with home and overseas personnel on an interchangeable basis is the preponderant pattern. A recent study of the foreign affairs organizations of 34 nations reveals that 29 follow that pattern, including Great Britain, France, Argentina, Australia, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. In the minority of five with the United States are the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, and Lebanon.

A. The Background and Present Composition

1. PRIOR TO 1946

The origins of the Foreign Service go back at least to 1778 when Benjamin Franklin was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to France by the Continental Congress. Until 1924 separate diplomatic and consular services existed and both, until the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft, were victims of political patronage.

In 1924 the Rogers Act combined the diplomatic and consular services into a single organization under the name "The Foreign Service of the United States" and the present career system was firmly established.¹ Between 1927 and 1935, however, three other foreign services were created. In 1927 the Department of Commerce

¹ Act of May 24, 1924 (43 Stat. 140).

was authorized by the Congress to set up a separate career service to represent the interests of American business abroad. In 1930 the Department of Agriculture received similar authorization. Finally, in 1935 the Bureau of Mines of the Department of Interior was also authorized to send a few representatives overseas. In 1939 the foreign services of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments were merged into the Foreign Service,² and in 1943 Interior's mineral specialists joined the Foreign Service Auxiliary.

During World War II the need for the service abroad of additional personnel with specialized knowledge led to the creation of an Auxiliary Foreign Service in the summer of 1941.³ Originally created to fill the needs for personnel in Latin America to analyze import requirements, supervise the black list and do cultural relations work, it was later utilized to fill similar needs in London, Moscow, Madrid, and other points. By January 1946 the auxiliary contained 976 officers as contrasted with only 820 in the career Foreign Service. The bulk of the auxiliaries were either specialists in international trade, cultural relations, strategic raw materials, press and information services or junior officers who served as vice consuls just as the younger men in the regular Foreign Service. The auxiliary came to an end on November 13, 1946 when the Foreign Service Act of 1946 became effective.

2. SINCE 1946

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 marks the beginning of a new era in American representation abroad. Its changes were fundamental. Too often it is regarded as a special bill pushed through for the benefit of the regular Foreign Service officers alone and with no awareness of the real needs of the United States overseas. In fact, one active element in the Foreign Service officer group was deeply concerned in 1945 with the impending demands on the Foreign Service and was fearful that unless action was taken to ensure a Foreign Service responsive to those demands, the Foreign Service might tend to become superfluous. Opposed to this point of view was an older element who nostalgically desired as little change as possible. Finally, the officials in the State Department and the other departments had views and interests which were taken into account. The resulting legislative proposal, naturally enough, was in some measure a compromise among all these.

(a) THE MAJOR CHANGES MADE BY THE 1946 ACT

The major changes made by the 1946 Act included the following:

1. All Foreign Service personnel were classified into five basic groups: Ambassadors and Ministers; Foreign Service officers; Foreign Service reserve officers; Foreign Service staff officers and employees and alien personnel.

² Reorganization plan No. II (5 U. S. C. sec. 1335).

³ For a more detailed discussion of the Auxiliary Foreign Service, see appendix VII-A and Elton Atwater, "The American Foreign Service since 1939," 41 Am. Journ. Int. Law 73 (1947).

2. The number of classes of Foreign Service officers was reduced from 11 to 7, including the new class of Career Minister.

3. A new branch of the Service was established, to be known as the Foreign Service Reserve, and to be composed of officers who would be specialists in various fields and would serve for limited periods of time only.

4. All other American employees of the Service, except consular agents, were put together into a new branch known as the Foreign Service Staff, with salaries ranging up to \$10,000 per annum.

5. The pay scale of the Service as a whole was raised, permitting payment of salaries up to \$25,000 for Ambassadors, and up to \$13,500 for Foreign Service officers.

6. A more adequate allowance structure for all Foreign Service personnel serving abroad was created.

7. A Foreign Service Institute to train Foreign Service personnel progressively throughout their careers was created.

8. Home leave after 2 years abroad for all personnel was provided, and the requirement that all Foreign Service officers serve at least three of their first 15 years of service within the United States was established.

9. A promotion-up or selection-out procedure was set up in the case of Foreign Service officers to eliminate officers not up to the requirements of the Service and to insure promotion of qualified officers at a rate which would permit them to reach the top of the Service while still relatively youthful and vigorous.

10. It was required that all positions in the Service be classified.

11. The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor were given membership on the Board of the Foreign Service and general rights to participate in the assignment of Foreign Service personnel.

12. The position of Director General was created with the responsibility for administering the Foreign Service.

(b) CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONNEL UNDER THE 1946 ACT

The five major classifications of Foreign Service personnel under the 1946 act, the personnel strength of each as of September 1, 1948, and certain comparative figures as of January 1, 1939, approximately 10 years ago, are shown in the table below:

Classification	Sept. 1, 1948	Jan. 1, 1939
Chiefs of Mission.....	¹ 63	² 51
Foreign Service officers.....	1, 297	715
Foreign Service Staff officers.....	3, 928	³ 876
Foreign Service Reserve officers.....	207	-----
Alien clerks and employees.....	6, 799	2, 107
Total.....	⁴ 12, 294	3, 749

¹ As of Sept. 1, 1948, there were 20 noncareer chiefs of mission, i. e., ambassadors and ministers appointed by the President from outside the Foreign Service. Thus today the Foreign Service provides 68 percent of the chiefs of mission as contrasted with 53 percent 10 years ago.

² As of Jan. 1, 1939, there were 24 noncareer chiefs of mission. Later that year approximately 113 commercial and agricultural offices were transferred into the Foreign Service.

³ The Foreign Service Staff did not exist under that name in 1939 but a group of American clerks and miscellaneous employees outside the officer group did exist and they correspond to the present staff category.

⁴ In addition as of Sept. 1, 1948, there were 32 part-time consular agents. These consular agents may be of American or foreign nationality and serve at points where it is not worthwhile to maintain a regular post.

1. The Foreign Service Officer Category

The Foreign Service officer category is the traditional group of United States diplomatic and consular representatives. They are appointed to the Foreign Service by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It is expected to be a disciplined and mobile corps of trained men,⁴ selected by rigorous competitive examination which will provide versatile generalists for the overseas missions. It is described officially as the relatively small but basic tough core of the entire Foreign Service, available for across-the-board assignments or for any type of specific assignment. * * *

These factors, coupled with common exposure to the vicissitudes of life abroad and traditions developed over the years, tend to make the Foreign Service officers a group apart from the other categories of the Foreign Service and from other Government civil servants.⁵

The 1946 act breaks the officer category down into seven classes, with annual salaries ranging from a maximum of \$13,500 for career ministers to a minimum of \$3,300 for newly appointed class 6 officers. The piercing of the \$10,000 civil servant salary ceiling was one of the signal accomplishments of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. The entrance to the Foreign Service officer category is by competitive examinations; written and oral, prepared by and given under the supervision of the board of examiners established by the 1946 act.⁷

2. The Foreign Service Staff Category

The Foreign Service Staff category of Staff officers and Staff employees was created to include two classifications of personnel. One group has administrative, fiscal, clerical, and custodial duties and the other has specialist and technical responsibilities of a less general nature than those of the Foreign Service officer group. The salary scale on an annual basis ranges from \$10,000 in class 1 to \$720 in class 22. While the 1946 Act does not draw the line between Staff officers and Staff employees, those in Class 11 and higher (salary range of \$3,240-\$10,000) would appear to be the officers and those in classes 12 through 22 the employee group. As of September 1, 1948, 1,251 or less than 30 percent of the staff category were in class 11 or above. Appointments to and promotions within the staff category were intended to be along the lines of the civil-service system rather than the system applicable in the case of Foreign Service officers.⁸

3. The Foreign Service Reserve Category

The Foreign Service Reserve category consists of officers appointed to the Foreign Service, in the language of section 401 of the 1946 act,

⁴ House Report 2508 (79th Cong., 2d sess.) accompanying H. R. 6967 which became the 1946 act.

⁵ Memorandum, Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service (October 24, 1947).

⁶ The varied types which go to make up this group are interestingly described in *Fortune* (July 1946).

⁷ The first examination under the 1946 act was given in September 1947. It was taken by 1288, of whom 117 passed both parts, and are now awaiting appointment to probationary status in class 6.

⁸ House Report 2508 (79th Cong., 2d sess.)

"on a temporary basis * * * in order to make available to the Service such specialized skills as may from time to time be required." These temporary appointments are for nonconsecutive periods of not more than 4 years each and, having served one such period, an individual is not eligible for reappointment until the lapse of a period equal to his preceding tour of duty or 1 year, whichever is shorter. The reserve category was further intended to be a supplementary source of specialized assistance for the permanent service, especially in the fields of journalism, radio, the arts, scholarship, and science.⁹ The reserve is broken down into six grades, corresponding salarywise to the six grades of the officer category below the career minister grade.

The 1946 act, furthermore, makes provision for transfer to the Foreign Service officer group from the staff and reserve upon passing appropriate examinations and if the applicant has completed 4 years of service if under 31 years of age and 3 years of service if over 31 in either the Foreign Service or the State Department.

B. Major Present-Day Organizational Problems of the Foreign Service

The problems of organization involved in the Foreign Service relate both to its internal composition and administration and to its relationships with the State Department and the rest of the executive branch. In considerable measure these problems, as with the overseas service of any nation, tend to be unique.

The discussion which follows should be considered in the light of several factors. First, the 1946 act has been in force for only 2 years. The relative brevity of this period, coupled with restricted appropriations, has made it impossible as yet for all the objectives of the 1946 act to be achieved. Secondly, the Foreign Service, taken as a whole, is aware of its obligations in helping the United States to play its new role in foreign affairs and realizes that the emphasis must be on purposeful action and not on protocol.

The organization of the Foreign Service involves the following major problems:

1. The diffusion of command over and within the Foreign Service, involving the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary-Administration, the Director General and the Board of the Foreign Service.
2. The sharp cleavage between the Foreign Service personnel and the departmental personnel.
3. The cleavages within the Foreign Service itself between the officer, staff, and reserve categories.
4. The policies and administration with respect to recruitment and assignments and transfers within the Foreign Service.

⁹ *Ibid.*

5. The tendency of the State Department to ignore the overseas missions and to treat them as a messenger service.

6. The divided command in overseas areas between the chiefs of missions and the heads of other American programs.

7. The necessity for meeting the overseas requirements of the other departments and agencies.

8. The need for keeping Foreign Service personnel, in the language of section 111 (a) of the 1946 act, "broadly representative of the American people" and "fully informed in respect to current trends in American life."

1. THE PROBLEM OF DIFFUSION OF COMMAND

The power of administrative control over the Foreign Service is divided at least three ways under the 1946 act, section 201 provides that the Foreign Service shall be administered by a director general and stipulates that he shall be appointed from the career minister or class 1 grade of the officer category.¹⁰ The same section provides that under the general supervision of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary-Administration the Director General, "in addition to administering the Service," shall coordinate the activities of the Foreign Service with the State Department and with other governmental agencies and shall direct performance by members of the Service of their various duties. At the same time section 211 of the act creates a Board of the Foreign Service composed of three Assistant Secretaries of State, the Director General, and representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. This Board has power to recommend, not to the Director General, but to the Secretary of State policies and procedures to govern "the selection, assignment, rating, and promotion of Foreign Service officers" and "the administration and personnel management of the Service."

These provisions of the 1946 act are factors contributing to the present organizational difficulties in conducting foreign affairs. While prior to 1946 the Foreign Service had been administered separately from the Departmental Service, the separation was made more distinct by the creation of the position of Director General with power to administer the Foreign Service. In practice today the Foreign Service, except in fiscal and perhaps budget matters, largely sets policy and operates its own organization independently of departmental direction.¹¹ This semi-independence is especially evident in the assignment of Foreign Service personnel to the State Department where the departmental personnel office claims it is unable to get from the Foreign Service the necessary data to pass upon suggested

¹⁰ Throughout the legislative development of the 1946 act the Budget Bureau made particular objection to section 201 which established the Director General.

¹¹ Congressman Vorys, one of the three members of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee which drafted the 1946 act, has described the Foreign Service as "practically a separate branch of the Government." Congressional Record, July 20, 1946, p. 9589.

appointees. Furthermore, by reason of the fact that the Corps of Inspectors is composed of Foreign Service officers and reports to the Director General rather than to the Secretary of State, the Foreign Service is in effect a "self-audited" organization.¹²

Paradoxically, the 1946 act, by creating the Board of the Foreign Service and by giving the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor through that Board a voice in the administration of the Foreign Service, made the Foreign Service less of a self-administered organization. At present this Board is an extremely active participant in the day-to-day administration of the Foreign Service, especially in connection with transfers and assignments of Foreign Service personnel. The desirability of personnel administration through committees is dubious but is defended by the three other departments on the ground that they cannot rely on the Division of Foreign Service Personnel to take their special needs into account in selecting and assigning personnel overseas and that only by committee control through a subboard can they safeguard their own interests. The whole process appears to be one of bargain and compromise which is highly unsatisfactory to the Foreign Service and the State Department and which, at the same time, fails to meet the real needs of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

The position of the Director General as semi-independent of the Secretary of State, and the activities of the Board of the Foreign Service, as both a policy and an operational body, violate good organizational and administrative principles. The former condition has tended to deepen the cleavage between the State Department and the Foreign Service while the latter situation is inefficient and produces constant bickering. The position of Director General should be eliminated and the control of Secretary of State over the Foreign Service made clear and precise. The needs of the other departments and agencies, as discussed hereinafter, must be met by other means.

2. THE PROBLEM OF CLEAVAGE BETWEEN FOREIGN SERVICE AND DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

Foreign Service personnel serve in the State Department as well as overseas. Today a cleavage exists between the Foreign Service personnel so serving and the departmental personnel. If permitted to continue unchecked this cleavage may have serious consequences on the security of the United States.

The causes of this cleavage are deeply rooted in the basic attitude of Foreign Service and departmental personnel. An accentuating factor is the types of position which the two services occupy in the State Department. The Foreign Service dominates the geographical offices and its own administrative office, while the departmental

¹² Sec. 681 of the 1946 act requires the inspectors to be Foreign Service officers. It does not, however, require that they report to the Director General.

service dominates the balance. As of November 1, 1948, 185 Foreign Service officers were on duty in the United States, 145 or 78 percent of them in the State Department and 40 or 22 percent in the other departments or in training. Of the 145 in the Department, 73 or over 50 percent were in responsible positions in the Office of the Secretary or in the 4 geographic offices, and 53 or 37 percent were engaged in administration of the overseas activities of the Foreign Service or related duties.¹³

The influence of the Foreign Service officers lies in their positions in the Department. In the Office of the Secretary of State, the Counselor and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff are both Foreign Service officers. Of the six other members of the Policy Planning Staff, four are Foreign Service officers and one an ex-Foreign Service officer. In the geographical units the Foreign Service domination is very clear despite the fact that the departmental personnel outnumber the Foreign Service two to one. Of four office directors, three are members of the Foreign Service and the fourth is a former member. All the deputy directors are Foreign Service officers. At the division level, 16 out of 21 division chiefs are from the Foreign Service. Likewise, many of the assistant division chiefs are Foreign Service officers. The fact is that only the subordinate positions are filled by non-Foreign Service officers.¹⁴

At times the cleavage between the Foreign Service and the departmental personnel creates the impression that the State Department is divided into two hostile camps. Foreign Service personnel express opinions that departmental personnel, particularly those in the economic units, are of inferior ability, overpaid, and poor security risks. They feel, furthermore, that the functional units are overmanned and perform functions which are not properly those of the State Department. Departmental personnel, with equal frankness, condemn the typical Foreign Service officer as oversecurity conscious, narrow and unrealistic in outlook (living in the nineteenth century), biased in favor of foreign countries, viewing himself as one of an elite band of superior mortals, and inclined to do business on an "off-the-cuff" basis. The truth, of course, lies somewhere between these two extremes. But whatever the validity of either viewpoint, the fact remains that the cleavage exists and is a serious one.

¹³ The remainder were scattered with 6 in United Nations affairs, 8 in economic affairs, 1 in research and intelligence and 4 in public affairs. Of the 40 Foreign Service officers stationed outside the State Department, 30 were in training, 18 at colleges and universities, the Foreign Service Institute and the National War College. The remaining 10 were distributed in the Commerce Department, 8, and in Central Intelligence Agency, 2. In addition 11 were assigned for training to the United States but were studying languages in foreign countries.

¹⁴ The justification for the assignment of the foregoing positions to Foreign Service officers is that the man charged with responsibility for foreign policy in a given area and with maintaining contact with the United States' missions there must have more than casual or book knowledge of the area. This special knowledge can be acquired only by service in one or more countries in the particular area.

3. THE PROBLEM OF THE OFFICER, STAFF, AND RESERVE CATEGORIES

(a) *The officer and staff category.*—Prior to World War II the Foreign Service was essentially no more than the group of Foreign Service officers who make up the officer category under the 1946 act. Despite the purpose of the 1946 act to make the staff category a career within itself, it appears that to date this has not been successfully accomplished. The officer category still offers a superior career in terms of compensation, perquisites, and opportunities; and it commands the preponderance of administrative attention.

The officer and employee groups within the staff category have different grievances. The staff employees, with fiscal, clerical, custodial, or minor administrative duties, receive insufficient attention from an administrative standpoint. Recruitment and assignment procedures appear to be elementary. Appointees expecting to go overseas are often retained in the Office of the Foreign Service for long periods doing clerical work or nothing. The policies in force governing recruitment for positions involving high security risks, such as code clerks, fix salaries at levels inadequate to recruit either the necessary caliber of personnel or to retain recruits for more than short periods. Other difficulties are found in the staff's lack of free entry privileges and other perquisites at many posts. The morale of the staff employees, moreover, is unnecessarily low because of lack of assistance in making the adjustment to living conditions overseas.

All these factors lead to an inordinate rate of turn-over, heavy transportation costs, constant replacements, and general inefficiency. The Office of the Foreign Service is aware of these difficulties but takes the position (with some exceptions) that the only remedy lies in increased appropriations, which will make possible a larger administrative staff.

The sources of these difficulties could be eliminated to a considerable degree if more attention were paid to staff personnel by the Office of the Foreign Service. This would require attention to recruitment and indoctrination and an insistence upon adequate personnel programs in the missions abroad. The chiefs of mission (and their wives) in turn, given the outline of an adequate program, can do much for staff personnel at their posts. Certain ambassadors and their wives have managed to make the staff jobs more attractive and thereby afforded models for a general program of this nature.

The difficulty in the case of the staff officers, classes 11 or 10 and above, appears to be more basic. The intended distinction in the 1946 act was based on function. The officer category was to provide the generalists and the staff category the specialists and technicians such as in aviation, petroleum, and administration. Yet today the functions of the upper level staff officers remain one of the principal unsolved questions of personnel administration within the Foreign Service.

Major points of friction from the staff officer standpoint include the following:

1. The staff officer career is inferior to the officer career in terms of compensation (a \$10,000 ceiling as contrasted with a \$13,500 ceiling), in terms of retirement and other benefits (a condition which the Office of the Foreign Service is moving to correct), and in terms of perquisites by reason of restrictive practices in the grant of diplomatic status to the staff group.

2. The extent to which officers and staff officers, despite their differing backgrounds and experience, perform the same functions makes it difficult to justify differences in pay and status and tends to make the current system of classification run counter to the principle of equal pay for equal work.¹⁵

3. The preponderance of upper level positions held by the officer category. As of September 1, 1948, there were 753 regular officers in classes 3, 4, and 5 (the \$4,500-\$9,900 bracket) as against 446 staff officers of classes 1 through 8 (the corresponding salary bracket).

4. The feeling that a highly restrictive policy applies to transfers from the staff to the officer category under section 517 of the 1946 act. To date only six appointments have been made under its provisions, all in 1946.¹⁶

5. The absence of a career promotion system for staff officers comparable to that in the case of regular officers. This result, of course, was intended by the 1946 act.

6. The lack of statutory guarantee of assignment of staff officers to the United States for 3 out of the first 15 years of service as in the case of the officer category.

In large measure these complaints appear to be valid. While the distinction between "generalists" and "specialists" will inevitably exist as a matter of personnel classification, the specialist classification above the clerical and other like grades should be made a career in its own right. Inequalities in compensation and retirement should be removed, perquisites where they differ should attach to jobs and not to classification within a personnel system, and means for assuring transfer at the higher levels (classes 1 and 2 of the officer category) of "specialists" with "generalist" aptitudes should be made effective.

(b) *The Officer and the Reserve Categories.*—The problem of the reserve category is different. The reserve officer is classified exactly the same as the regular officer (except for the class of career minister) and is entitled to the same compensation. Section 524 of the 1946 act, moreover, gives him some basis upon which to claim rank and

¹⁵ The fact that the officers and staff officers tend to perform the same functions is borne out by functional analyses made by the Foreign Service and by instances such as regular officers serving as petroleum attachés in Bucharest and Cairo and staff officers as petroleum attachés in Paris, Bogota, and Lima. And in Rio de Janeiro the petroleum attaché is a reserve officer.

¹⁶ The existence up to July 1, 1948, of the so-called Manpower Act, has been the major factor in why sec. 517 has been used so seldom. (P. L. 488, 79th Cong., 2d sess.)

status. The essential distinction, and the intended one, is that the officer category fills the permanent positions and the reserve category the temporary ones.

The basic trouble with the reserve category is that it seems to rest on an unrealistic concept. The limitation to 4 years' service overseas apparently contemplated that it would attract individuals who wished to spend some time abroad and who would then return to their regular positions in Government or private industry. The fact is that for most persons, this involves a considerable risk in terms of personal security. Over 60 percent of the reserve's present membership came from the wartime auxiliary, the State Department, and the noncareer Foreign Service. Thus it recruits principally individuals who are seeking permanent work in the Foreign Service. Since presumably a considerable number are specialists, it would seem that the staff category was the more logical classification for the bulk of the present reserve.

4. THE PROBLEMS OF RECRUITMENT AND ASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS

Personnel administration within the Foreign Service, including recruitment, assignment and transfer, promotion, discipline, separation and retirement, is handled, under the Director General, in the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. This Division is also responsible for the classification of all positions in the Foreign Service and the measurement of performance. The principal problems today are with respect to recruitment and assignments and transfers.

(a) *Recruitment*.—At present the recruitment of Foreign Service officers is handled by the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service (BEX), while recruitment of staff personnel is the responsibility of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. BEX, through the examination process, is responsible for determining eligibility for entrance into Foreign Service officer class 6, the probationary group, and for "lateral entrance" into classes 1 through 5.

The type of career system envisaged for the officer category requires that most recruits enter at the bottom. This principle is reflected in the policy of BEX that the most desirable age for the admission of candidates to class 6 (the lowest grade) is between 21 and 25 years of age, with the maximum age set at 30. Both written and oral examinations are given and the process in both appears to be fair and impartial and entirely free from any taint of political pressure. The assumptions upon which the examinations are based, however, admit some room for divergence of opinion. One assumption is that every Foreign officer should be a representative young American. This involves what is essentially a subjective judgment not susceptible to objective test and at present it tends to result in the class 6 appointees,

regardless of wide geographical differences in origin and schooling, to be of a definite type.

A second assumption, wholly warranted by the intent of the 1946 act, is that the Foreign Service officer should be a "generalist." At the same time the Foreign Service as a whole needs various specialists at the high levels, and a definite tendency has been observed for Foreign Service officers to seek to specialize at some point in their careers. The staff category at present cannot be relied upon to produce the type of high-level specialists needed by the United States abroad. Likewise, high level specialists cannot be attained by recruitment of generalists at the bottom and later development of specialties by the men so chosen.

Since World War II recruitment above class 6 has been possible through two channels. One, section 517 of the 1946 act, is a continuing channel, and the other, the Manpower Act of July 3, 1946, expired July 1, 1948. To date six appointments (all in 1946) have been made under section 517, while 165 have been admitted in all under the Manpower Act. Since the latter has been regarded by the Foreign Service administration as an adequate means of lateral entrance to the officer category, section 517 has not been really implemented. Selection under the Manpower Act was a painstaking process, a consequence in part of a conviction that the positions involved were of outstanding importance and in part from a desire to allay fears of the existing Foreign Service officers that the new recruits would be admitted to the officer category without subjection to a rigorous selection process. The lateral entrance problem looms very large in the minds of the members of the officer category. Many regard the Manpower Act as an unnecessary evil thrust upon them by the Budget Bureau and other departments and agencies who receive reports from overseas missions.

(b) *Assignments and Transfers.*—The assignment and transfer of Foreign Service personnel is necessarily closely related to the three categories of officer, staff, and reserve. The main concern has been, as in recruitment, with the officer category, a consequence in part of the powers over assignment procedures for officers conferred on the Board of the Foreign Service by the 1946 act. Despite this emphasis, however, the assignment and transfer of officers appears to be a relatively haphazard process. This is even more true in the case of staff personnel where assignments are generally made on an *ad hoc* basis with vacancies being filled as they occur without reference to any pattern of planned assignment.

The vital need today is for an effective long-range assignment system which will permit the realization of satisfactory careers throughout the Foreign Service. Part of the difficulty, no doubt, can be traced to the fact that the three categories of officer, staff and reserve within which assignments and transfers must be made do not as yet,

and may never, unless modified, afford a stable framework for this purpose. Another important factor is that in staffing some 300 posts the Foreign Service is faced with recurring emergencies in which tomorrow's plans must yield to today's needs. This appears to arise in some measure from a shortage of personnel in the middle classes of the officer category. Furthermore, the fact that few missions are large enough to provide the requisite progressive experience calls for a service-wide large-scale program which alone presents many problems.

Still other reasons for the present situation include the individualistic tradition which grew up when the Foreign Service was small and compact and which promotes distrust of personnel administration, the as yet uncompleted classification of overseas positions required by the 1946 act, the existence of 91 hardship posts with an obligation to make recompense in future assignments, and the intervening powers of the Board of the Foreign Service in action on individual assignments and transfers. Finally, a certain defeatist attitude exists, based on a feeling that the solution lies only in larger funds for assignments and transfers and that such larger funds will not be forthcoming from the Congress.

5. THE PROBLEM OF MAKING BROADER UTILIZATION OF THE OVERSEAS MISSIONS

The tendency for many years has been to treat the overseas missions and their staffs as "messenger boys" of Washington. This tendency has manifested itself in at least four important respects.

1. The inability of the missions in many instances to get answers to inquiries they make of the State Department.
2. The failure in the State Department to consult with the missions as to the adoption of and methods for carrying out policies in a particular country before the policies are adopted and instructions issued.
3. The failure in the State Department to examine and give due weight to reports and recommendations received from the missions.
4. The failure in the State Department to identify and give credit to initiative and courage on the part of individual members of mission staffs. The tendency is to accent blame for mistakes rather than credit for achievement. The general result has been to create a timid frame of mind on the part of a considerable segment of the Foreign Service who are afraid to "stick their necks out."

The present Foreign Service personnel, particularly the officer category, are admittedly skillful in the numerous problems of taking care of Americans and American interests abroad. In general they understand the methods of dealing with the government officials to whom they are accredited and with the mechanisms for getting things done in foreign countries. These skills, however, are too often limited to the mere machinery of operations rather than extending

to the making of substantive contributions developed from an understanding of economic and social implications and other factors.

These weaknesses are both the cause for and the effect of the messenger-boy attitude in the State Department toward the missions overseas. They point to a failure in the Foreign Service itself. The Foreign Service has been developed too completely with the idea that the chief requisite is an all-purpose officer. Too little emphasis has been given, in terms of the basic personnel system and the administration thereof, to obtaining the varied skills required today for the effective conduct of foreign affairs, particularly in economics, agriculture, labor, and other fields.

A further factor contributing to the messenger-boy attitude in the State Department toward the overseas missions is found in the present Departmental pattern of organization. As a result of the coordinate authority system, no single channel of contact exists between the Department and the field. While the main channel is through the country desks on the geographic side, other links are in the economic, information, and intelligence units. The civil air attachés, for instance, are closer to the Aviation Division than to the country desks. Until the top command of the Department effectively delegates authority to an action level organized essentially on a regional pattern but combining economic, intelligence, information, and other skills and until this action level has decentralized to it the tools of administrative management in order to facilitate its operations in the field, this factor will continue to plague the relationships between the Department and the overseas missions.

Still another factor in the present problem is the traditional concept of conducting foreign affairs on a country to Washington basis with too little or no emphasis on regional aspects. Too often one mission staff in Latin America, for example, will have little or no idea of problems of other missions in the same region. The State Department and the Foreign Service have recognized this shortcoming and efforts are being made, especially through regional conferences, to promote understanding of common problems overseas.¹⁷ This policy should be continued, and it could be given impetus by delegation of action authority within the State Department to high level heads of regional offices, accompanied by decentralization to them of the tools of administration.

6. THE PROBLEM OF DIVIDED COMMAND IN OVERSEAS AREAS BETWEEN THE CHIEFS OF MISSIONS AND THE HEADS OF OTHER AMERICAN PROGRAMS

The United States today has overseas well over 20,000 civilian

¹⁷ Regional conferences have taken place within the past 12 months as follows: (1) Ottawa, Canada, consular problems in Canada; (2) Bangkok, Siam, political problems in Far East; (3) Capetown, South Africa, consular problems; (4) Mexico City, Mexico, consular problems; (5) Paris, France, political problems in France and North Africa; (6) Paris, France, security problems, Europe and Near East; (7) Rome, Italy, peace treaty and economic reporting problems.

employees, American and alien. These are exclusive of Army and Navy civilian personnel. Of these, approximately half are in the Foreign Service and the balance are employees of other departments and agencies. The largest groups of the non-Foreign Service personnel are those connected with the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Philippine Rehabilitation Program. The functions of some of these employees are very closely related to the conduct of foreign affairs, as, for example, those engaged in foreign assistance programs under ECA and elsewhere. The functions of others, of course, are but remotely related to foreign affairs, as, for example, the field employees of the Civil Aeronautics Administration engaged in aviation safety inspection work abroad.

In 1939 the principle that all United States employees abroad should be responsible to the ambassador or minister in a particular country was recognized by the consolidation of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments' overseas services with the Foreign Service. Since World War II, however, this principle has been violated in numerous instances, the most prominent of which are the original Greek Aid Mission and the present ECA missions. In the case of the former, the friction between the head of the Greek Aid Mission and the ambassador was the subject of widespread criticism. In the case of ECA it is evident that duplication and overlapping in the work abroad of the ECA and the regular missions are inevitable despite the cooperation of the missions in making facilities and administrative services available to ECA and despite the strong efforts being made by the ambassadors and the ECA representatives to tie their work together as closely as possible. In the case of ECA, it seems clear that a good case can be made for special staff rather than for use of the regular Foreign Service personnel. This special staff, however, need not report to one head and the Foreign Service to another.

The presence of separate missions abroad, each with its own head, is confusing to the foreign governments and weakens the effectiveness of United States representation. Coupled with the present tendency to send other official and unofficial emissaries abroad, it is distinctly detrimental to the conduct of foreign affairs by the United States.

The establishment of a single American spokesman for all United States activities in a particular country can be accomplished without the assumption by the State Department of responsibility for the various operational tasks involved. These special operational tasks, whether they be economic rehabilitation (European Recovery Program, Philippine Rehabilitation Program), economic, social, and educational (Institute of Inter-American Affairs), or otherwise, can be separately administered in Washington, but it is both impractical and dangerous for them to have spokesmen and operators abroad who are not responsible to the American ambassador or minister for supervision

and coordination. If the operational task should ever transcend the regular diplomatic job in importance, it may be desirable to make the head of the special mission the ambassador for the duration of the particular program.

7. THE PROBLEM OF MEETING THE OVERSEAS REQUIREMENTS OF THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The present-day large-scale participation of other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign affairs has made them extensive end-users of the reporting from the overseas missions. This is particularly true with respect to the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Interior, and agencies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Communications Commission. Their requirements for the most part involve relatively specialized economic or technical information. This involves fact-gathering by experienced observers equipped to know what kind of and how to get data needed by the end-users.

The State Department also depends on the overseas missions for reporting of political, economic, and other information. The ultimate use of the reporting data by the State Department and the end-users, however, is different. This difference does not mean that the requirements of both the State Department and the end-users cannot be satisfied in considerable measure by the same type of individual. The specialist or technician who is necessarily best equipped to fulfill the needs of the end-users can also satisfy many of the requirements of the State Department and can also be a valuable aide to the chiefs of missions. It is clear, for example, that the most valuable commercial work is done by commercial attachés recruited prior to 1939 when commercial reporting was an independent service of the Commerce Department.

In the main, therefore, and to avoid the creation of expensive duplicating overseas staffs, requirements of both the State Department and the other departments and agencies should be satisfied in large measure through a single service. In limited cases, however, and not including by any means all those now classified as specialized attachés, the needs of the other departments and agencies involve such highly specialized technical reporting or the quantity of reporting is so great as to justify the assignment to such reporting of full-time personnel.

Constant friction, arising from a number of factors, exists between the other departments and agencies and the State Department. First, departments such as Commerce and Agriculture are skeptical, with justification, that the present recruitment system for Foreign Service Officers will be successful in producing specialists to fulfill their needs. At the same time they seem reluctant to utilize the

Staff category, apparently because of a belief that it is an inferior service. Second, departments such as Labor and Interior feel a need for additional services overseas and complain of the long process through which they must go in order to bring about the creation of additional posts. Finally, as pointed out earlier, even if specialist posts are created, the assignment of personnel to those posts presently involves a continual process of bargains and deals through the Board of the Foreign Service. Contrasted with this highly unsatisfactory picture is the Treasury Department, with its independent small group of overseas attachés.¹⁸ Not only is the Treasury satisfied with the present arrangements but the chiefs of missions testify that they have been very successful in using the Treasury attachés as members of their mission staffs.

One of the roots of the difficulty lies in the fact that appropriations for the reporting requirements of the other departments and agencies are part of the Foreign Service appropriation, thus giving the Foreign Service the final word on creation of posts and assignments to them. In view of the related requirements of the State Department and the end-users, the bulk of the reporting must be done through a single service but one with a personnel system which will attract the types of specialists needed to fulfill requirements of both. On the other hand, where highly specialized reporting is involved, or the quantity of reporting for a particular end-user is sufficiently great, the friction can only be eliminated by having each of the other departments and agencies obtain its own appropriation for these full-time posts. They can then make a grant-in-aid of funds therefrom to the State Department, designate the men to fill the posts (who will then be temporarily enrolled in the Foreign Service), and assign them overseas through the State Department. The State Department would, of course, have the right to pass on individuals so designated from the standpoint of their personal suitability, either for service overseas generally or for the particular mission to which the other department or agency wishes to make the assignment. In general, the present Treasury system, except for the fact that it operates on nonappropriated funds, affords a pattern to be followed, and indicates that the power of the purse does not necessarily prevent the representative of another department from becoming an effective member of the State Department overseas team.

8. THE PROBLEM OF "RE-AMERICANIZATION"

The 1946 act stated as one of its objectives the insuring that the Foreign Service was "broadly representative of the American people"

¹⁸ At the present time there are 12 Treasury attachés abroad.

and "fully informed in respect to current trends in American life."¹⁹ These objectives can be achieved only by the members of the Foreign Service spending more time in the United States. The progress along this path to date has been very limited.

The 185 Foreign Service officers and 155 Staff members in the United States as of November 1, 1948, constituted only 6½ percent of the total in the two groups. They were assigned as follows:

Assignment	Officer category	Staff category
State Department-----	145	¹ 144
Other Departments and Agencies-----	10	6
Training (in Foreign Service Institute, National War College and educational institutions-----	30	5
	185	155

¹ Of these 144, 80 were temporarily assigned to the United States for on-the-job training, while awaiting assignment or otherwise.

Of the 145 Foreign Service officers assigned to the State Department, 64 are in the political-geographic desks where the emphasis is not on the United States, but on particular foreign countries, often the ones where the various officers most recently served.

Currently the State Department is trying to develop a positive program to facilitate assignment of Foreign Service personnel to other Departments and agencies, to domestic governmental field offices and to business and educational institutions for training. This program, while a step in the right direction, does not go far enough and, indeed, can never be more than a palliative.

Foreign Service personnel, to keep in touch with Americans, must serve in the United States for longer periods than actually is the case today. The present system of separate overseas and home personnel services will always make it well-nigh impossible to station more than a handful of Foreign Service personnel in this country. It is doubtful whether the Congress will ever make adequate appropriations available for even a relatively large-scale assignment of Foreign Service personnel in the United States outside Washington. The main avenue then lies in making it possible for present Foreign Service personnel to serve for longer periods, especially early in their careers, in the State Department. This would aid in the achievement of another goal,

¹⁹ To promote this objective, sec. 572 requires that "every Foreign Service officer" (Staff are not included) shall serve in the United States for at least 3 out of the first 15 years of his service. Other sections provide for assignment of both Officer and Staff personnel to other governmental departments and agencies, to trade, labor, agricultural, scientific and other conferences, to international organizations, and, for training purposes, to educational institutions, to trade, labor, and other associations and furthermore, the 1946 act liberalized the home-leave provisions by providing that the Secretary of State shall order all American Foreign Service personnel to take a statutory leave of absence in the continental United States upon completion of 2 years' service or as soon as possible thereafter.

that of giving departmental personnel opportunities to serve overseas. Both these can be carried out most effectively with a single unified service.

C. The Future Course

The present internal organization of the Foreign Service and its present relationship to the State Department are both unsatisfactory. Forward steps were embodied in the 1946 act and further progress can be made by careful administration. The main sources of difficulty, however, are more fundamental.

The bulk of the trouble is connected in one way or another with the existence of separate home and overseas services. The desirability of interchangeability between the Department and the overseas posts was pointed out as early as 1908. The idea of merging the two into a single service is also far from new and it appears to have been discussed at the time of the passage of the Rogers Act in 1924. It was reviewed at various times thereafter, and in 1945 during the early stages of preparation for what eventually became the 1946 act, the subject was given special consideration. At that time the Foreign Service drew up a paper outlining a possible long-term amalgamation plan. The tendency of other governments to have single foreign office services was accented at about this same time by consolidation of the two British services, which was authorized in 1943 and which began to take place in 1945.

The creation of a single service is not a task to be undertaken lightly. It would have the disadvantage of disrupting both the State Department and the Foreign Service at a critical time, although it is not clear when, if ever, United States international relations will become normal. It would run the further risk of doing no more than magnify the very difficulties which are presently sought to be obviated.

On the other hand, a single service, with its members obligated to serve either at home or abroad, offers the greatest promise of giving the United States an able and aggressive foreign affairs service equipped to meet the many new problems which face this country today. Through such a service the chain of command from the Secretary of State on down can be clearly defined, the cancerous cleavage between Foreign Service and Departmental personnel can gradually be eliminated, more logical and hence more effective recruitment, assignment, and other personnel policies can be placed in operation, and the problem of an Americanized foreign affairs service will be ameliorated insofar as it is practicable to do so. Linked with other changes in the organization of the State Department, the creation of a single service will help materially in establishing a responsible basis for delegation of authority within the State Department and in utilizing to a much greater extent the resources of the missions overseas. Given these and other advantages and after weighing all the evidence the risk is a calculated one which should be taken without further question.

Chapter VIII

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A. The Nature of the Problem

No problem confronting the United States in its foreign relations today is more crucial than the relationship between the Congress and the Executive Branch. Its sheer power superiority places upon the United States a major burden of world leadership with accompanying demands for positive and consistent United States foreign policies. The United States has not always been able, however, to act either positively or consistently.

Too often the reason has been bad relations between the Executive and legislative branches of the Government. To the extent that this situation is inherent in the United States form of Government by reason of the constitutional separation of powers, the merits and demerits of a solution, which would involve a fundamental change in the governmental structure, have been deemed to be beyond the scope of this task force. Nonetheless, even under the present form of government much can be done to improve the present unsatisfactory relationship between the Executive and legislative branches.

Before proceeding with a discussion of Executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs matters, it would be well to enunciate the three basic requirements of a modern United States foreign policy since all these requirements necessitate close liaison between the Congress and the President.

1. AGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON BROAD OBJECTIVES

In the crisis society of today, action, both positive and sustained, is required of the United States. Such action is scarcely possible without agreement within the Government on the basic objectives of foreign policy. Nor is this agreement likely without real cooperation between the legislative and Executive branches. As seen earlier, the President alone cannot control our foreign relations because both the Constitution and historical usage have given Congress certain powers which materially limit the President's freedom. Today both the Senate and the House are being consulted regularly because of their constant involvement in such matters as foreign aid appropriations, the reciprocal trade program, participation in the United Nations, ad-

mission of displaced persons, and the like. Nor can Congress alone control United States foreign policy since the President, with his power to recognize other nations, to negotiate executive agreements, and to dispatch executive agents—all without reference to Congress—has sufficient authority to be quite independent of the legislative branch in many respects.

2. PROMOTION OF BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLICIES

Today's United States foreign policies requires the broadest public understanding and support possible since our Government must constantly call on John Doe for votes, dollars, and manpower. Thus any study of Executive-legislative relations with regard to foreign policy must at the same time be aware of the impact of public opinion on these relations. Since our constitutional system unlike cabinet government, makes both the President and Congress more responsible to the public than to each other, it is obvious that any effort to improve relations between these two branches must provide for the careful coordination of their relations with the public and their relations with each other.

3. COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Finally there should be full and positive cooperation with the United Nations and other means of multilateral dealings. This cooperation in turn requires the fullest collaboration between the executive and legislative branches of our government. As the United States has actively participated in the work of international organizations, the President has had to depend more and more on Congress to implement that participation with funds and legislation. This experience has already demonstrated that only with the best working relationship between Congress and the President can we make the most of our activities in the United Nations—the best hope we have for world peace.

A sound interpretation of the Constitution and of American history and usage demonstrate that neither the President nor the Congress is at all times the predominant force in the conduct of foreign affairs. Instead, their respective roles can best be described as requiring joint legislative-executive cooperation. This theory of joint cooperation between the two branches in matters relating to the conduct of foreign affairs is sustainable not merely by reference to the Constitution and the President but also is in accord with the practical demands of the United States' new position in world affairs.

The choice of methods for the conduct of foreign relations today depends largely on the extent to which the will of the majority of the American people is effectuated. Action by executive-legislative co-

operation determines our domestic policy and may also be the most satisfactory method for conducting the foreign relations of the United States. Although the Constitution generally provides for the application of the principle of the separation of powers, it has given joint responsibility to the executive and legislative branches in a number of matters indicating that the "Fathers" intended them to collaborate. The President makes treaties only with the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, and "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" he appoints "ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls." The House controls appropriations for both domestic and international expenditures, and Congress as a whole has the power "to declare war," "to regulate commerce with foreign nations" and to tax "for the common defense." Concurrent responsibility requires Constitutional understanding between the branches, "supplementing the law of the Constitution and indicating how the organs entrusted with the control of foreign relations ought to exercise their discretionary powers to avoid friction."¹

While the Senate was originally intended to act as an executive council to the President and as a check by the several States upon his usurping their powers, the effect of the two-thirds rule, since the rise of political parties and partisanship, has been to paralyze the exercise of governmental powers in a fashion never intended by the framers.² Since it is seldom that two-thirds of the members of the Senate belong to the same party as the President, one-third plus one of the members of the Senate have the power of holding up a treaty.³ In addition to these implications, the use of executive agreements is limited by the fact that a cooperative foreign policy frequently requires legislation involving both the House and the Senate.

Seen in the light of present circumstances, both the treaty-making procedure of the Constitution and the executive agreements procedure of the Constitution, when not supported by Congressional action, contribute to the difficulty. Considering the number of treaties it has approved the Senate seems to have performed its treaty role adequately, but figures do not demonstrate the "prenatal effects" of the two-thirds rule which result in the smothering of treaties, nor do they show what policies Presidents and Secretaries of State have refrained from pursuing from fear of senatorial action.⁴ Nor do figures illustrate the important consequences that have followed the rejection of important treaties such as the Versailles Treaty of 1919.

¹ Quincy Wright, "The Control of American Foreign Relations" (New York 1922), X.

² This is the conclusion of many writers including W. S. Holt "Treaties Defeated by the Senate," Baltimore, 1933, 11-12.

³ It has been computed that approximately one-twelfth of the population of the United States can prevent the remainder from adopting a treaty since senators representing 3,584,000 people can block the will of 131,000,000 people. Kenneth W. Colegrove, "The American Senate and World Peace," New York, 1944, 53.

⁴ Blair Bolles, "Who Makes Our Foreign Policy," 50. From 1789 through 1934 of 961 treaties submitted to the Senate, 682 have been accepted as submitted, 173 accepted with amendments, 15 rejected, while 91 received no action.

The role of the Senate has made both the United States and foreign governments hesitate to negotiate agreements, a condition which was thought to suit the national interests in 1787 and for the century or so following. Today, however, such hesitancy may block the development and implementation of a foreign policy of world cooperation to which the United States is heavily committed.

Partly as a result of the difficulties of the treaty procedure, wide use has been made of executive agreements as an alternative procedure for participating in international affairs. By 1944 more than 1,200 agreements had been entered into by the United States involving both major and minor issues.⁵ Since 1939 there has been a sharp increase in the number of international compacts entered into by the United States "and the ratio is now at least ten to one against the use of the treaty procedure."⁶ No clear distinction can be made as to the use of executive agreements and treaties; the former have included such matters as "most-favored-nation" agreements, and limitation of armament on the Great Lakes, the Boxer Rebellion Settlements, the "Open-Door" Policy and the Over-Age Destroyer Agreement of 1940. However beneficial such agreements may have been, this procedure, like the two-thirds rule, is not in harmony with democratic processes when it does not involve congressional participation. A President elected for a fixed term of 4 years may attempt to speak for the United States only to find that his policies do not have public support. While some executive agreements require implementation by legislation, some do not; yet they may set in motion a chain of events requiring action by the Congress at a later date.

Legislative-executive cooperation involves increased use of the executive agreement combined with the joint resolution of Congress, although treaties may still be advisable in certain instances. Such a procedure would not diminish the authority nor the responsibility vested in the Chief Executive by the Framers who, in the words of Secretary of State Hughes, felt that "the vital interests of the Nation were believed to demand this concentration of power." It would mean that the President, in negotiating international agreements should consider congressional policies and work in close cooperation with Congress. It might mean the formation of some joint legislative-executive body to discuss foreign affairs.⁷ While continuing the legal responsibility of the constitutional system instead of the political responsibility of the parliamentary system, it would do much to establish a maximum of mobility for the Executive with a maximum of final responsibility to the electorate.⁸

⁵ Wallace McClure, *International Executive Agreements* (New York 1941), xii, 55-193, 332-345.

⁶ John S. Dickey, "Our Treaty Procedure Versus Our Foreign Relations," 22 *Foreign Affairs* 359 (April 1947).

⁷ Suggested by many persons including Secretary of State Hughes in 1922 and Representative Estes Kefauver in 1944.

⁸ McClure points out that the treaty procedure "offers a minimum of both these qualities." *op. cit.*, 381.

There are many examples of the use of the executive agreement in combination with the joint resolution as opposed to agreements that do not require congressional participation. Texas was so admitted into the Union, and the annexation of Hawaii was similarly effected. The procedure has been used in the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements from the passage of the McKinley Tariff Law of 1892 to the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which has been renewed at three-year intervals until 1948. The method has been utilized to effect American participation in international organizations such as the I. L. O.⁹ and to approve the UNRRA agreement with the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China in 1943.

The constitutional system with its doctrine of separation of powers interposes certain obstacles in the conduct of foreign relations. The desirability of the removal of these obstacles by a change in the basic structure of the government, or even mitigation of the difficulties by elimination of the two-thirds rule in regard to treaties, as noted earlier, are deemed to be subjects beyond the present terms of reference. At the same time no amendment to the Constitution is necessary to bring about a considerable measure of increased executive-legislative cooperation in the conduct of foreign relations.¹⁰

B. Relations Between the Department of State and Congress

As the State Department has been forced to go to the "grass roots" to arouse the public to take a more active and intelligent interest in United States foreign policy, it has become increasingly aware that this effort must be carefully coordinated with its legislative relations program. Since the Department's public relations have been aimed primarily at exerting favorable public pressure on Congress, it is only natural that Congress has taken an active interest in these efforts. Since Secretary of State Daniel Webster employed "special propaganda agents" to promote his treaty of 1842 with England, and since Secretary Seward expended funds to create support for the acquisition of Alaska or "Seward's Ice Box," Secretaries of State generally have been concerned with this problem. Perhaps no greater efforts have been made to coordinate the handling of the reins of congressional and public relations than during the incumbency of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Having served in the Senate himself, he was particularly careful, especially in connection with the reciprocal trade program

⁹ E. S. Corwin holds that the fundamental law of the Constitution is no bar to participation in international organization.

¹⁰ This is the view of Quincy Wright, *op. cit.*, 369. Public men, including senators, and authors have advocated Constitutional amendment; however, (Colegrove, *op. cit.*, 166-191) experience with the treaty procedure suggests that the notion of a separation of authority invites each branch to exalt its own role. Experience also suggests that ways can be devised to offset this tendency.

and the United Nations, to keep Congress informed fully and usually well in advance of the general public.¹¹

The close working relationship that existed for some time between Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was responsible for the Department's relations with Congress, and Assistant Secretary Archibald MacLeish, responsible for public relations, resulted in a very effective linking together of these two important activities. When this kind of coordination was lacking at an earlier time, however, as in the case of Franklin Roosevelt's 1938 Chicago "Quarantine Speech," the Administration won little support from Congress. Nor did the legislators like the fact that much of the history of our relations with Japan in the 1931-41 decade was revealed for the first time in State Department public releases and in a Nation-wide broadcast. This brief review of the problem seems to point to two primary conclusions:

1. As the Department of State has acted to evoke more intelligent and active support from the public, it has become increasingly aware of the need to consult Congress concerning both the substance of what is to be told the public and how it is to be told, since Congressmen are also vitally concerned with opinion back home.

2. At the same time it would seem reasonable for the Department to think of Congress as a vital information channel both to and from the people.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DIRECT RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

A review of recent United States foreign relations reveals the many factors that have served to increase the extent and complexity of the Department's direct relations with Congress—the increased need for implementing foreign policy with legislation and money, as in the case of ERP; the swelling flood of foreign policy problems; and the growing need to build a broader foundation for our foreign policy by developing closer relations with Congress as well as the general public. Even with the decrease in the use of formal treaties, the Chief Executive still feels that it is wise to consult with Congress—specifically the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—before deciding whether to use a treaty or executive agreement, as in the case of UNRRA. As the State Department has had to bear a major part of the burden of these increasing relations with Congress, it has had to devote more and more attention to all phases of the problem—the decision as to who within the Department is to deal with Congress, the kinds of issues to be discussed, the degree of secrecy that must be maintained in those discussions, the actual organization of Departmental relations with Congress, and the problem of timing those relations.

¹¹ Some criticism was made, however, that this policy was carried out mainly with respect to the Senate and that the House was not kept sufficiently informed.

(a) *Who Is to Represent the State Department Before Congress*

The increasing attention paid by the State Department to the question of who is to represent it before Congress emphasizes the fact that this is one of the most vital jobs in the Department. Since 1790, when the Department consisted of a total of eight persons and Mr. Jefferson could handle all necessary relations with Congress himself, Secretaries of State have increasingly had to lean on various assistants to help them in their dealings with Congress. First the Secretaries used various aides on an ad hoc basis calling on officers whose specialized knowledge qualified them to talk to Congress on particular problems as they arose. More recently, because of the growing volume of foreign policy problems that call for congressional attention, the task of maintaining liaison with Congress has assumed the proportions of a full-time job.

In earlier days one of the most effective aides of the Secretary of State was A. A. Adeë—Secretary Hay called him “semper paratus Adeë”—who, as an Assistant Secretary of State from 1882 until 1924, was often useful in dealing with Congress, usually not in a direct way but rather working behind the scenes to temper the words and action of the Secretaries.¹² Elihu Root called on Wilbur J. Carr, then head of the Consular Service, to assist him in getting Congress to pass legislation reorganizing the consular service and the Department as a whole. Woodrow Wilson was one of the first to use the counselor, a post created in 1909, as special adviser on congressional relations among other problems. To that position he first appointed John Bassett Moore who had already had experience in influencing congressional opinion when he served as secretary and counsel to the United States Commission to the Peace Conference with Spain in Paris in 1898. More recently Secretary Cordell Hull depended on Judge R. Walton Moore, a former Congressman, who is said to have been useful not so much for his participation in the formulation of policy as relations he established with Congressmen.

The development which led to the making of congressional liaison a full-time job, however, began when Secretary Hull appointed Breckinridge Long, in October 1940, as Assistant Secretary to devote most of his time to maintaining close relations with Congress. The position was officially designated “Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations” in January 1944. Long was soon thereafter succeeded by Dean Acheson whose participation at the highest levels of policy formulation enabled him not only to speak authoritatively to Congress but also to see that the congressional point of view was brought to bear on the making of policy. His use of able assistants to follow important issues from beginning to end and to do everything necessary to present a strong case to Congress, and his insistence that

¹² Bertram D. Hulen, “Inside the Department of State” (New York 1939), 25-27.

all important contacts between the Department and Congress be cleared through his office were significant in contributing to the effectiveness of his work.

When, in July 1945, Acheson rose to the rank of Under Secretary, he continued to manage congressional liaison and the Assistant Secretary post remained unfilled. Then after Acheson's resignation early in 1947, the assignment was made to a Foreign Service officer who has also had to discharge other responsibilities of a critical nature at the highest level in the State Department. During the last year and a half, Congressmen and others have become increasingly critical of the Department's relations with Congress and have cited as a reason for their criticism the lack of liaison personnel with the adequate time and the requisite background to win congressional confidence—not necessarily the "crony approach" but rather an approach that is convincing by its command of the facts, by its intimate connection with the making of policy, and by its air of dignified authority tempered with political acumen. The critics have also questioned the wisdom of giving the job to a permanent career officer whose experience may have sheltered him too much from the winds of politics. Looking back over all this experience point to certain conclusions concerning how to organize the Department's relations with Congress.

1. Since all legislation and many international agreements implementing our foreign policy must eventually pass through the eye of the congressional needle, it would seem that the function of maintaining liaison with Congress should receive the full attention of one high officer, at least at the level of Assistant Secretary of State, with the assistance of a competent staff.

2. Since liaison with Congress is primarily a political job that plays an important part in the President's whole political program, it seems important that the officer charged with congressional liaison should feel close responsibility to the Secretary of State and the President.

3. This officer cannot replace but can greatly aid the Secretary and Under Secretary in their relations with Congress.

4. Neither the personality nor the philosophy of such a man can be legislated nor expressed in any neat formula. These two imponderables can and should, however, be the subjects of a great deal of careful thought. He must be selected so that he may serve effectively as an interpreter both of the Department to Congress and of Congress to the Department. If for any reason it should seem advisable to select a permanent career officer for this post, attention should be paid to the problem of finding a man with political acumen who has the time and an active desire for the type of work involved.

5. The work of this officer will bear greatest fruit if he participates in policy formulation to an extent that will enable him to speak convincingly and authoritatively to Congress without becoming so engrossed in policy that he neglects his primary task. At the same

time policy making within the Department should benefit by virtue of the knowledge that same officer will bring to it of the attitude of Congress.

(b) Relations of Other State Department Officials With Congress

In a larger sense, many other members of the Department, besides the special liaison officer, must also consider themselves partially responsible for helping to maintain close relations with Congress. Among those who have been especially influential in this respect are the present legal adviser who played such an important part in working out the details of the ERP legislation with the Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Under Secretaries, such as William Clayton who played such an important role in dealing with Congress on economic matters like the reciprocal trade program; Assistant Secretaries such as the present Assistant Secretary for Administration who has been especially active before the Appropriations Committees on annual budgets and other administrative matters (operating quite independently of the Counselor's Office) and finally faithful workers below the Assistant Secretary level who are "close to the job" and therefore are constantly being called upon to tell Congress about it. As one considers the part these people have played in the Department's relations with Congress several conclusions seem apparent.

1. While the liaison officer has served as guide and interpreter, he has also had to depend on the "operators" within the Department to present technical testimony to Congress. He cannot, nor should he, expect to know so much about any one issue that he can plead the case alone before Congress without calling on the officers who are daily working on the problems.

2. On the other hand, these policy officers benefit by meeting Congress face to face, by learning to consider the legislative point of view in every phase of policy making. Direct contact may help to change attitudes of fear and scorn to appreciation and respect for a body of able men who are also working for the American people who sooner or later must pass judgment on most of the policy programs.

3. In the interest of consistency and efficiency, the Department has also been forced more and more to coordinate the many contacts that are made by Department officials with the "Hill" by passing these lines of communication through a central office, at present that of the counselor. Efforts must continue to be made to provide Congress with the greatest possible service consistent with Departmental interests.

(c) When and What to Tell Congress

The twin questions of what to tell Congress and when to tell it have been increasingly answered by the State Department, as much and as soon as possible. Congress resents being told too little and

too late as seems to have been the case with the aid program for Greece and Turkey; it wants time to think, to hold hearings, and to get reactions from home. The objection often heard on the executive side that there is always danger of an advance legislative veto which will thwart executive leadership may be countered by the consideration that it is often better to learn of legislative objections early rather than late in order to attempt to meet or alter them. Dean Acheson took special pains to keep Congress informed from the birth of such important projects as the Warm Springs and Bretton Woods conferences. A comparison of the League experience with the United Nations also seems to indicate that, in case of doubt, it is far better, national security permitting, to give too much information too soon rather than too little and too late. It is concluded from this brief review of the problem that officers charged with maintaining liaison with Congress have operated most effectively when they have kept Congress informed fully and well in advance on important developments. In these days of crises rather than policies, a maximum of general background briefing seems necessary.

